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Home My WebLink About96-00013 I \ ....E - . ,. ~ J --? ~ ~ " ,.' v ' . )- \ ! I I I . I . / . , ! ' i. > ~ 1 , ' ~ ~ Ji I i rYJl - I I 8-1 .01 z. , J (:: i ~ ~ GJ .S :. Ih:~ f-< ill ~ M 0 J .f 'M ..c: M -> 0 - M 'M k 'M C U :.: ..... 0 III ...t . ill ..... l"l Ul U u i .llf~ M 0<( I C C \0 GJ 0 M *CIIO ... '" GJ III ...t M M > ... r- . 'M 'M ...t iMIlo - I>l ~ U ~ -- ,- EILEEN S. KROH, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. No. 96-13 Civil Term WILSON CASTILLO, Defendant civil Action - Law ENTRY OF APPEARANCE TO THE PROTHONOTARY: Please enter our appearance on behalf of wilson Castillo, Defendant in the above-captioned matter. accept service on behalf of said Defendant. We are authorized to DUANE, MORRIS & HECKSCHER /Zltt,,-C LL l~ Matthew Chabal, III 1.0. No. 49926 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 1003 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1003 (717) 237-5500 Dated: February 7, 1996 I I I I I I \ I I I , ~ 0 ',- e l:;; -a, . . ,-- c., ::'"1< ~() q~ ~~ .- u~.. ~, <i: I";:~ en .'.l.') ~JS" I :) ;:.~; J. -. U.lll c.:. :;1'jJ .._t. 1.>.. ;' :J(\... ,. L>.. ..~ Il- U) 5 C.l C.il (J .. '. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Wanda L. Heinbach, a paralegal with the law firm of Duane, Morris & Heckscher, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Praecipe for Rule to File a Complaint was served upon the following person at the address below by depositing the same in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, at Harrisburg, on February ,?, 1996. W. Scott Henning, Esq. Handler & Wiener P.O. Box 1177 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1177 Ii/jILt, J~ t:. ~L Wand'a L. 'Heinbach 305 NORTH FRONT STREET. P.O. BOX 1003 HARRISBURG, PA 17108-1003 ~ EILEEN S. KROH, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OP COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. No. 96-13 Civil Term WILSON CASTILLO, Defendant Civil Action - Law RULE TO FILE A COMPLAINT TO THE PLAINTIFF: You are ruled by Defendant Wilson Castillo to file a Complaint in the above captioned matter within twenty (20) days after service hereof or suffer an entry of judgment of non pros in favor of moving Defendant. ,--1. r -1m Date TRUE COPY FROM RECORD In Tesllmonv whereot, I here unto set IlV hand and the seal_ of sal It I arllsle P!r Th da I~ ~- (f) In failing to operate his vehicle at a speed, and under such control, as to be able to stop within the assured clear distance ahead, in violation of 75 Pa.S.C.A. !i3361; and, (g) In failing to exercise reasonable care in the operation and control of his vehicle, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. !i3714. 11. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant, Wilson Castillo, Plaintiff sustained severe injuries, including, but not limited to, a neck sprain, headaches, and severe pain in the right arm, shoulder, and scapula, and a cervical disc protrusion. 12. As a result of the negligence of Defendant, Wilson Castillo, Plaintiff has been and probably will in the future be hindered from performing the duties required by her usual occupation and from attending to her daily duties, to her great detriment, loss, humiliation and embarrassment. 13. As a result of the negligence of the Defendant, Wilson Castillo, Plaintiff has undergone great physical pain, discomfort, and mental anguish to her great physical, emotional, and financial detriment and loss. 4 to be factual in nature, they are denied. Defendant specifically denies negligence. By way of further answer, Defendant: (a) did keep a proper lookout for the traffic conditions then and there existing; (b) was reasonably vigilant to observe Plaintiff's vehicle; (c) operated his vehicle under proper and adequate control; (d) operated his vehicle in a proper manner; (e) followed Plaintiff's vehicle at a distance that was reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway, in compliance with 75 Pa. C.S.A. !i 3310; (f) operated his vehicle at a speed, and under such control, as to be able to stop within the assured clear distance ahead, in compliance with 75 Pa. C.S.A. !i 3361; and (g) exercised reasonable care in the operation and control of his vehicle, in compliance with 75 Pa. C.S.A. !i 3714. 11. The allegations in Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent those allegations are deemed to be factual in nature, they are denied. Defendant specifically denies negligence and that Plaintiff sustained severe injuries. 12. The allegations in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent those allegations are deemed to be factual in nature, 3 they are denied. Defendant specifically denies negligence and that Plaintiff was injured. 13. The allegations in Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent those allegations are deemed to be factual in nature, they are denied. Defendant specifically denies negligence and that Plaintiff was injured. 14. The allegations in Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff's Complaint constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent those allegations are deemed to be factual in nature, they are denied. Defendant specifically denies negligence and that Plaintiff was injured. 15. The allegations in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent those allegations are deemed to be factual in nature, they are denied. Defendant specifically denies negligence and that Plaintiff was injured. 16. The allegations in Paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Complaint constitute conclusions of law to which no response is required. To the extent those allegations are deemed to be factual in nature, they are denied. Defendant specifically denies negligence and that Plaintiff was injured. 4 23. Plaintiff's injuries were the result of Plaintiff's own actions or other activities or occurrences over which Defendant had no control or responsibility. 24. The collision between the vehicle operated by Plaintiff and the vehicle operated by Defendant was the direct result of the negligence of Plaintiff in that: (a) she failed to keep a proper lookout for the traffir: conditions then and there existing; (b) she failed to follow the traffic ahead of her at a distance that is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway; (c) she failed to drive her vehicle with due regard for the highway and traffic conditions which were existing and which she was or should have been aware; (d) she failed to keep alert and maintain a proper watch for the presence of other vehicles and hazards; (e) she failed to have the vehicle she was operating under proper and adequate control; (f) she failed to operate her vehicle at a safe and appropriate speed under the conditions and having disregard for the actual and potential hazards then existing; (g) she operated a vehicle with careless disregard for the safety of persons and property. 6 25. In the alternative, if she was not solely liable and responsible for the collision, Plaintiff was contributory negligent in that: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) she failed to keep a proper lookout for the traffic conditions then and there existing; she failed to follow the traffic ahead of her at a distance that is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and teh traffic upon and the condition of the highway; she failed to drive her vehicle with due regard for the highway and traffic conditions which were existing and which she was or should have been aware; she failed to keep alert and maintain a proper watch for the presence of other vehicles and hazards; she failed to have the vehicle she was operating under proper and adequate control; she failed to operate her vehicle at a safe a~d appropriate speed under the conditions and having disregard for the actual and potential hazards then (f) existing; (g) she operated a vehicle with careless disregard for the safety of persons and property. 26. Defendant gives notice that he intends to rely upon such other and further defenses as may beome available or apparent 7 during discovery in this action and hereby reserves the right to assert any such defense or defenses. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and to enter judgment in Defendant's favor and against Plaintiff, and to award Defendant costs and all such other and further relief to which Defendant is entitled. DUANE, MORRIS & HECKSCHER rl.,-UL-H" U~ Matthew Chabal, III I.D. No. 49926 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 1003 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1003 (717) 237-5514 Attorneys for Defendant Dated: 3/2-'/'IG 8 VERIFICATION I, Wilson Castillo, do hereby certify that I am the Defendant in the above-captioned matter. I have read the foregoing Answer And New Matter which has been drafted by my counsel. The factual statements contained therein are true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge and belief although the language is that of my counsel and, to the extent that the content of the foregoing document is that of counsel, I have relied upon counsel in making this Verification. This statement is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S.A. !i 4904, relating to unsworn falsification to authorities. d ) /;. ,-r' /J/ tv / J...,nf ./ C "~A..--C D Wilson Castillo claim is barred by the doctrine ot laches and proof to the contrary is demanded at the trial in this matter. 21. Denied. The allegation set forth in Paragraph 21 is a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required, however, to the extent that The Honorable Court deems a response necessary, the Plaintitf specifically denies that the claim is barred by the doctrines of estoppel and waiver and proof to the contrary is demanded at the trial ill this matter. 22. Denied. The allegation set forth in Paragraph 22 is a conclusion of law to which no responsive pleading is required, however, to the extent that The Honorable Court deems a response necessary. the Plaintiff simply denies that she was contributorily/comparatively negligent or assumed the risk and proof to the contrary is demanded at the trial in this matter, 23. Denied. It is denied that the Plaintiff's injuries are the result of her own actions or ot~er activities or occurrences over which the Defendant had no control or responsibility and proof to the contrary is demanded at the trial in this matter. 24. Denied, It is denied that the Plaintiff was negligent In any of the respects alleged by the Defendant in Paragraph 24(a) through Paragraph 24(g), and proof to the contrary is demanded at the trial in this matter. 25. Denied. It is denied that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent in any of the respects set forth in Paragraph 25(a) through Paragraph 25(g), and proof to the contrary is demanded at the trial in this matter. 26. Denied. The statement set forth in Paragraph 26 Is Simply a reservation of the right to assert further defenses that may be developed as a result of discovery. v . EILEEN S. KROH, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v, NO. 96-13 Civil Term WILSON CASTILLO, Defendant CIVIL ACTION. LAW JURY TRIAL DEMANDED PRAECIPE TO THE PROTHONOTARY OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY: Please marked the above-captioned action as settled and discontinued. HANDLER & WIENER Date: 5~1/ -1f