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HomeMy WebLinkAbout96-4429 CIVILROLAND R. BISHER, JR., Plaintiff DAVID JOHN SPURRIER, M.D.; BHUPINDER PAL SINGH, M.D.; WILLIAM W. YOUNG, M.D.; NHS NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., formerly known as EHG NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.; KENNETH KYLER, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the State Correctional Institute at Camp Hill; JEFFREY BEARD, Ph.D., individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill; MARTIN F. HORN, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT CAMP HILL; and COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS of CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 96-4429 CIVIL IN RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND OLER, J.J. OPINION AND ORDER This matter pertains to an action for medical negligence and violation of civil rights, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983~ and the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In sum, the complaint consists of three counts: Count One alleges negligence in the provision of medical care; Count Two is a claim in negligent hiring/supervision and vicarious liability; Count Three is a claim for violation of civil rights. The plaintiff, Roland Bisher, is ~ The plaintiff contends that his treatment constituted a denial of his due process rights and creel and unusual punishment, in violation of the 5th, 8th, and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, thus actionable per 42 U.S.C. §1983. NO. 96-4429 CIVIL presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford ("SCI-Graterford"). At the times relevant to this matter, he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill ("SCI-Camp Hill"). The plaintiff was represented by counsel from the time the action was brought, in 1996, until April 2001, when counsel withdrew from the representation. The action was initially brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County but was subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania by the Commonwealth defendants. Upon the federal court's denial of the Commonwealth defendants' motion to dismiss on 11th Amendment grounds, the case was remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County. Mr. Bisher's claim stems from his incarceration at SCI-Camp Hill between May 19, 1994, and November 28, 1994. He complains that the medical treatment he received at the correctional facility for a throat condition--caused by his ingestion of corrosive lye in early childhood--was rendered in a negligent manner. Specifically, he claims that he required, but failed to receive in a timely manner, esophageal dilations of his cricopharyngeal colonic stricture and cologastric stricture. The failure to perform such dilations on a regular basis, Mr. Bisher alleges, seriously jeopardizes his "ability to eat, drink, swallow, and ultimately breathe." Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 7. As alleged, and admitted, the plaintiff was examined by a gastroenterologist consultant in September 1994. This examination appears to have confirmed the need for the above-mentioned dilation. The first dilation--that is, during the plaintiff' s incarceration at SCI-Camp Hill--was performed on September 27, 1994. Prior to Mr. Bisher's transfer to another correctional facility, SCI-Graterford, in November 1994, a number of additional dilations were performed at SCI-Camp Hill. NO. 96-4429 CIVIL Nevertheless, Bisher contends that an alleged delay in providing him esophageal dilations exacerbated both the difficulty of future dilations, as well as the chances of future esophageal perforations, hence giving rise to pain and suffering and other related problems. The threshold issue in this matter involves the requirement that, in a medical malpractice action, expert testimony is generally required to identify the appropriate standards of care, as well as any alleged deviations there from. Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 584 A.2d 888, 892 (Pa. 1990) (plaintiff required to present an expert witness who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered); Strain v. Feroni, 592 A.2d 698, 701 (Pa. Super. 1990) (to prove aprimafacie case, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce expert testimony to establish the recognized standard of medical care attributable to physicians under like circumstances); Bowser v. Lee Hospital, 582 A.2d 369, 373 (Pa. Super. 1990) (in order to establish a cause of action for medical malpractice, the plaintiff must present expert testimony establishing variance from accepted medical practice and that this deviation from community standards caused the plaintiff s injuries). It is the plaintiff s obligation to satisfy the causation burden of a medical malpractice action with expert witnesses, as the causes of injury involved in such malpractice actions are ordinarily beyond the knowledge of the average layperson and are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge. Mitzelfelt, 584 A.2d at 892; Gradel v. Inouye, 421 A.2d 674, 679 (Pa. 1980). This evidentiary requirement arises out of the judicial concern that, absent the guidance of an expert, jurors are unable to determine relationships among scientific factual circumstances. Brannen v. Lankenau Hospital, 417 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. 1980) (citingMcMahon v. Young, 276 A.2d 534 (Pa. 1970)). NO. 96-4429 CIVIL Here, following the plaintiff' s deposition and the exchange of written discovery, the defendants filed a motion to compel the plaintiff' s expert reports. Subsequently, on August 2, 2001, this court entered an order requiring Mr. Bisher to provide expert reports within sixty days. The order was served upon the plaintiff at his place of incarceration in September 2001. Mr. Bisher failed to comply with the order within the allotted sixty days. The defendants then filed their initial motions for summary judgment based on the lack of expert testimony. We, in turn, denied the motions as premature, explaining that the defendants had not yet obtained the requisite order imposing sanctions for failure to comply with the aforementioned discovery order. In response, the defendants filed motions for sanctions, seeking the preclusion of any expert testimony by the plaintiff for his failure to comply with the discovery order. A hearing on the motions for sanctions was set for June 6, 2002. The plaintiff was advised of the pending hearing at his place of incarceration. The hearing was attended by counsel for all defendants. The plaintiff, it bears noting, did not respond to the motions for sanctions, did not participate in the hearing, and was not represented. At the close of the hearing, this court entered an order precluding the plaintiff from introducing any expert testimony at trial. The defendants then filed their second motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, together with discovery, including expert reports, show that there is no genuine issue of material of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2. Where a defendant is the moving party, summary judgment is appropriate when the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff' s inability to satisfy an element of the cause of action. Id. NO. 96-4429 CIVIL The evidence of record, and the fact that the plaintiff will not be able to substantiate his allegations with the requisite expert testimony, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the plaintiff will not be able to produce evidence that any of the defendants acted below the applicable standards of medical care, or show the existence of a causal link between the care received and the injuries alleged. Summary judgment in favor of the defendants is thus appropriate with respect to counts one and two of the plaintiff' s amended complaint. Turning to the third count of Mr. Bisher's complaint, we observe that, in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Here, Bisher alleges deprivation of adequate medical care, in contravention of the 8th Amendment's bar to cruel and unusual punishment. In order for a plaintiff to establish a violation of the 8th Amendment premised on the denial of proper medical care, an inmate must show a "deliberate indifference to a serious medical need." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Under the Estelle test, a valid constitutional claim requires the consideration of such factors as "the severity of the medical problem, whether the potential for harm if medical care is denied or delayed is substantial, and whether such harm actually resulted from the lack of medical attention." Andrews v. Glenn, 768 F.Supp. 668, 670 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (citing Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975)). The conduct of the defendants which serves as the basis for a §1983 action must amount to more than negligence or inadvertence. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. A complaint that alleges negligent medical diagnosis or negligent treatment of a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the 8th Amendment. Id at 105. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation simply because the patient in question NO. 96-4429 CIVIL is a prisoner: a cognizable claim requires the prisoner to allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Id. Furthermore, considerable latitude is given to decisions made by prison medical personnel in the diagnosis and treatment of inmates. Ellison v. Scheipe, 570 F.Supp. 1361, 1363 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Piece, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (courts will disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment which remains a question of sound professional judgment)). Given these factors, it is reasonable to conclude that expert testimony is required to educate the members of a jury on the medical complexities involved, the proper diagnostic steps called for, and the adequate level of medical care required. Hence, in light of his inability to satisfy the elements of a negligence claim, Mr. Bisher can scarcely be expected to meet the heightened evidentiary requirements of a civil rights claim for inadequate medical care. The third count of Mr. Bisher's amended complaint requires evidence in the form of expert medical testimony. Since the plaintiff is not able to present such evidence, summary judgment must be granted in favor of the defendants on the third count as well. ORDER AND NOW, this day of August, 2002, following argument thereon, the motion of the defendants for summary judgment is SUSTAINED and the plaintiff's complaint DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, Kevin A. Hess, J. NO. 96-4429 CIVIL Roland V. Bisher, Pro Se Plaintiff John R. Kantner, Esquire Raymond Dorian, Esquire Kimberly A. Sommar, Esquire For the Defendants :rlm ROLAND R. BISHER, JR., Plaintiff DAVID JOHN SPURRIER, M.D.; BHUPINDER PAL SINGH, M.D.; WILLIAM W. YOUNG, M.D.; NHS NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., formerly known as EHG NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.; KENNETH KYLER, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the State Correctional Institute at Camp Hill; JEFFREY BEARD, Ph.D., individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill; MARTIN F. HORN, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT CAMP HILL; and COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS of CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 96-4429 CIVIL IN RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND OLER, J.J. ORDER AND NOW, this day of August, 2002, following argument thereon, the motion of the defendants for summary judgment is SUSTAINED and the plaintiff's complaint DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, Kevin A. Hess, J. NO. 96-4429 CIVIL Roland V. Bisher, Pro Se Plaimiff John R. Kantner, Esquire Raymond Dorian, Esquire Kimberly A. Sommar, Esquire For the Defendants :rlm