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Home My WebLink About2015-312 ESTATE OF RICHARD LEON : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DICKMAN, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff : : CIVIL ACTION – LAW and : : NO. 2015-0312 CIVIL MARYLYNN KULP, : Interpleader Plaintiff : : vs. : : SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE : COMPANY OF AMERICA, : Defendant : IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S AND INTERPLEADER PLAINTIFF’S CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE EBERT, JR., MASLAND AND BREWBAKER, J.J. OPINION AND ORDER 1 Richard Leon Dickman (“Decedent”) died intestate on July 12, 2014. During his lifetime, Decedent had procured a life insurance policy from Defendant, Security Life Insurance 2 Company of America (“Security Life”). The life insurance policy had a death benefit of $25,000.00, and an optional accelerated benefit of up to $12,500.00 for “limited life 3 expectancy.” The beneficiary of the life insurance policy is Interpleader Plaintiff, Marylynn 4 Kulp. On or about June 26, 2014, Decedent requested the full accelerated limited life benefit by 5 submitting an application to Security Life. On July 8, 2014, Security Life issued and mailed a 1 Stipulated Facts (“S.F.”) submitted on February 13, 2017 by Plaintiff, Estate of Richard Leon Dickman, and Interpleader Plaintiff, Marylynn Kulp, ¶ 11. 2 S.F. ¶ 1. 3 S.F. ¶¶ 4-5. 4 S.F. ¶ 6. 5 S.F. ¶ 7. check for $12,250.00 payable to Decedent, which reduced the total benefit of $12,500.00 by a 6 $250.00 administrative fee. The check was not cashed prior to Decedent’s death on July 12, 7 2014. After becoming aware of Decedent’s death, Security Life stopped payment on the 8 check. Decedent is survived by his surviving daughters and heirs, DeNae Dickman, Amanda 9 Dickman, and Gabrielle Dickman (collectively the “Heirs”). Defendant deposited the sum of $12,500.00 with the Cumberland County Prothonotary’s Office to be held in escrow pending the 1011 outcome of this case, and was dismissed as a party to this suit. The case is now before this court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by both Plaintiff and Interpleader Plaintiff. Analysis Both parties agree that the outcome of this case depends on the definition of the word “paid.” If the policy is considered “paid” when the payment is sent or received, Plaintiff will prevail, and $12,250.00 will pass to the estate. If the policy is considered “paid” when the check is cashed, Interpleader Plaintiff will prevail, and receive the $12,500.00 payment. The life insurance policy contract itself contains no definition of “paid.” However, it does contain the following information under the heading “Method and Timing of Payment:” 6 S.F. ¶¶ 8-10. 7 S.F. ¶ 12. 8 S.F. ¶ 13. 9 S.F. ¶ 14. 10 S.F. ¶¶ 15-16. 11 It is noted that this court believes that $12,500.00 was the sum deposited because it was the highest amount sought from the Defendant by either Plaintiff or Interpleader Plaintiff. However, the Court notes that had it found for Interpleader Plaintiff by holding that the benefit was not “paid” until the check was tendered, the proper amount due to Interpleader Plaintiff under the terms of the policy would have been $25,000.00. 2 you The Accelerated Benefit is payable in a lump sum. It will not be paid if weyou die before payment is made. At the time pay the Accelerated Benefit, weyouyou will provide with a benefit payment notice informing of the your amount of Accelerated Benefit, the amount of the administrative charge, 12 and the amount of insurance remaining.\[\] Clearly, Security Life considered the policy “paid” at the time that the check was sent along with the benefit payment notice; the language of the policy itself states “\[a\]t the time we pay you…” The issue date of the check, attached to the accompanying benefit statement, was 13 July 8, 2014, four days prior to Decedent’s death. It is apparent that payment was both made and received while the Decedent was still alive. It is axiomatic that in order to create a cohesive body of law, decisions should be made with a view towards achieving consistency and certainty. Contrary to Interpleader Plaintiff’s tenuous claim that a check should not be considered “paid” until it is tendered, Plaintiff’s position more easily achieves those objectives. Rather than waiting for a check to be cashed, insurance companies and others can rest assured that they have satisfied their obligations when the check is sent, if doing so is considered having it “paid.” In respect of these goals, and in accordance with Security Life’s own policy, this Court recognizes that Decedent’s claim was paid when the check was mailed to him, and thus Plaintiff’s claim will prevail. ORDER th AND NOW, this 18 day of April, 2017, following argument by both counsel and consideration of the respective filings and briefs, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for 12 S.F., Exhibit A, pg. 23 (emphasis in original). 13 S.F., Exhibit D. 3 Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Interpleader Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. BY THE COURT, __________________________ Jessica E. Brewbaker, J. Marc Roberts, Esquire 149 East Market Street York, PA 17401 For the Plaintiff Megan C. Huff, Esquire 1135 East Chocolate Avenue, Suite 300 Hershey, PA 17033 For the Plaintiff Interpleader David Fitzsimons, Esquire Martson Law Offices 10 East High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 For the Defendant :rlm 4 ESTATE OF RICHARD LEON : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DICKMAN, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff : : CIVIL ACTION – LAW and : : NO. 2015-0312 CIVIL MARYLYNN KULP, : Interpleader Plaintiff : : vs. : : SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE : COMPANY OF AMERICA, : Defendant : IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S AND INTERPLEADER PLAINTIFF’S CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE EBERT, JR., MASLAND AND BREWBAKER, J.J. ORDER th AND NOW, this 18 day of April, 2017, following argument by both counsel and consideration of the respective filings and briefs, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Interpleader Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. BY THE COURT, __________________________ Jessica E. Brewbaker, J.