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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0001464-2016 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : V. : CP-21-CR-1464-2016 : : CHARGES: : (1) DUI-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE : (2) DUI-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE : (3) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION SCHEDULE : 1 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - : MARIJUANA : (4) DRIVING WHILE OPERATING : PRIVILEGE IS SUSPENDED OR REVOKED : (DUI-RELATED) DANIEL LEE TRIMMER : (5) RESTRAINT SYSTEMS : : AFFIANT: TROOPER LUKE MACKE IN RE: DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION OPINION & ORDER OF COURT Peck, J., April , 2017 Before this Court is Defendant Trimmer’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion to Suppress. Following a hearing on November 22, 2016, the matter was taken under advisement. This Court now grants Defendant’s Motion. The evidence the Commonwealth obtained following the stop of the vehicle at issue here shall be suppressed. 1 FINDINGS OF FACT 1.On January 18, 2016, Trooper Luke Macke of the Pennsylvania State Police was observing traffic along Interstate 81 South in Cumberland County. 2.Trooper Macke observed a vehicle with the license plate “JWM 9283”. 3.Trooper Macke ran the plate number through the CLEAN system and no record was found. In Trooper Macke’s experience, a lack of record indicated the vehicle was probably fraudulently registered. 1 See, Notes of Testimony, In re: Suppression Motion Hearing, November 22, 2016. 4.Based on those facts, Trooper Macke initiated a traffic stop. Trooper Macke did not witness any other Vehicle Code infraction prior to making the stop. 5.Defendant was in the driver’s seat. After Defendant rolled down his window to speak with Trooper Macke, Trooper Macke noticed a strong smell of marijuana. He also noticed Defendant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot. 6.Trooper Macke asked Defendant for his license and registration but the driver did not immediately produce the registration. 7.Trooper Macke asked Defendant for his name and date of birth, and upon running that information through another computer system, found Defendant’s license was suspended. 8.Trooper Macke then spoke with the passenger, Cheyenne Ditzler, Defendant’s girlfriend. Ms. Ditzler admitted to having a marijuana cigarette and told Trooper Macke that Defendant had handed it to her when Trooper Macke initiated the stop. 9.Trooper Macke returned to the driver side window and had Defendant step out of vehicle. Defendant admitted to having smoked marijuana earlier in the day. Trooper Macke asked if Defendant had anything on his person and Defendant stated he had two baggies of synthetic marijuana “in his butt”. He also admitted the marijuana cigarette Ms. Ditzler was holding was his. 10. Another trooper arrived at the scene and evaluated Defendant to determine whether he was under the influence of a controlled substance. In that trooper’s judgment, Defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance and incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 11. Defendant was transported to Carlisle Regional Medical Center and asked if he would consent to a blood draw. He was read the then-standard version of form DL-26, which included provisions stating Defendant would be subject to increased criminal penalties if he refused to consent to a blood draw. 12. Defendant consented to the blood draw. The results showed three Schedule 1 controlled substances present in Defendant’s blood. 2 13. Before leaving the scene of the stop, Trooper Macke ran the vehicle’s VIN number and found the vehicle was in fact validly registered to Ms. Ditzler’s mother, but the registration indicated the vehicle’s license plate should have read “JWN 9238.” (The plate showed an “M” instead of an “N”.) At the hearing on the matter, the Commonwealth and defense counsel agreed it appeared that PennDOT had either issued an incorrect plate or incorrectly recorded the plate number. 14. Defendant was charged with two counts of driving under the influence of a controlled substance, one count of unlawful possession of marijuana, one count of driving with a suspended license related to DUI, and one count of not using a seatbelt. 15. Defendant brought the instant Omnibus Motion to Suppress on two grounds: a.That Trooper Macke could not have had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate the stop based on the incorrect license plate, and therefore all evidence obtained as a result of the stop should be suppressed; and b.If not suppressed under the theory stated above, the results of the blood draw should be suppressed under Birchfield v. North Dakota, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (U.S. 2016). DISCUSSION Defendant raises two issues for our consideration. This Court shall discuss each issue in turn. A.Reasonable Suspicion to Stop the Vehicle Defendant argues the evidence recovered as result of the stop must be suppressed because Trooper Macke did not have adequate legal grounds to initiate the stop in the first place. Pennsylvania law states a police officer who is “engaged in systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or who has reasonable suspicion that a violation \[of the Code\] is occurring or has occurred” may “stop a vehicle…for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification or engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information as the officer 3 § may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.” 75 Pa.C.S. 6308(b). The Commonwealth limits its argument on this issue to asserting that stopping a vehicle to ascertain whether the vehicle is properly registered is an investigatory stop. This Court agrees such a stop is an investigatory stop. Investigatory stops must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008). We recognize that Pennsylvania law allows that a properly initiated investigatory stop may be valid even if it turns out no violation of the vehicle code occurred. However, that is not the issue here. The Commonwealth does not address the key argument raised by the Defendant – whether an investigatory stop initiated on the basis of faulty information from a government agency carrying out an executive function of the Commonwealth implicates the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Reasonable suspicion must have a factual basis, and the source of that factual basis is consequential. Defendant argues the instant case is controlled by Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2014). In that case, the Court suppressed evidence where it was obtained during a search incident to arrest where the arrest was made on the basis of a computer system maintained by the Commonwealth erroneously showing that the defendant was subject to an active arrest warrant. The court reasoned that where the error was an administrative error of the executive branch, there was no valid reason for the arrest. The Court reasoned a “good faith exception” would be needed if the evidence was to be admitted, and because the Commonwealth does not recognize a good faith exception, the evidence could not be admitted. The Johnson court looked to the reasoning previously laid out in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991), which suppressed evidence recovered as the result of a defective search warrant because a good faith exception could not excuse the defective search. Defendant argues that, taken together, these cases indicate that where evidence unfavorable to a defendant is recovered due to 4 an administrative error of the executive branch, the evidence must be suppressed because 2 the Commonwealth does not recognize the good faith exception. It is well-settled that the Commonwealth does not recognize a good faith exception. The Courts have recognized this principle in regards to violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. See, Commonwealth v. Slattery, 139 A.3d 221 (Pa. Super. 2016). (refusing to allow a good faith exception where a police officer pulled over a vehicle because he mistakenly believed 75 Pa.C.S. §3334 required a driver to signal at least 100 feet before changing lanes). In light of the foregoing, the key question in the instant case is whether the defective basis for the stop (the mismatched license plate and registration) is due to error by the Commonwealth or by Defendant. If the mistake is properly classified as an administrative error committed by the Commonwealth’s executive branch, it seems there was not valid reason for the stop under Johnson and Edmunds, supra. Conversely, if the mistake is properly attributed to the vehicle registrant, there is no need to invoke the good faith exception at all. The Motor Vehicle Code does not explicitly assign either PennDOT or a driver/registrant the responsibility to ensure an issued license plate matches a validly issued vehicle registration. The Motor Vehicle code explicitly requires drivers to maintain up-to-date vehicle registration: 75 Pa.C.S. §1301 Registration and certificate of title required: (a) Driving unregistered vehicle prohibited. — No person shall drive or move and no owner or motor carrier shall knowingly permit to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle which is not registered in this Commonwealth unless the vehicle is exempt from registration. The Motor Vehicle Code further requires drivers to display registration plates: 2 Federal courts recognize the good faith exception, whereby evidence discovered as a result of defective suspicion or prompting is not automatically excluded as long as the relevant law enforcement officers were acting in good faith at the time. See, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and following case law. 5 75 Pa.C.S. § 1332 Display of registration plates (effective until Dec 21, 2016): General rule. — Every registration plate shall, at all times, be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned or on which its use is authorized in accordance with regulations promulgated by the department. Registrants are further required to update PennDOT of a change of name or address, 75 Pa.C.S. §1312, and to notify PennDOT of lost, stolen or defaced plates, 75 Pa.C.S. §1333(a). The Motor Vehicle Code assigns other responsibilities to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is responsible for issuing vehicle registration and license plates: 75 Pa.C.S. § 1331. Issuance and reissuance of registration plates. (a)Department to provide plates. — Registration plates shall be provided by the department. (b)Information on plate. — Every registration plate shall have displayed upon it the identifying numbers or letters assigned to the vehicle, the name of the Commonwealth, which may be abbreviated, and any other data the department may deem necessary. 75 Pa.C.S. §1308 Issuance of registration (a)General rule. — The department, upon registering a vehicle, shall issue to the registrant a registration card which shall contain the registration number assigned to the vehicle, the name and address of the registrant and the name of the owner, if other than the registrant, a description of the vehicle including the vehicle identification number, the expiration date and such other information as may be determined by the department. PennDOT also is responsible for maintaining records of all registrations and transfers of registrations issued. 75 Pa.C.S. §1316. Importantly, the Commonwealth is responsible for issuing both license plates and proof of registration. A registrant vehicle owner is responsible for providing the pertinent information about themselves and the vehicle, but the Commonwealth is responsible for assigning license plates and vehicle registrations. This Court does note that in Johnson and Edmunds, supra, the error was clearly a mistake committed by a Commonwealth agency. Private citizen defendants are 6 not responsible for inputting information into the electronic systems maintained by the 3 Commonwealth which record search and arrest warrants. When obtaining a vehicle registration, private citizens do interact with PennDOT systems. However, in the vehicle registration process, a registrant’s responsibility thereto is limited. The registrant is responsible for providing correct personal and vehicle information. Then (as long as the applicant does not seek a vanity plate) PennDOT assigns a license plate and records the number in the vehicle registration information. PennDOT gives the registrant the license plate and registration document. To this Court’s knowledge, an applicant is not asked to review the plate and registration document for correctness before they are finalized. (No evidence of legal authority was presented as to the same.) A registrant’s informal role in the license plate number assignment process is limited to “double checking” PennDOT’s work, in the context of putting the plate on their vehicle (which the Court recognizes is often done by a dealer selling the vehicle). That role is not statutory, but one of common 4 sense or chance. Without statutory authority placing an affirmative duty on vehicle registrants to ensure that information is error-free, this Court will not confer such duty on the registrant. Furthermore, this Court declines to interpret the Motor Vehicle Code as placing a duty on every driver to cross-check the license plate and registration of every vehicle that person may drive to ensure they are free of clerical errors. In the instant case, Ms. Ditzler’s mother, who was the vehicle registrant, abided by statutes that required her to register her vehicle and to maintain the license plates issued 5 to her by the Commonwealth. The mismatch between the valid registration and the license plates issued consisted of substituting an “M” for an “N”, a regrettable clerical 3 See also, Commonwealth v. Gamble, 546 A.2d 681 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (Although different analysis, instructive that in that case, where the State failed to notify defendant that his license was suspended, the court upheld the trial court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion for an arrest of judgment with respect to the charge under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1543(b) for the unlicensed operation of a vehicle because he could not have known he was violating the law.) 4 In the instant case, it is easy to imagine that even if the registrant did affirmatively compare the license plate PennDOT gave her with the registration slip she received, she could have easily neglected to notice the mismatch of the “M” and the “N”, just as PennDOT seemingly did. 5 This Court recognizes that the relevant registration statutes of the Motor Vehicle Code are not entirely clear on this point, and that the Commonwealth may choose to challenge this interpretation on appeal. 7 error. PennDOT’s error then led to Trooper Macke initiating the stop at issue. Because the stop was initiated due to an error of the Commonwealth, a good faith exception would have to be applied to allow the use of the evidence recovered as a result of the stop. Although Trooper Macke reasonably and in good faith stopped the vehicle at issue here, Commonwealth law does not recognize a good faith exception. Therefore, the evidence 6 the Commonwealth obtained following the stop of the vehicle here must be suppressed. B.Blood Draw Results Must be Suppressed Because this Court finds the initial reason for the stop was not valid, the results of the blood test of defendant obtained as a result of the stop must be suppressed, along with all other evidence recovered as a result of the stop, regardless of issues implicating Birchfield v. North Dakota, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (U.S. 2016). CONCLUSION Because the stop was initiated by Trooper Macke based on faulty information from a government agency carrying out an executive function of the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth does not recognize a good faith exception, the evidence must be suppressed. Defendant’s Omnibus Motion is granted. BY THE COURT, Christylee L. Peck, J. 6 We recognize that our decision herein results in a windfall for the Defendant. We further recognize that the issue is capable of repetition if the vehicle owner does not correct the license plate error as any good citizen should do. We further recognize that the issue is complicated, and accordingly caused us consternation in the decision, by the fact that as of even possibly today, the license plate is in error, making Trooper Macke’s decision to pull over the Defendant correct at the time. Nevertheless, as we cannot attribute the error to Defendant or the vehicle owner, our analysis of the facts and caselaw lead to the conclusion that a good faith exception would have been necessary. 8 Matthew P. Smith, Esq. Chief Deputy District Attorney Bradon Toomey, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Court Administrator 9