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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-4768 civilWESLEY R. WOLTZ, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : NEWVILLE BOROUGH :NO. 97-4768 CIVIL TERM WATER SEWER AUTHORITY, Defendant IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Before HOFFER, P.J., OLER and HESS, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, December 31, 1998, after consideration of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Defendant, NEWVILLE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY, the facts of record, and the applicable law, Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Robert O'Brien, Esquire "~G~ 17 West South Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for the Plaintiff G. Bryan Salzmann, Esquire 1580 Gabler Road P.O. Box 276 Chambersburg, PA 17201 Attorney for Defendant WESLEY R. WOLTZ, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NEWVILLE BOROUGH NO. 97-4768 CIVIL TERM WATER SEWER : AUTHORITY, : Defendant IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Before HOFFER, P.J., OLER and HESS, JJ. OPINION HOFFER, J.: In this opinion we address Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff has opposed the motion on the grounds that (a) damages should be assessed under common law contract theories in addition to federal statutory law; (b) the amended complaint sets forth an alternate theory of recovery and not a new cause of action; and (c) thero was a willful violation constituting a material fact that has to be determined at trial. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff, Wesley Woltz, was employed by Defendant Newville Borough 96-4768 CIVIL TERM Water and Sewer Authority as an assistant plant operator in the Borough Water and Sewer Department. The Plaintiff was paid an hourly wage for a forty hour work week scheduled from Monday to Friday. In addition to his regular forty hour work week, the Plaintiff was required by the Defendant to conduct tests in the plants on alternate weekends and holidays. The Plaintiff was not compensated or otherwise paid by the Defendant for these required activities. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant until May 15, 1996. Plaintiff commenced this action, for the collection of unpaid wages, by praecipe for a writ of summons on August 27, 1996. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant on November 22, 1996. The complaint alleged that Defendant, as Plaintiff's former employer, failed to compensate Plaintiff for overtime hours worked between May 1989 and May 1996. Plaintiff sought relief under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment Collection Law (43 P.S. sec. 260.1 et seq.) for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys fees and costs. Plaintiff apparently concluded during discovery that, as a former municipal employee, he was barred from recovery under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law. On April 21, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Motion To Amend the Initial Complaint to eliminate his claim pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law and to substitute new claims for unpaid wages pursuant to the Fair 96-4768 CIVIL TERM Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §201 ,et seq. ("FLSA") and common law theories for breach of contract. Leave to amend was granted pursuant to an order of court by J. Wesley Oler, J. and Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on July 18, 1997. Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 20, 1998 on the grounds that the Plaintiff's common law breach of contract claim is pre- empted by the FLSA, Plaintiff fails to establish a common law breach of contract claim, and Plaintiff fails to establish a willful violation of the FLSA. DISCUSSION A. The remedy provided for by the FLSA is Plaintiff's exclusive remedy for recovering overtime compensation. Plaintiff's common law breach of contract claim is barred as preempted by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 201, et seq. Although the FLSA has no express language asserting its pre-emption of state law, courts have consistently held that when an employer violates 29 U.S.C.A. sec. 206 or 207 that the statute is the exclusive remedy for the enforcing of rights created under the FLSA. Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F.Supp. 1329, 1340 (E.D.Pa. 1976); Tombrello v. USX Corp. 763 F.Supp. 541 (N.D.Ala. 1991); Nettles v. Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95, 100 (D.S.C. 1988). The Tombrello court stated that "as a matter of law, plaintiff 3 96-4768 CIVIL TERM cannot circumvent the exclusive remedy prescribed by Congress by asserting equivalent state law claims in addition to the FLSA claim." Tombrello v. USX Corp. 763 F. Supp. 541,545 (N.D.Ala. 1991). In the present case, Plaintiff has brought suit to claim overtime compensation under state common law contract theories in addition to the FLSA. Since the FLSA is the applicable law, and courts have interpreted claims for wages and overtime compensation to be exclusively remedied by the FLSA, Plaintiff's argument for recovery under common law contract theories is rejected. FLSA pre-empts common law contract theory recovery and is, consequently, the exclusive remedy in the present case. In Plaintiff's amended complaint, he asserts that pursuant to Plaintiff's employment, the employer provided a written contract. The document attached to the amended complaint, entitled "Job Description," is not an employment contract, but a job description. The Plaintiff himself identifies the document as a job description in his deposition. (Deposition of Wesley Woltz, February 11, 1998, p. 19). The document describes in detail what is entailed in the Plaintiff's job and the hours to be worked. There are no numbers on the job description indicating an amount of wages to be paid or the period in time during which Plaintiff would be employed. Plaintiff admits in his testimony that he was not told he would be 4 96-4768 CIVIL TERM working for any set period of time. (Deposition of Wesley Woltz, February 11, 1998, p. 19). For these reasons this job description cannot be construed as a contract. Even if the document could be viewed as a contract, the claims for wages made under common law contract theories are pre-empted by the FLSA. B. Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts an alternate theory of recovery and not a new cause of action. A cause of action is described as the facts which give a person a right to judicial relief. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. (1979). "Alternative theories of recovery are different means for obtaining the same relief for the same harm caused by the same party." Kelly v. Resource Housing of America, 615 A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. 1992). Without new facts or parties, an amended complaint applying new law is an alternate theory of recovery. If the law put forth in an alternate theory of recovery replaces inapplicable law, this procedural defect is viewed with tolerance. "Scarcely any procedural defect is viewed with greater tolerance by modern courts than errors in the form of action." Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 38 A. 2d 732, 733, 155 Pa. Super. 286 (1944). The function of a pleading is to put the other party on notice of what the pleader intends to prove in trial. Id. at 734. Changing a form of action, for 96-4768 CIVIL TERM example, with an alternate theory of recovery, does not change the facts of a case that are pleaded. The purpose of the pleading remains fulfilled. The substitution of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Plaintiff's amended complaint is purported, by Defendant, to constitute a new cause of action. The Plaintiff states that the amended complaint puts forth alternate theories of recovery. In the present case, the facts haven't changed; the parties are still the same and the alleged harm caused Plaintiff is still the same. The only thing that has changed from the original complaint to the amended complaint was the law under which relief is sought. We view this change as a different means for obtaining the same relief for the same harm caused by the same party. Plaintiff's substitution of the FLSA for the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law is an alternate theory of recovery and not a new cause of action. Distinguishing between an alternate theory of recovery and a new cause of action is relevant in determining the date from which damages are calculated. Because Plaintiff's substitution of the FLSA is not considered a new cause of action but an alternate theory of recovery, damages are computed from the date that Plaintiff filed the original complaint. Since the FLSA provides for a Statute of Limitation period of two years, Plaintiff may recover overtime wages from two years prior to the November 22, 1996 filing of his complaint. Since the Plaintiff worked 96-4768 CIVIL TERM for the Defendant until August 27, 1996, the Plaintiff may recover damages from November 22, 1994 until August 27, 1996. C. Defendant did not willfully violate the FLSA. A willful violation of the FLSA requires '1hat the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether the conduct was prohibited." McLaughlin v. Richlan Shoe Co., 486 US 128, 100 L Ed 2d 115, 108 S Ct. 1677 (1988). For example, a willful violation of the FLSA would occur when a city imposes a revised play plan which reduces an employee's regular rate of pay so that regular pay received, plus regularly scheduled overtime pay received, as required by the FLSA, would equal the individuals former annual wage. Craven v. City of Minot, N.D. 730 F. Supp. 1511, 1512 (D.N.D. 1989). In other words, a willful violation occurs when a municipality purposefully attempts to circumvent FLSA regulations. There are no facts in the present case to suggest that Defendant willfully violated FLSA regulations. Defendant provided significant overtime pay to Plaintiff during his employment for instances when Plaintiff was called in on an emergency basis. (Deposition of Wesley Woltz, February 11, 1998, p. 40-41). Defendant believed that the testing completed by Plaintiff after hours was done 7 96-4768 CIVIL TERM in the course of his regular employment, and not subject to FLSA overtime provisions. (Affidavit of Fred Potzer ). Defendant had a good faith belief it was in compliance with FLSA. Any alleged FLSA violations were not willful.