HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-2526 civilCLIFTON H. HENDERSON and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
SUSAN G. HENDERSON, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
:
V.
DETWEILER ENTERPRISES, INC. :
and EDWARD W. SEIK, Sr. t/a :
TRINDLE SPRING DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, C.M. DETWEILER :
REALTY, CARLIA LENKER, and
FIRST AMERICAN FLOOD DATA : NO. 98-2526 CIVIL
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants :
:
ROBERT G. HARTMAN, Jr.,
HARTMAN & ASSOCIATES, INC., :
ROBERT G. HARTMAN &
ASSOCIATES, INC. and
WHITTOCK-HARTMAN,
Additional Defendants :
IN RE: DEFENDANT FIRST AMERICAN FLOOD DATA SERVICES, INC.'S
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
Before HOFFER, P.J., OLER, J. and GUIDO, J.
AND NOW, ,1998, pursuant to the
opinion filed on this date, Defendant's Preliminary Objections are denied.
By the Court,
David W. DeLuce, Esquire
Johnson, Duffle, Stewart & Weidner
301 Market Street
P.O. Box 109
Lemoyne, PA 17043-0109
For the Plaintiffs
Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire
Irwin, McKnight & Hughes
West Pomfret Professional Building
60 West Pomfret Street
Carlisle, PA 17013-3222
For Defendant First American Flood Data Services, Inc.
Jeff Foreman, Esquire
3207 North Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
For Defendants Detweiler Enterprises, Inc. and Edward W. Seik, Sr.,
t/a Trindle Spring Development Co.
C.M. Detweiler, Inc. t/d/b/a
Howard Hanna Detweiler Realty
3310 Market Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Carlia Lenker
3310 Market Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Robert G. Hartman, Jr., Hartman & Associates, Inc., Robert G.
Hartman & Associates, Inc. and Whittock-Hartman
2101 Orchard Road
Camp Hill, PA 17011
CLIFTON H. HENDERSON and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
SUSAN G. HENDERSON, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs :
Vo
DETWEILER ENTERPRISES, INC. :
and EDWARD W. SEIK, Sr. t/a :
TRINDLE SPRING DEVELOPMENT :
COMPANY, C.M. DETWEILER :
REALTY, CARLIA LENKER, and :
FIRST AMERICAN FLOOD DATA NO. 98-2526 CIVIL
SERVICES, INC., :
Defendants :
ROBERT G. HARTMAN, Jr., :
HARTMAN & ASSOCIATES, INC., :
ROBERT G. HARTMAN & :
ASSOCIATES, INC. and ·
WHITTOCK-HARTMAN, :
Additional Defendants :
IN RE: DEFENDANT FIRST AMERICAN FLOOD DATA SERVICES, INC.'S
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
Before HOFFER, P.J., OLER, J. and GUIDO, J.
OPINION
HOFFER, P.J.:
In this opinion, we address Defendant First American Flood Data Services
Inc.'s preliminary objections in the form of a demurrer to Plaintiffs Clifton and
Susan Henderson's complaint. Plaintiffs asserted a series of claims against the
Defendant. Defendant has demurred to each claim.
On May 1, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging fraudulent
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, negligence and
98-2526 CIVIL TERM
violations of Pennsylvania law regarding unfair trade practices on the part of
several defendants? Claims of breach of contract, negligence and unfair trade
practices were filed against Defendant First American Flood Services, Inc.
Defendant has filed preliminary objections to the complaint.
In determining preliminary objections in the form of a demurrer, a court must
accept as true all well pleaded facts, and reasonable inferences taken therefrom,
set forth in a plaintiff's complaint. Scarpitti v. Webor~j, 530 Pa. 366, 368, 609 A.2d
147, 148 (1992). Where any doubt exists, a demurrer should not be granted.
Scarpitti at 147, 609 A.2d at 148-49.
The facts upon which we base this opinion are as follows: on October 13,
1994, Plaintiffs entered into a agreement of sale to purchase a lot and a home to
be constructed in the Trindle Spring development, Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania. In order to obtain the necessary financing Plaintiffs' lender, Source
One Mortgage Service Corporation (hereinafter, "Source One"), required a flood
certification to determine if the property was located in a special flood hazard area
and would require flood insurance. On December 5, 1994, Defendant certified that
Plaintiffs' land was not in a special flood hazard area and flood insurance was not
~ On June 26, 1998, a third party joinder complaint was filed by
Defendants Detweiler Enterprises, Inc. and Edward W. Seik, Sr. joining Robert
G. Hartman, Jr., Hartman & Associates, Inc., Robert G. Hartman & Associates,
Inc. and Whittock-Hartman as additional defendants.
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98-2526 CIVIL TERM
required. The record reflects that the flood certification was certified to Source One
and it referred to Plaintiffs as borrowers for the subject property. A second
certification, dated October 25, 1995, once again certified to Source One that the
property owned by the Plaintiffs did not require flood insurance and was not
located in the special flood hazard area. Plaintiffs signed and dated this
certification on November 13, 1995.
Subsequent to Plaintiffs' purchase of the property, Plaintiffs attempted to
refinance their loan in order to finish their basement and construct an in-ground
pool. Source One required another flood certification. On July 16, 1996,
Defendant issued a revised flood certification which determined that Plaintiffs'
property was within the special flood zone hazard area. Plaintiffs were required
to purchase flood insurance and forced to cancel their plans for a finished
basement and an in-ground pool. Plaintiffs allege that they can no longer use their
property as they had intended.
Based upon the facts, as pled by the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs may be
characterized as third party beneficiaries under Pennsylvania law and therefore a
grant of a demurrer is improper. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly
adopted Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1979) as the standard for
analysis of third party beneficiaries. See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 59-60,
459 A.2d 744, 751 (1983)(granting third party beneficiary status to a devisee under
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a will whose intended legacy was lost due to failure of an attomey to properly draft
the instrument). Section 302 of the Restatement, titled "Intended and Incidental
Beneficiaries", states:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and
promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended
beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the
parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the
beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not
an intended beneficiary.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1979).
The court in Guy concluded that Pennsylvania would apply a two part test
to determine if one is an intended third party beneficiary. Guy at 60, 459 A.2d at
751. In order to assert a claim under a contract as a third party beneficiary, both
parts of the following test must be satisfied:
(1) the recognition of the beneficiary's right must be
"appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties,"
and (2) the performance must "satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary" or "the
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance."
Id.
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98-2526 CIVIL TERM
The Guy test was applied in Scarpitti v. Weborg, 530 Pa. 366, 609 A.2d 147
(1992), a case dealing with contracts between parties involved in residential
development. In Scarpitti, plaintiffs were purchasers of residential lots in a
subdivision which contained deed restrictions, including one which said homes
could have no larger that a two and one-half car garage. Scarpitti at 369, 609 A.2d
at 149. Defendant was an architect, under an implied contract with the developer
of the subdivision only, who reviewed the plans of plaintiffs and other purchasers
to determine if the plans conformed with the deed restrictions. Scarpitti at 368, 609
A.2d at 149. The case arose because the defendant rejected the plaintiffs' plans
which included three car garages then later approved other homeowners' plans
with three car garages. Scarpitti at 369, 609 A.2d at 149.
The court in Scarpitti held that:
a party becomes a third party beneficiary only where both
parties to the contract express an intention to benefit the
third party, in the contract itself, unless, the
circumstances are so compelling that recognition of the
beneficiary's right is appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties, and the performance satisfies an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the
beneficiary or the circumstances indicate that the
promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance.
Scarpitti at 372-73, 609 A.2d at 150-51(citations omitted). The court applied the
test and found that the plaintiffs were intended third party beneficiaries. Scarpitti
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98-2526 CIVIL TERM
at 373, 609 A.2d at 151. The court found that the third party beneficiary
relationship was within the contemplation of the parties to the contract because the
purpose of the agreement between the architect and the developer was to make
the lots more attractive to future purchasers because they would be assured that
the homeowners would abide by the deed restrictions. Id. Although plaintiffs were
not parties to the agreement, they had a recognizable right to uniform enforcement
of the deed restrictions. Id._.~.
At argument in the case at bar, Judge Guido brought to the attention of the
Court an unpublished opinion in the case Welsh v. Wood, et al. (98-0613 Civil),
written by Judge Bayley. In Welsh, plaintiffs sued a termite inspection company
and its employee, a real estate agency and its agent and an appraiser after they
discovered substantial termite damage to their home two months after they
purchased it. The appraiser demurred, claiming that she owed no duty to the
plaintiffs because she did the appraisal for FHA purposes and owed a duty to the
federal government only. The court agreed and granted the demurrer. Although
the facts in Welsh are comparable to those in the case at bar, Welsh does not
control the outcome sub judice. Welsh. can not be extended beyond its application
to FHA loans and appraisals.
In the case at bar, Defendants undertook the flood certification, knowing that
it would control the Plaintiffs' use of their property. Although Defendant contracted
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98-2526 CIVIL TERM
with Source One, the purpose of the certification was to determine whether
Plaintiffs would get a loan or be required to purchase flood insurance. The
certification form reflected that Plaintiffs were the borrowers. Clearly, the benefits
of the flood certification went beyond Source One and gave the Plaintiffs a right to
an accurate flood certification. In applying the two part test, generated under
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1979), the Court is compelled to
recognize that the Plaintiffs obtained rights under the contract between Defendant
and Source One and that Defendant intended to give the benefit of the promised
performance to the Plaintiffs. Both parts of the test are satisfied and Plaintiffs can
be characterized as third party beneficiaries to the contract.
As third party beneficiaries to the contract between Source One and the
Defendant, Plaintiffs can (1)sue under the contract; (2) assert a claim in negligence
for they were owed a duty of care; and (3) go forward with their case against
Defendant for violation of Pennsylvania law related to unfair trade practices
because they became purchasers of goods or services. Therefore, Defendant's
Preliminary Objections are denied?
2 With the denial of Defendant's Preliminary Objections, in the form of a
demurrer, Defendant is now compelled to answer Plaintiffs' Complaint and has
the opportunity to offer any affirmative defenses to the claim that may apply.
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