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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-4837 civil, 97-4838 civilMATX, INC., : IN THE COURT Of COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : : NO. 97-4837 CIVIL TRAPPE HILL HOLDINGS, INC., : trading as McCORMACK MATERIALS, : Defendant LUTHER N. AMOS, JR., IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. NO. 97-4838 CIVIL TRAPPE HILL HOLDINGS, INC., : trading as McCORMACK : MATERIALS, : Defendant IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS Before HOFFER, P.J., OLER, J. and GUIDO, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, December 31, 1998, pursuant to the opinion filed this date, Defendant's Preliminary Objections are dismissed and Defendant is hereby ordered to respond to Plaintiffs' Complaints. By the Court, 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL George A. Vaughn, III, Esquire 3904 Trindle Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 For the Plaintiffs William P. Douglas, Esquire Douglas, Douglas & Douglas 27 W. High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 For the Defendant MATX, INC., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V, : : NO. 97-4837 CIVIL TRAPPE HILL HOLDINGS, INC., trading as McCORMACK MATERIALS, Defendant LUTHER N. AMOS, JR., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V, : : NO. 97-4838 CIVIL TRAPPE HILL HOLDINGS, INC., : trading as McCORMACK MATERIALS, Defendant IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS Before HOFFER, P.J., OLER, J. and GUIDO, J. OPINION In this opinion, we address Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Complaints. The facts are as follows: Defendant, Trappe Hill Holdings, Inc., trading as McCormack Materials, is a Virginia corporation which builds sand and gravel extraction facilities. Plaintiff, Luther N. Amos Jr. (hereinafter Amos), is an engineer with expertise in design and construction of sand and gravel extraction facilities and a Cumberland County, Pennsylvania resident. Plaintiff, Matx, Inc. (hereinafter Matx), is a Pennsylvania corporation with a place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Matx is involved in construction and civil 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL engineering and has developed an expertise in sand and gravel extraction facilities. Amos was the long time chief engineer for L.B. Smith, Inc., another Pennsylvania corporation involved in the business of designing and equipping sand and gravel operations. (Notes to Testimony of Deposition of Luther N. Amos, hereinafter N.T. Amos, p.4). For a number of ~ears, while employed at L.B. Smith, Inc., Amos worked with the Defendant and consulted on several of the Defendant's other projects. (N.T. Amos, p. 9-10). The record reflects that Matx also had dealings with the Defendant in the past. Matx did a series of small jobs working directly for the Defendant and as a subcontractor to L.B. Smith, Inc. on Defendant's projects in New Jersey. (Notes to Testimony of Deposition of Joseph V. Capuano, President, Matx, Inc., hereinafter N.T. Capuano, p. 17). The project which gave rise to the present controversy was a sand and gravel extraction facility, built in New Brunswick, Canada, designed to obtain course sand to be shipped to Brooklyn, New York. (N.T. Amos, p. 5). In April of 1996, Randy Waterman, a representative of Defendant, contacted Amos, at his home, to request Amos' expertise for the project. (N.T. Amos, p. 5). Amos agreed to work, as a consultant on the project, for $50 per hour. (N.T. Amos, p. 6). Throughout the course of dealing between Defendant and Amos, Amos never 2 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL visited Defendant's Virginia offices; all communications between the two took place by phone or fax or on the project site. (N.T. Amos, p. 15). Amos regularly billed Defendant for his work and was sent payment at his Cumberland County home. (N.T. Amos, p. 8). Amos has sued the Defendant because he claims he is still owed approximately $9000 for the work he did for Defendant on the New Brunswick, Canada project. (Amos Complaint, p. 2). Matx became involved in the project in April of 1996 when Amos, acting on behalf of the Defendant, contacted Matx about putting in two conveyors, used to load ships, at the New Brunswick, Canada project site. (N.T. Capuano, p. 7). Matx did the conveyor work and was paid by check sent to its Carlisle office. (N.T. Capuano, p. 7). Mat)( was called again in August of 1996 to work on the construction of a second plant at the New Brunswick project. (N.T. Capuano, p. 8). Matx sent the Defendant a proposal on the pricing to do the work on the second phase of the project. (N.T. Capuano, p. 9). Further negotiations were completed and Matx sent two men to Canada to work on the construction of the second plant in the fall of 1996. (N.T. Capuano, p. 10-13). Matx claims that it has not been paid for the second stage of work done. (Matx Complaint, p..4). The balance due of nearly $17,000 is the subject Matx's complaint against the Defendant. (Matx 3 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL Complaint, p. 4). Both Amos and Matx filed complaints against the Defendant on September 8, 1997. On November 10, 1997, the Loudon County Sheriff served the Defendant with both complaints at Defendant's Upperville, Virginia office. Identical preliminary objections, asserting lack of jurisdiction on the part of this Court to hear the Plaintiffs' cases, were filed in each case on December 5, 1997, but argued much later. The Court will address Defendant's objections to jurisdiction in both the Amos and Matx cases together because the factual background which gives rise to jurisdiction in both cases is so closely linked. Discussion The issue presented in the case at bar is whether the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania may exercise in personam jurisdiction over the Defendant, a Virginia corporation. For the reasons that follow, we find that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the Defendant is neither a violation of Pennsylvania law, nor a violation of the United States Constitution. In considering a defendant's preliminary objections, all well pleaded facts and any reasonable inferences therefrom asserted by the plaintiff must be accepted as true. Colt Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Boisseau, 435 Pa. Super. 380, 382, 645 A.2d 1350, 1351 (1994). In order to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out 4 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL of state defendant, a court must test the facts of the case against the state's long arm statute and against the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Kubik v. Lettereri, 532 Pa. 10, 12, 614 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1992). Plaintiffs, in the cases at bar, have asserted breach of contract claims against the Defendant. Plaintiffs claim to have been harmed by Defendant's failure to pay for work done under their respective contracts. Plaintiffs are both Pennsylvania residents. Both were contacted in Pennsylvania to request their assistance on Defendant's sand and gravel extraction project in New Brunswick, Canada. The Pennsylvania long arm statute provides the basis upon which a court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over an out of state defendant. It states: (a) General Rule. - A tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person (or the personal representative of a deceased individual who would be subject to jurisdiction under this subsection if not deceased) who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or other matter arising from such person: (1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. Without excluding other acts which may constitute transacting business in this Commonwealth, any of the following shall constitute transacting business for the purpose of this paragraph: 5 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL (I) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object. (ii) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object with the intention of initiating a series of such acts. 42 Pa. C.S.A. Section 5322. A clear reading of the statute leads us to conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction is proper under the statute. Defendant reached into Pennsylvania to transact business. Defendant hired Pennsylvania residents so as to reap a pecuniary gain. Defendant had previous dealings with both plaintiffs, knowing that they were Pennsylvania residents. Defendant transacted business in this Commonwealth by hiring the Plaintiffs to manage and participate in the construction of its New Brunswick, Canada sand and gravel extraction project. Even if a state long arm statute confers jurisdiction, a court may not exercise in personam jurisdiction over an out of state defendant unless it is determined that a grant of jurisdiction would not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Kubik v. Lettereri, 532 Pa. 10, 12, 614 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1992). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressly adopted the constitutional 6 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL test set out in Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). The standard which must be met by a state in asserting specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant as articulated in Burger King is clear: (1) the non-resident defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state and (2) the assertion of in personam jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice. The determination of whether this standard has been met is not susceptible of any talismanic jurisdictional formula: the facts of each case must always be weighed in determining whether jurisdiction is proper. Kubik at 17, 614 A.2d at 1114 (citations omitted). Weighing the facts in the case at bar, Defendant has established minimum contacts with Pennsylvania. Defendant's reliance on Derman v. Wilair Services, Inc., 404 Pa. Super. 136, 590 A.2d 317 (1991), alloc, denied, 529 Pa. 621,600 A.2d 537 (1991), is misplaced. In Derman, plaintiffs, representatives of New York residents killed in a plane crash in Pennsylvania, attempted to sue a New York corporation, in Pennsylvania, for failure to properly maintain the plane. Id. The court found jurisdiction to be improper because the non-resident defendant had not reached into Pennsylvania to establish minimum contacts. Id. The case at bar is easily distinguishable because Defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of Pennsylvania when it deliberately chose to hire Pennsylvania residents 7 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL to work on the New Brunswick, Canada project. Further support for asserting jurisdiction over the Defendant sub judice can be found by comparing the facts at hand with the facts in Richard T. Byrnes, Co., Inc. v. Buss Automation, Inc., 415 Pa. Super. 549, 609 A.2d 1360 (1992). In Byrnes, jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant was proper where the defendant allegedly failed to pay a commission to the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen, owed under a contract. Id. Reaching out to a Pennsylvania resident and knowingly forming a contract with that citizen was enough to establish minimum contacts and make the assertion of jurisdiction fair. In the case at bar, Defendant reached into Pennsylvania to conduct business.1 Defendant purposefully availed itself of the expertise of Pennsylvania citizens in sand and gravel operations. The Defendant solicited work from the Plaintiffs, knowing that they were Pennsylvania citizens; they did not come to the Defendant looking for employment. Defendant deliberately engaged in significant activities in Pennsylvania. It is reasonable to believe that Defendant should have anticipated being haled into a Pennsylvania court. Defendant chose to contract ~ It is clear that the fact that Defendant was never physically present in Pennsylvania during the course of dealing between the parties is not a bar to the assertion of jurisdiction over the Defendant. See Colt Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Boisseau, 435 Pa. Super. 380, 391,645 A.2d 1350, 1356 (1994). 8 97-4837 CIVIL 97-4838 CIVIL with parties from Pennsylvania. Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Pennsylvania and minimum contacts were established. It is reasonable and fair to assert jurisdiction over the Defendant in the case at bar. Pennsylvania has an interest in providing a means of redress for its own citizens. If the Plaintiffs' allegations are proved at trial, it would be clear that Defendant intentionally harmed the Plaintiffs by failing to pay for work done while reaping an economic gain for itself. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable and fair to assert jurisdiction over the Defendant. Defendant's preliminary objections are therefore dismissed.