HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-0099 civilCOMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : NO. 98-0099 CIVIL TERM
:
GEORGE C. FULTON, JR.
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S APPEAL FROM SUSPENSION
OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, December 31, 1998, in accordance with this opinion,
Defendant's request that the Court sustain the instant appeal and allow Defendant
to retain his driving privileges is denied.
By the Court,
George H. Kabusk, Assistant Counsel
Department of Transportation
Riverfront Office Center
1101 South Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17104-2516
For the Commonwealth
Barbara J. Patton, Esquire
Allen Shaffer & Associates
129 Market Street
Millersburg, PA 17601
For the Defendant George C. Fulton, Jr.
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v. : NO. 98-0099 CIVIL TERM
:
GEORGE C. FULTON, JR.
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S APPEAL FROM SUSPENSION
OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
OPINION
Hoffer, J.:
In this opinion, we address Defendant's request for the Court to sustain
the instant appeal and allow Defendant to retain his driving privilege.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was convicted on March 19, 1996, of violating Section 3733
of the Vehicle Code (fleeing a police officer on December 29, 1995). This
conviction was not certified to PennDOT until November 14, 1997.
PennDOT sent out an official notice of suspension dated and mailed
December 16, 1997
DISCUSSION
The Defendant, in challenging the revocation of his license, bears the
burden of proving that there has been an unreasonable delay between his
98-0099 CIVIL TERM
conviction and the revocation of his operating privilege. Fordham v. Com.,
Dept. of Transp., 663 A.2d 868_871_(Pa.Cmwlth. 1995). But PennDOT is
chargeable with delay only from the point when it receives the certificate of
conviction. Dep't. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Turner, 155
Pa. Commw. Ct. 106, 634 A.2d 759, 761 (1993). Consequently, a delay
that is not attributable to PennDOT, such as the failure of a clerk to certify
the conviction to the Department in a timely manner, cannot serve as a basis
for the invalidation of a license revocation. Fordham, 663 A.2d at 871.
The Courts have interpreted the law to mean that PennDOT is required
to send out notices of suspension within a reasonable period of time.
Turner, 624 A.2d at 761. As a matter of law, a five month delay of notice of
suspension, attributable to PennDOT, has been held to be reasonable. Id.
And, conversely, a nineteen-month delay, attributable to PennDOT, has been
held to be an unreasonable delay. Id.
Unreasonable delay alone is not enough to overturn a suspension
without a licensee also showing that he has suffered prejudice as a result of
the delay. Turner, 624 A.2d at 761. Prejudice is shown when the licensee
proves that he changed his circumstances in reliance on the belief that his
98-0099 CIVIL TERM
operating privileges would not be impaired. Id.
The record shows that the Clerk of Courts certified Defendant's
conviction on November 14, 1997. We can assume that PennDOT did not
receive notice of certification before that date and shortly after that time,
approximately a month, PennDOT mailed Defendant's official notice of
suspension dated December 16, 1997. Since PennDOT is only responsible
for delay from the date it receives the certification of conviction, the delay at
issue in the present case is only one month. One month is clearly a
reasonable delay. Since a one month delay is clearly reasonable, we need
not address the issue as to whether or not this delay caused Defendant to
suffer prejudice.