HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-0097 SUPPORTHELEN M. MCCURDY,
Plaintiff
VS.
ROBERT L. MCCURDY, JR.,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
02-0097 SUPPORTS
PASCES NO. 979104228
DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S EXCEPTIONS TO SUPPORT MASTER'S
INTERIM ORDER OF COURT
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the appeal of the defendant, Robert L. McCurdy, Jr. (hereinafter
"father"), from the interim order of court entered on recommendation of the Support Master on May 28,
2002. The father raises two issues: (1) Whether the Support Master erred in applying the methodology
set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(c)(1), rather than (c)(2), to the facts of this case; and (2) whether the
Support Master erred in failing to conclude that the amount of time the children spend with their father is
equal to or greater than the amount of time they spend with their mother.
The father and the plaintiff, Helen M. McCurdy (hereinafter "mother"), were married on
September 29, 1989. They separated on December 23, 2000. There were three children born of the
marriage: Brittany A. McCurdy, Amanda R. McCurdy, and Benjamin R. McCurdy.
On February 13,2001, this court entered a custody order which provided that the parents were to
share physical custody of the children. On February 2, 2002, the mother filed for spousal and child
support. After a conference on March 21, 2002, the Domestic Relations Officer concluded that the
mother was not entitled to the requested support. However, at the Support Master's hearing, on May 15,
2002, the Master determined that the mother, while not entitled to spousal support, was entitled to child
support. The father thereafter filed the instant exceptions.
02-0097 SUPPORTS
Initially, we should address the weight which the court will accord the Master's findings of fact
and his legal conclusions. The reviewing court is not obligated to accept the Master's findings
without question:
The report of the master is entitled to great consideration in that
he has heard and seen the witnesses, and it should not be lightly
disregarded. It is advisory only, however, and the reviewing court
is not bound by it and it does not come to the court with any
preponderate weight or authority which must be overcome.
Acure v. Acure_, 219 Pa. Super. 415,281 A.2d 694, 695 (Pa. Super.
1971). The reviewing court must consider the evidence, its weight
and the credibility of the witnesses, de novo. Id. The Master's
report is not controlling, either on the lower court or on the
appellate court. Id.
Rothrock v. Rothrock, 2000 Pa. Super. 412, 415,765 A.2d 400, 404 (2000).
At the Support Master's hearing, the father contended that he had custody of the children
more than 50% of the time. He made this contention notwithstanding his admission that he only had
the children 43% of the overnights. By his computation, the father claimed that, while he had the
children for fewer overnights, he has custody of the children for 70.3% of their "waking hours."
Based upon this computation, he denies having responsibility for child support.
This case requires the application of Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16-4(c). The rule pertains to scenarios
in which a "non-custodial" parent has physical custody of the children for a substantial period of
time. It provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Substantial or Shared Physical Custody
(1) The support guidelines contemplate that the obligor has regular
contact, including vacation time, with his or her children, and that
he or she makes direct expenditures on behalf of the children. When,
however, the children spend 40% or more of their time during the
year with the obligor, a rebuttable presumption exists that the obligor
is entitled to a reduction in the basic support obligation to reflect this
additional time. Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) below,
2
02-0097 SUPPORTS
the reduction shall be calculated pursuant to the formula set fort in
Part II of subdivision (a) of this Rule. For purposes of this provision,
the time spent with the children shall be determined by the number of
overnights' they spend during the year with obligor. [Emphasis added.]
(2) Without regard to which parent initiated the support action, when
the children spend equal time with both parents, the Part II formula
cannot be applied unless the obligor is the parent with the higher
income. In no event shall an order be entered requiring the parent with
the lower income to pay basic child support to the parent with the higher
income. However, nothing in this subdivision shall prevent the entry of
an order requiring the parent with less income to contribute to additional
expenses pursuant to Rule 1910.16-6. Pursuant to either party' s
initiating a support action, the trier of fact may enter an order against
either party based upon the evidence presented without regard to which
party initiated the action. If application of the formula in Part II results
in the obligee receiving a larger share of the parties' combined income
in cases in which the parties share custody equally, then the Court shall
adjust the support obligation so that the combined income is allocated
equally between the two households.
As the Support Master pointed out, the parties agree that the custody order provides that the
father has the children for 156 nights per year (42.74% of the total overnights, to be exact). Based
upon this percentage, the Master concluded that subsection (c)(1) applies to the arrangement. The
father disagrees. In support of his contention, the father cites Colonna v. Colonna, 788 A.2d 430
(Pa. Super. 2001), wherein the court stated that "[w]hile the support law does not define the term
custodial parent, it is commonly understood to mean a parent who acts as the primary caregiver on a
regular basis for a proportionately greater period of time... [i]n most instances the Court can easily
determine the custodial parent for purposes of child support by identifying which parent has physical
custody of the child for a majority of the time." 788 A.2d at 438-439. Because the court used the
phrase "majority of the time," rather than "majority of overnights," the father concludes that he is an
equal custodial parent with the mother.
According to the custody order, the father has the children on alternate weeks during the
school year, aside from Wednesday night which they spend with the mother. The children spend
02-0097 SUPPORTS
approximately four hours with the father Monday through Friday--two hours before and after
school--during the mother's custodial week. The father claims that this balances out the Wednesday
overnight spent with the mother during his custodial week. During the summer, the father has the
children for 30 continuous days and the mother has the children for 14 continuous days. During the
remaining six weeks of the summer, the parents share weekends equally while, from Monday
through Friday, the children are with the father from 7:00 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. and spend the evenings
and overnights with the mother. In the end, the fact remains that the mother has the children for 209
overnights out of the year, compared to 156 nights spent with the father. The father contends that
Colonna_, Id., stands for the proposition that it is the total hours spent with each parent and not the
number of overnights that should be utilized to determine which parent is the custodial parent. Even
if we accept his interpretation, the result of this case would not be different. As the Master noted:
Even, assuming arguendo, that the father is legally
correct that total hours spent with each parent and not
the number of overnights spent with each parent
should be utilized to determine which parent is the
custodial parent or obligee for support purposes, the
father has the children in this case a fewer number of
hours in his custody than does the mother. The
mother has custody of the children not only more
overnights per year but also more hours per year. ~
Consequently, the methodology of computing the
father's support obligation as set forth in Rule
1910.16-4(c)(1) must be used.
~Plaintif/'s Exhibit 4 correctly shows that during a calendax year of
365 days, or 8,760 hours, the children spend more than half of the
total hours in a year with the mother. The father axgues that he has
the children more hours that they are awake. However, there is no
legal authority that only hours spent awake by the children should
count as custodial hours.
Support Master's Report and Recommendation, p. 5.
4
02-0097 SUPPORTS
While not determinative for the master we note that mother produced evidence that she is the
one who pays the recurring and special expenses of the children. It appears only appropriate that she
be assisted in this financial undertaking.
In conclusion, we accept the Support Master's recommendation that: (1) the plaintiff's claim
for spousal support is denied; (2) the defendant shall pay support for his children in the amount of
$465.00 per month; (3) the defendant shall pay 45% of unreimbursed medical expenses incurred by
the children which exceed $250.00 per year, per child; and, (4) the defendant shall pay $35.00 per
month on arrearages.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of September, 2002, the exceptions of the defendant to the
report of the Support Master in this case are OVERRULED and the interim order of court of May 28,
2002, is herewith made a permanent order of court.
BY THE COURT,
Steven Howell, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
J. Paul Helvy, Esquire
For the Defendant
DRO
:rlm
Kevin A. Hess, J.
HELEN M. MCCURDY,
Plaintiff
VS.
ROBERT L. MCCURDY, JR.,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
02-0097 SUPPORTS
PASCES NO. 979104228
DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S EXCEPTIONS TO SUPPORT MASTER'S
INTERIM ORDER OF COURT
ORDER
AND NOW, this
day of September, 2002, the exceptions of the defendant to the
report of the Support Master in this case are OVERRULED and the interim order of court of May 28,
2002, is herewith made a permanent order of court.
BY THE COURT,
Steven Howell, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
J. Paul Helvy, Esquire
For the Defendant
DRO
:tim
Kevin A. Hess, J.