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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-0637 CRIMINALCOMMONWEALTH VS. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 01-0637 CRIMINAL BRENTON JOSEPHS IN RE: PCRA PETITION BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is a petition of the defendant for post-conviction collateral relief. On July 3,2001, the defendant pled guilty to a count of the unlawful delivery of a schedule I, controlled substance, and a count of aggravated assault. He was sentenced on August 14, 2001, to concurrent terms of four to eight years. The instant petition asks the court to revisit his plea of guilty to the count of aggravated assault "[b]ecause nobody was hurt. The police report clearly shows that I did not try to hit anyone. The officer only felt fear which is not enough to even charge a felony I. I feel the court should reconsider that fact." At the recent hearing of this matter there was general agreement that the court could not "reconsider" the acceptance of the plea of guilty to aggravated assault without undoing the plea agreement between the parties. ~ The defendant now seeks to withdraw his earlier guilty pleas in their entirety. The aggravated assault arose out of incidents following the completion of the undercover buy of marijuana. When the police attempted to arrest the defendant, he fled in his vehicle. He engaged in a high-speed chase and, at one point, he drove southbound in the northbound lanes of ~ The Commonwealth agreed to the mandatory minimum sentence on the charge of the delivery of approximately twenty pounds of marijuana and agreed also not to object to concurrent sentences provided that the defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault. 01-0637 CRIMINAL U.S. Route 15. It was at that point, it is alleged, that he drove his vehicle at another vehicle driven by Officer Mark Martin of the Upper Allen Township Police Department. The Commonwealth contends that Officer Martin would have been struck by the defendant had he, Officer Martin, not taken evasive action. At his guilty plea, the defendant claimed not to remember that he had almost struck a police officer. IN fact, the question of whether he would plead guilty to the charge of aggravated assault was the source of considerable discussion with the court. It was clear that the defendant had been advised to plead guilty by his attorney given the agreement with the Commonwealth for a four to eight year sentence and the possibility that sentences would be run concurrent. IN addition, the defendant had an understanding with the federal government that if he pled guilty to the two Cumberland County charges, a certain federal prosecution would be dropped. After some discussion of the guilty plea to aggravated assault, the following exchange occurred between the court and the defendant: THE COURT: And, Mr. Josephs, ! am going to say it again, hopefully for the last time, but if you plead guilty, you are admitting that the officers were endangered in the way that Mr. Zigmund has just said. And if you don't think that's what happened, or you don't agree that that [sic] what's happened, then you should not plead guilty, do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Knowing that, is it your desire to enter the guilty plea, or would you rather not? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you understand that in the end, even though the advice of your attorney is 2 01-0637 CRIMINAL very important to you and to this system, nonetheless the decision as to whether or not to plead guilty in the end is your decision and your decision alone, do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Where PCRA relief is sought in connection with a guilty plea, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that he was unlawfully induced to plead guilty or that it was ineffective assistance of counsel which caused an involuntary or unknowing plea. Com. v. Mendoza, 730 A.2d 503 (Pa. Super. 1999). To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, the defendant "must show that his underlying contention possesses arguable merit, that the course chosen by counsel had no reasonable basis designed to serve [defendant's] interests, and that counsel's conduct prejudiced [the defendant]." Id~. There is no requirement that the defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty. All that is required is that the decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. Id. There is no question in this case that the defendant's plea of guilty to aggravated assault, as part of a larger plea agreement, was encouraged on him by counsel. It is equally clear that counsel's advice to the defendant was designed to serve the defendant's interests. By entering the plea, the defendant was shielded from the possibility of greater sentences in the case and from a prosecution by the federal government. The egregious nature of the defendant's high- speed flight from the police made it likely that he would, in the end, be found guilty of some form of assault with no guarantee that the sentence for the offense would not run consecutive to the drug charge. It cannot be said that counsel's conduct "prejudiced" the defendant. To the 01-0637 CRIMINAL comrary, counsel's conduct did have the defendam's best imerests very much in mind. Accordingly, the defendam's petition will be denied. ORDER AND NOW, this post-conviction collateral relief is DENIED. day of October, 2002, the petition of the defendant for BY THE COURT, Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Dirk Berry, Esquire For the Defendant Kevin A. Hess, J. :rlm 4 COMMONWEALTH VS. BRENTON JOSEPHS AND NOW, this post-conviction collateral relief is DENIED. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 01-0637 CRIMINAL IN RE: PCRA PETITION BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER day of October, 2002, the petition of the defendant for BY THE COURT, Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Dirk Berry, Esquire For the Defendant Kevin A. Hess, J. :rlm