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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-0381 CivilFIRST UNION HoME · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF EQUITY BANK, · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff · · CIVIL ACTION--LAW ROBERT M. MRAZ, ' EMMIE V. MRAZ and · RONALD A. RILEY, · Defendants ' No. 99-0381 CWIL TERM IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 OLER, J., August 10, 2001· In this mortgage foreclosure case, a pro se defendant has filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court from a denial of a "Motion for Disposition on -_ Pending Counterclaim." This motion, which was filed more than a year after the entry of a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its mortgage foreclosure claim and more than three months after a sheriff's sale of the mortgaged premises, requested the court to: (1) rule on the pending Counterclaim Motion Pending Disposition, (2) but a hold on all preceding pertaining to Mortgage Foreclosure NO. 99-381 until this Counterclaim is addressed, and (3) issue an Order stopping the Sheriff's Office of Cumberland County from sellin~ named Defendant's Home until final litigation of this action.- This opinion in support of the order appealed from is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). STATEMENT OF FACTS This action in mortgage foreclosure was commenced on January 21, 1999, by Plaintiff bank/mortgagee against Defendant Ronald A. Riley (hereinafter Motion for Disposition on Pending Counterclaim of Defendant Riley, filed March 8, 2001. Defendant), his mother, and his stepfather.2 Plaintiff sought to foreclose on property at 3653 Chestnut Street, Camp Hill (Hampden Township), Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, which served as security for a debt in the amount of $95,379.18.3 4 It was The property had originally been owned by Defendant's stepfather. deeded by Defendant's stepfather to Defendant's stepfather and Defendant's mother in 1993.5 Defendant's stepfather and Defendant's mother subjected the property to the mortgage at issue on September 2, 1994.6 Defendant's mother died on June 20, 1995.7 Defendant's stepfather thereafter deeded the property to himself and Defendant.8 According to Plaintiff's complaint, payments on the mortgage fell in arrears in 1998, as a consequence of which the instant action was filed? Defendant, who was not liable on the debt which the mortgage secured, was joined only as an owner in the suit.l° Defendant, an inmate at a state correctional institution throughout the course of this litigation, began filing objections, motions and petitions almost immediately after commencement of the suit.~ The docket now extends to five pages. 2 Plaintiff's complaint; Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, Riley's Exhibit "A" 3 Plaintiff's complaint. 4 Plaintiff's complaint (deed excerpt). 5 Plaintiff's complaint (deed excerpt). 6 Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 3. 7 Plaintiff's complaint (deed excerpt). Shortly after commencement of this action, a suggestion of death was filed with respect to Defendant's mother, on March 15, 1999. 8 See Plaintiff's complaint (deed excerpt). 9 Plaintiffs complaint, paragraph 5. ~0 Plaintiff's complaint; see Pa. R.C.P. 1144. ~ See, e.g., Plaintiff Riley's Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, filed February 12, 1999. This motion, as was the ease with others, was filed both at the instant docket number and in a ease in which Defendant had filed suit against the bank. 2 On February 22, 1999, Defendant filed a 42-page document which included an item entitled "Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him." Contained within this item were several paragraphs ~, ~ · ,~12 denominated Counterclmm. These paragraphs stated as follows: 16. Plaintiff Riley asserts that he has filed with this forum on November 18th, 1998 his "pro se" action against Defendant Bank at number #98-6576, seeking injunctive and other relief upon Defendant Bank and Defendant MRAZ for conduct which attempts to deprive him of his interests in the estate/property which prompts Defenant Bank's action in this Court. Additionally, he has filed for injunctive relief and has sought to have that complaint filed at the above-said number with this Court entered as counterclaim to defendant bank's claims asserted upon him. For purposes of brevity, Plaintiff Riley incorporates his complaint and as if set forth at length herein. In seriatim, he alleges that Defendant Bank and Defendant MRAZ acted in a manner which deprived him and intends to deprive him of his interest in the estate now the subject of foreclosure before this Court. Plaintiff served both Defendant Bank and Defendant MRAZ certified mail, and, which service was effected upon both parties via mailing February 2nd, 1999. 17. Plaintiff Riley asserts that he is entitled to relief in that the liability of Defendant Bank and MRAZ has attempted to deprive him of his inherited interest in the estate now subject to foreclosure by the conduct of MRAZ. Plaintiff Riley, at all times, is and has been free from fault in any such proceedings relating to loans, mortgages and/or effectuation(s) of payment therefor. 18. Plaintiff Riley's complaint filed in this Court upon MRAZ and Defendant Bank is incorporated from paragraphs 1 through 26, and, if set forth at length thereof, including all relief and damages therefor. Thus, additional paragraphs shall be set forth by number only at 18 through 44, in the instant pleadings and objections filed by named Plaintiff. See attached Exhibit "A", infra. ~2 Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, paragraphs 16-18, 45. 3 45. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Riley respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Defendant Bank's complaint against him and to hold Defendant Bank and MRAZ liable for damages and relief as set forth in Plaintiff's complaint and counterclaim thereagainst.~3 The preliminary objections averred, inter alia, that "umbrage is taken at any attempts to indicate that this Plaintiff relinquishes or seeks to relinquish his interest in the property/estate in question and subject to Defendant bank's foreclosure action.'d4 Grounds asserted for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint ,,16 "lack of and/or included "insufficient specmcay, "lack of capacity to sue, improper service of the writ and/or pleadings,''~? "failure of the complaint to state a cause of action,'da "failure... to conform to law [and] rules of Court,''~9 and "scandalous content(s).''2° ~3 id. ~4 Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, paragraph 2. ~ Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, paragraph 11 ("Plaintiff Riley is entitled to dismissal based on the insufficient specificity in the pleadings. filed by Defendant Bank indicating his liability to them in any manner."). ~6 Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, paragraph 12 ("Plaintiff Riley is entitled to dismissal of the complaint against him based on the lack of capacity to sue him as a Defendant by Defndant Bank."). ~7 Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, paragraph 13 ("Plaintiff Riley is entitled to dismissal based on the lack of and/or improper service of the writ and/or pleadings upon him by Defendant Bank."). la Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, paragraph 14 ("Plaintiff Riley is entitled to dismissal based on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action against him."). ~9 Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, paragraph 15 ("Plaintiff Riley is entitled to dismissal based upon the failure of Defendant Bank's pleadings to conform to law, rules of Court, and, its scandalous content(s) against named Plaintiff."). 20 Plaintiff Riley's Preliminary Objections to Defendant Bank's Complaint upon Him, paragraph 15 ("Plaintiff Riley is entitled to dismissal based upon the failure of Defendant Bank's pleadings to conform to law, rules of Court, and, its scandalous content(s) against named Plaintiff."). 4 On March 26, 1999, Defendant filed a document entitled "Plaintiff's Supplemental Preliminary Objections." The gist of these preliminary objections seemed to be summarized in one of the paragraphs as follows: Plaintiff Riley asserts that the complaint does not allege any valid claims against him for which liability can be imposed upon him by this Court. A review of the facts contained in the complaint [filed by the bank's counsel] and the records possessed by him indicate this as well. By these facts, it is clear that, at the time [the counsel] filed this complaint against named Plaintiff herein, he had full, complete and clear knowledge that no actual facts existed whereby the action could be maintained against named Plaintiff for relief [the counsel] asserts his entitlement to. These facts are requisite elements of the crimes of perjury, obstruction of justice and barratry. They are also clear requisits of violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct all lawyers are to adhere to.2~ On July 26, 1999, the Honorable Edgar B. Bayley of this court entered an order denying Defendant's "preliminary objections.''22 Upon Plaintiffs praecipe, a default judgment on Plaintiffs claim was entered against Defendant on September 8, 1999. On October 7, 1999, Defendant filed an "Objection to Default Judgment Entered September 8th, 1999."23 The bases for the objection were that Plaintiffs counsel had not commenced the litigation in good faith and that Defendant had filed a motion for summary judgment.24 The court issued a rule upon Plaintiff to show cause why the default judgment should not be stricken or opened? Plaintiff filed a response on October 2~ Plaintiff's Supplemental Preliminary Objections, paragraph 51. 22 Order of Court, July 26, 1999. 23 Defendant Riley's Objection to Default Judgment Entered September 8th, 1999, filed October 7, 1999. 24 Defendant Riley's Objection to Default Judgment Entered September 8th, 1999. 2~ Order of Court, October 13, 1999. 5 25, 1999.26 On April 18, 2000, Defendant's objection to the default judgment was denied?? No appeal was filed from this order. On December 6, 2000, the real estate sub judice was sold at a sheriff's sale.28 On March 8, 2001, Defendant filed the "Motion for Disposition on Pending Counterclaim" referred to at the beginning of this opinion.29 The motion was denied by the court on March 21,2001.30 On April 4, 2001, Defendant filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court from the denial of the order. A statement of matters complained of on appeal, filed on July 30, 2001, reads as follows: 1. On October 10, 1998, Plaintiff First Union Home Equity Bank (Plaintiff Bank) served upon Defendant Mraz a Notice To Intention To Foreclosure. 2. On November 18, 1998, Defendant Riley filed an Action In Equity No. 98-6576 asserting a claim against Defendant Mraz for fraud, by virtue of his subjecting of the property in question to a lien either prior to and/or after placement of Defendant Riley on the deed as party in interest th the estate. A second count premisses liability of Plaintiff Bank for it's conspiratorial participation in Defendant Mraz's fraud. The third count against Plaintiff Bank is negligence for failing to investigate all parties involved in the estate, acquiring a loan in default from Mellon Bank on behalf of Defendant Mraz, and providindg Defendant Mraz with a second loan (Home Improvement) to buy two vehicles with. Additionally, on page 10 of Defendant Riley's Equity Action named Defendant requested as relief that this Equity Action be granted as a 26 Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Ronald A. Riley's Objection to Default Judgment Entered September 8, 1999, filed October 25, 1999. 27 Order of Court, April 18, 2000. 28 Sheriff's Sale Return, filed January 24, 2001. 29 Motion for Disposition on Pending Counterclaim, filed March 8, 2001. 3o Order of Court, March 21,2001. In reciting the facts of this case, the court has, in the interest of presenting an intelligible history pertinent to the appeal, omitted reference to a large number of objections, motions and petitions filed by Defendant in the course of the litigation and disposed of by the court. These appear on the docket and are contained in the record. 6 timely responsive pleading and counterclaim to any action filed by Plaintiff Bank for action taken against Defendant Mraz and/or the estate. 3. In Defendant Riley's Preliminary Objection February 16, 1999, to Plaintiff Banks Mortgage Foreclosure No. 99-381 filed January 21, 1999, Defendant Riley set forth under the heading "Counterclaim" his cause of action assertidgin his Action In Equity filed November 18, 1998, No. 98-6576. 4. Defendant Riley asserts that his Counterclaim is not a mere answer or denial of Plaintiff Bank's allegations in its Mortgage Foreclosure, but rather asserts an independent cause of action, 275 N. E.-2d 688, 690, the purpose of which is to oppose or deduct from Plaintiff Bank's Mortgage Foreclosure (16 F.R.D. 225. 227) and which Counter-Demand is still pending disposition before the Court. 5. Named Defendant asserts that to allow the Sheriff of Cumberland County to put all of Defendant's property out of his Home into the street_, and sell his Home is a miscarriage of justice born out of the deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as the sale of Defendant Riley's Home denying the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before property is taken from it's possessor; and the denial of equal protection of the law as a result of this Courts refusal to acknowledge named Defendants properly pleaded and main tained Counterclaim to Plaintiff Banks Mortgage Foreclosure pending disposition before the Court.3! It may be noted that Defendant's action against Plaintiff herein at No. 98- 6576 Civil Term, referred to in the statement of matters complained of, remains pending in this court? DISCUSSION In the present case, several factors militated against granting Defendant's Motion for Disposition on Pending Counterclaim, filed on March 8, 2001. First, the averments of the "counterclaim" were contained in preliminary objections 3~ Appellants Statement of Matters Complained of, filed July 30, 2001. 32 Most recently in that case, an appeal by PlaintiffRiley (Defendant herein) to the Superior Court from a discovery order was quashed as interlocutory, on June 26, 2001. See Riley v. First Union Home Equity Bank, 573 MDA 2001 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 26, 2001). 7 disposed of adversely to Defendant by Judge Bayley of this court on July 26, 1999;33 the averments were not reiterated in a proper responsive pleading following disposition of the preliminary objections.34 Second, to the extent that the counterclaim was intended to embody a defense to the present action it was subsumed by the default judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the denial of Defendant's "objection" to the default judgment, fi:om which no appeal was taken. As has been frequently observed, at some point "litigation must eventually come to an end." Mcbfillen v. 84 Lumber, Inc., 538 Pa. 567, 571,649 A.2d 932, 934 (1994). The denial of a motion or petition to strike or open a default judgment is a final, appealable order. See, e.g., Flynn v. Casa Di Bertacchi Corp., 449 Pa. Super. 606, 674 A.2d 1099 (1996). Third, the relief requested in Defendant's motion was largely preempted by the default judgment and sale of the premises months prior to the filing of the motion. Finally, Defendant's "counterclaim" against Plaintiff subsists in litigation pending in this court at No. 98-6576 Civil Term. For the foregoing reasons, it is believed that the denial of Defendant's Motion for Disposition on Pending Counterclaim was proper. BY THE COURT, esley O~, Jr., J. 33 In Pennsylvania, it "has long [been] recognized that judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each others' decisions." Commonwealth v. Start, 541 Pa. 564, 573, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (1995). The coordinate jurisdiction rule "embod[ies] the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter." Id. at 574, 664 A.2d at 1331. 34 See Pa. R.C.P. 1028(d) (right of objecting party to plead over within 20 days following order overruling preliminary objections).