HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-2842 CivilCHRISTOPHER A. WRIGHT, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Petitioner : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW
:
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, :
DEPARTMENT OF :
TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU:
OF DRIVER LICENSING, :
Respondent : NO. 01-2842 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925
OLER, J., September 12, 2001.
In this license suspension case, Respondent, the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation, has appealed to the Commonwealth Court from an order of this court
partially sustaining an appeal by Petitioner, Christopher A. Wright, from a one-year
suspension of his driving privileges imposed by the Department pursuant to Section
1532(d) of the Vehicle CodeI in response to Petitioner's first conviction for an offense
related to underage possession or consumption of alcohol.2 The court denied the appeal
with respect to Petitioner's claim that the suspension should be invalidated due to delay
in notification, but sustained the appeal to the extent that the period of suspension was
reduced to 90 days, the period applicable to a "first offense" under Section 1532(d)fi
The case presented the issue of whether a licensee's first conviction could be
deemed to be a "second offense," for purposes of applying enhanced penalty provisions
of Section 1532(d) of the Vehicle Code, when the licensee's first conviction occurred at a
point in time prior to a second violation and subsequent conviction.4 The court concluded
1 Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, No. 81, § 1, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1532(d) (West
1998 & Supp. 2001).
2 See Respondent's Notice of Appeal, filed August 16, 2001; Order of Ct., August 1,
2001.
3 Order of Ct., August 1, 2001.
4 N.T. 7, Hr'g August 1, 2001 (hereinafter N.T. ~.
that the first conviction was a "first offense" under Section 1532(d), and that the
Department of Transportation had improperly applied the enhanced penalty provisions of
that section to a "first offense."
Following the entry of the court order and the filing of Respondent's Notice of
Appeal, the Commonwealth Court, in Ciaccia v. Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation, held, on facts similar to those in the present case, that a first conviction
was properly deemed a "second offense," for purposes of the enhanced penalty
provisions of Section 1532(d), when the Department previously had received a record of
a second conviction and had imposed a suspension applicable to a "first offense" in
response to the second conviction.5 From the holding in Ciaccia, it is clear that this
court's analysis of the enhancement issue was in error and that the Department's
suspension should have been upheld in its entirety.
~. This opinion is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(a).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner is Christopher A. Wright, 20, and resides at 1714 Comell Road, Camp
Hill, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Respondent is the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (hereinafter
Department).6
Petitioner was convicted on two separate occasions of violations of 18 Pa. C.S.A.
§ 6308, which relates to the underage possession or consumption of alcohol.? Both the
first violation and conviction occurred before the second violation and conviction. The
date of the first conviction, for the violation that occurred on January 29, 2000, was
5 Ciaccia v. Pa. Dep 't of Transp., 2001 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 622 (August 20, 2001).
6 N.T. 3, 7; Commonwealth's Ex. 1, Hr'g August 1, 2001, at 2 (Report of Court Ordering
Suspension of Operating Privilege) (hereinafter Commonwealth's Ex. 1).
7 Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308(a)
(West 1998 & Supp. 2001) ("A person commits a summary offense if he, being less than
21 years of age, attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or knowingly and
intentionally transports any liquor or malt or brewed beverages .... ")
2
February 29, 2000. The date of the second conviction, for the violation that occurred on
November 11, 2000, was February 2, 2001.8
Pursuant to statutory requirements, records of these convictions were certified and
forwarded to the Department;9 however, the Department received the record of the
second conviction before it received the record of the first conviction. The record of the
first conviction was not forwarded to the Department until March 22, 2001, more than a
year after the first conviction date. During this interim, the second conviction occurred
and a record of that conviction was forwarded promptly to the Department on February 2,
2001.~°
On February 23, 2001, in response to the record of the second conviction, the
Department mailed to Petitioner an official notification of a license suspension. The
notification stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
As a result of your violation on 11/11/2000 of violating Section 6308
(offenses related to alcohol), your driving privilege is being SUSPENDED
for a period of 90 DAY(S) as mandated by section 1532D of the vehicle
code.TM
On April 10, 2001, in response to the record of the first conviction, the
Department mailed to Petitioner another official notification of a license suspension. The
notification stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
As a result of your violation on 01/29/2000 of violating Section 6308
(offenses related to alcohol), your driving privilege is being SUSPENDED
8 N.T. 4-7; Commonwealth's Ex. 1 at 2, 4 (Reports of Court Ordering Suspension of
Operating Privilege).
9 Act of March 25, 1988, P.L. 262, No. 31, § 11, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6310.4(a) ("Whenever a
person is convicted.., for a violation of... [18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308], the court.., shall
order the operating privilege of the person suspended. A copy of the order shall be
transmitted to the Department of Transportation.")
l0 N.T. 4-7; Commonwealth's Ex. 1 at 2, 4 (Reports of Court Ordering Suspension of
Operating Privilege).
~ N.T. 4-7; Commonwealth's Ex. 1 at 3 (Department's Notice of Suspension). The
effective date of the suspension was indicated to be March 30, 2001. Id.
for a ~eriod of 1 YEAR(S) as mandated by section 1532D of the vehicle
code.
On May 10, 2001, Petitioner appealed to this court from the one-year license
suspension.~3 At a hearing on the matter, Petitioner argued that the suspension ~vas
invalid because of an unreasonable delay between the point at which Petitioner was
convicted of the violation and the point at which the Department notified Petitioner of the
suspension.TM Respondent argued that the delay between the conviction and the
imposition of the suspension was not caused by the Department, and that, therefore, the
suspension is valid,is
Alternatively, Petitioner argued that, under Section 1532(d) of the Vehicle Code,
the Department was required to impose a 90-day suspension in response to a "first
offense." Petitioner argued that the Department violated this statutory mandate by
imposing a one-year suspension, the period applicable to a "second offense," in response
to the record of Petitioner's first conviction.~6 Respondent argued that the Department
may impose a suspension for a period applicable to a "second offense" in response to a
record of a first conviction when the Department previously has received a record of a
second conviction and has imposed a suspension applicable to a "first offense" in
response to the second conviction.~7
On August 1,2001, the court denied the appeal with respect to the contention that
the suspension was invalid because of unreasonable delay; however, the court sustained
12 N.T. 4-7; Commonwealth's Ex. 1 at 2 (Department's Notice of Suspension). The
effective date of the suspension was indicated to be June 6, 2001. Id.
~3 See Petitioner's Appeal from Suspension of Operator's License Privileges, filed May
10, 2001. Neither party has appealed the 90-day license suspension imposed by the
Department by notification dated February 23,2001.
14 N.T. 8.
15 N.T. 4, 18.
16 N.T. 7-8.
27 N.T. 8.
4
the appeal "to the extent that the period of suspension imposed by the Department, by
notice dated April 10, 2001, is reduced to 90 days.''la
On August 16, 2001, Respondent filed a notice of appeal to the Commonwealth
Court. 19
DISCUSSION
Statement of Law
Unreasonable Delay. The relevant period for determining whether a license
suspension is invalid because of an unreasonable delay in notifying the licensee is the
period between the point at which the Department receives the record of the conviction
and the point at which the Department notifies the licensee. Pokoy v. Pa. Dep't of
Transp., 714 A.2d 1162, 1164 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998). "In other words, only an
unreasonable delay by [the Department], and not the judicial system, invalidates [the
Department's] license suspension." Id.
Enhancement Provisions. Section 1532(d) of the Vehicle Code, which includes
enhanced penalties for repeat offenders, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Additional suspension.--The department shall suspend the operating
privilege of any person upon receiving a certified record of the driver's
conviction ... for a violation under... [18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308]. The
duration of the suspension shall be as follows:
(1) For a first offense, the department shall impose a
suspension for a period of 90 days.
(2) For a second offense, the department shall impose a
suspension for a period of one year.
(3) For a third and subsequent offense, the department shall
impose a suspension for a period of two years. Any multiple
suspensions imposed shall be served consecutively.
75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1532(d).
The Statutory Construction Act, which governs the interpretation of Pennsylvania
statutes, provides, in part, as follows:
ts Order of Ct., August 1, 2001.
~9 Respondent' s Notice of Appeal, filed August 16, 2001.
When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter
of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3, 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1921(b) (West 1998 & Supp.
2001).20
As noted previously, the Commonwealth Court has recently held that it is "the
order in which the Department receives the conviction that determines whether the
violation is deemed a first or subsequent offense," and that, therefore, a suspension
applicable to a "second offense" may. be imposed in response to a first conviction if the
Department previously has received a record of a second conviction. Ciaccia, 2001 Pa.
Comm~v. LEXIS at 4-5. In Ciaccia, the Court reasoned that, because the receipt of a
certified record of the driver's conviction is a "condition precedent" to the imposition of a
suspension under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1532(d), the date of the receipt of the record of the
conviction, rather than the date of the conviction itself, is the proper focus to determine
whether the conviction is a subsequent offense. Id. at 4.
Application of Law to Facts
Unreasonable Delay. The court found no merit in Petitioner's contention that the
license suspension was invalid because of an unreasonable delay between the date of his
first conviction and the date of his notification of the suspension imposed in response to
that conviction. Only unreasonable delay by the Department serves to invalidate a license
suspension. In this case, however, the delay was attributable almost wholly to the judicial
system; the Department was responsible for a delay of only 19 days. Because 19 days
was a reasonable period in which to notify Petitioner, the suspension was valid. See
Fordham v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., 663 A.2d 868, 872 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (holding
six-month delay to be reasonable); Pa. Dep't of Transp. v. Russo, 96 Pa. Commw. 187,
189, 506 A.2d 1349, 1350 (1986) (holding five-month delay to be reasonable).
20 "When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and
definite meaning.., the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Davis v.
Sulcowe, 416 Pa. 138, 143,205 A.2d 89, 91 (1964); see also 1 Pa. C.S.A. §1903 ("Words
and phrases shall be construed.., according to their common and approved usage .... ").
6
Enhancement Provisions. The court sustained Petitioner's appeal with respect to
his claim that the Department lacked the authority to impose a one-year suspension, the
period applicable to a "second offense" under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1532(d), in response to his
first conviction. In so holding, the court was attempting to apply Section 1921(b) of the
Statutory Construction Act, notwithstanding practical difficulties which would obviously
result where, as here, the Department's receipt of notices of (first) convictions was
delayed. This approach, as it developed, proved to be inconsistent with the subsequent
holding in Ciaccia.
BY THE COURT,
-. Jf~"sl~y C~lel~, igJ.
G. Patrick O'Connor, Esq.
3105 Old Gettysburg Road
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Attorney for Petitioner
George Kabusk, Esq.
PennDOT, Office of Chief Counsel
Third Floor, Riverfront Office Center
Harrisburg, PA 17104
Attorney for Respondent
7