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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-2319 CRIMINALCOMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. WILLIE JOE HUGHES 01-2319 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE BAYLEY, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., April 3, 2002:-- Defendant, Willie Joe Hughes, is charged with a count of unlawful use of or possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia.~ He filed a motion to suppress evidence upon which a hearing was conducted on March 26, 2002. We find the following facts. Early in the morning on June 12, 2001, Officers Jeffrey Kurtz and Shane Cohick, of the Carlisle Borough Police, received a radio dispatch of an anonymous tip reporting drug activity in room 507 of the Molly Pitcher Hotel. The officers went to the hotel, in the Borough of Carlisle, arriving at approximately 2:15 a.m. They went to room 507, which is on a hall on the fifth floor. They heard voices in the room. They knocked on the door, and announced "Carlisle Police". They heard some movement in the room for about a minute. Defendant then opened the door and stepped into the hallway. Officer Cohick told defendant that they were there because of a report of drug activity in the ~ 75 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(32). 01-2319 CRIMINAL TERM room. Defendant denied there was any illegal activity. As Officer Cohick was talking to him, Officer Kurtz saw something in defendant's shirt pocket that resembled a pen. He asked defendant several times what was in his pocket. Defendant, however, kept talking to Officer Cohick. Defendant then adjusted the item in his shirt pocket, at which time Officer Kurtz saw the tip of what he recognized, from his experience, was a glass crack stem with burnt residue on a screen. Officer Kurtz removed the item from defendant's pocket, and arrested him. In Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 1995), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: [t]hat Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development of three categories of interactions between citizens and the police. The first of these is a 'mere encounter' (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). The second, an 'investigative detention' must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. See Berkemerv. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Finally, an arrest or 'custodial detention' must be supported by probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 532 Pa. 62, 614 A.2d 1378 (1992). Id. at 293-94, 661 A.2d at 1047-48. (Emphasis added.) In Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320 (Pa. Super. 2000), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: In determining whether a 'mere encounter' has risen to the level of an 'investigative detention,' the focus of our inquiry is on -2- 01-2319 CRIMINAL TERM whether a 'seizure' on the person has occurred. Commonwealth v. Mendenhafl, 552 Pa. 484, 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998). Within this context, our courts employ the following objective standard to discern whether a person has been seized: '[VV]hether, under all the circumstances surrounding the incident at issue, a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave.' Commonwealth v. Smith, 732 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1999) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 672 A.2d 769, 774 (1996). Thus, 'a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.' United States v. Klm, 27 F.3d 947, 950 (3d Cir. 1994). Id. at 324. (Emphasis added.) An investigative detention constitutes a seizure of the person and must be supported by reasonable suspicion that the person being detained is engaged in criminal activity. Id. In the present case, Officers Kurtz and Cohick went to room 507 in the Molly Pitcher Hotel on an anonymous tip reporting drug activity in the room. Thus, they did not have sufficient information to conduct an investigatory detention of anyone in the room. The officers knocked on the door and announced that they were police officers. Defendant answered the door and stepped into the hall. It was during a discussion with defendant of whether there had been illegal drug activity in the room, and after Officer Kurtz asked him several times what was in his pocket, which questions defendant ignored, that the officer saw the glass crack stem, with burnt residue on a screen, in defendant's pocket. Up to that point we are satisfied, under all of the circumstances, that defendant would believe that he was free to leave or go back into his room. Thus, no seizure of defendant's person had occurred while the police officers were asking him a few questions. Therefore, when the contraband came into plain view, Officer Kurtz lawfully seized it and arrested defendant for unlawful use or possession with -3- 01-2319 CRIMINAL TERM intent to use the crack stem? ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of April, 2002, the motion of defendant to suppress evidence, IS DENIED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Daniel J. Sodus, Esquire For the Commonwealth Aria M. Waller, Esquire For the Defendant :prs 2 Officer Kurtz, seeing that the glass stem had what he believed to be burnt residue on the screen, had probable cause to believe that the device had been unlawfully used, or was possessed by defendant with the intent to use it unlawfully, and thus was drug paraphernalia. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 50 Cumberland L.J. 215 (2001). -4-