HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-0162 criminalCOMMONWEALTH In THE COURT Of COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO 98-0162 CRIMINAL TERM
CHARGE: (1) DUI
v. (2) CARELESS DRIVING
(SUMMARY)
(3) DRIVING UNDER
SUSPENSION
(SUMMARY; .DUI-RELATED)
TINA MARIE HILL AFFIANT: TPR. CHRISTOPHER O i ~
Defendant OTN: E863091-5
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R, A, P, 1925
Before HOFFER, P.J,
OPINION
HOFFER, P.J.:
In this opinion the Court addresses the findings to the captioned charges.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted on July 16, 1998, of Driving Under the
Influence and Driving Under Suspension (DUI-related). The Court found
defendant not guilty of Careless Driving. The Court set bail at $1,000, which was
posted on July 16, 1998. Defendant absconded from the area when directed to
appear for sentence. On August 4, 1998, a bench warrant was issued for her
arrest and bail was forfeited. Defendant subsequently turned herself in to police
in Charleston County, South Carolina on May 21, t999, and was extradited back
to the Commonwealth by Transcor. On June 15, 1999, this Court imposed a
judgment of sentence on defendant, from which she appealed to the Superior
Court.
Defendant's primary complaint is that the jury did not believe her side of
the story. She and Michael Highlands each testified that Highlands took
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defendant to two bars in Ed Benton's green pickup truck during the evening and
early morning of October 18 and 19, 1997. According to defendant's testimony,
Highlands waited in the truck, did not enter either bar and did not consume
alcohol. Highlands testified that he drank two beers at the Oliver Plunket with
defendant, who had mixed drinks and beer, but that he did not enter the second
bar, the Three Pines. Both defendant and Highlands testified that after
defendant exited the Three Pines, Highlands drove defendant to the Sheetz in
Mount Holly Springs, entering from Route 34. Both testified that Highlands went
inside the Sheetz, leaving defendant in the truck. Both testified that Highlands,
upon seeing police officers inside the Sheetz when a warrant was outstanding for
his arrest, fled the scene without returning to the truck.
For the Commonwealth, two witnesses who did not know defendant,
Jennifer Parsons and Christine Marie Barrick, testified that defendant drove the
truck into the Sheetz parking lot at 2 a.m. on October 19, 1997. Parsons and
Barrick each testified that defendant was alone in the truck. Two state police
officers happened to be inside the Sheetz convenience store when the sound of
squealing tires and the sight of a truck entering the lot drew them outside. There
was testimony that the truck had been driven in a careless manner, and that it
entered the Sheetz at a high rate of speed. Corporal Perry Tolbert and Trooper
Christopher C. Ott of the Pennsylvania State Police approached the truck. They
testified that defendant was alone in the truck. Both officers identified defendant
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in court as the driver. Corporal Tolbert testified that he did not see Highlands at
the scene, in the truck or in the Sheetz.
The officers asked defendant her date of birth, which she could not give.
Trooper Ott testified that defendant's eyes were blurry, glassy and bloodshot; her
speech was incoherent and slurred; and the odor of alcohol lingered about her.
Ott testified that after having witnessed these signs of intoxication in defendant,
he arrested her for Driving Under the Influence. Defendant stipulated at trial that
when her Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) was taken at 3:31 a.m. on October 19,
1997, it registered 0.174 percent. Defendant also stipulated that when she met
the police officers at 2 a.m., her BAC was greater than 0.10 percent. Ott testified
that at the scene, defendant told them that she had not been drinking, but then
said she came from the Three Pines Tavern.
Parsons testified that she could see the truck until the police arrived, and
no one got out of the truck to enter the Sheetz. Parsons testified that defendant
appeared to give the police "some attitude." Barrick testified that when the
officers approached defendant in the truck, no one left the truck.
Defendant was assigned court-appointed counsel on February 17, 1998.
At trial, defendant admitted to her defense counsel on redirect that she had
previously pled guilty to and was convicted of the charge of Unsworn Falsification
to Authorities in an unrelated matter. Defense counsel Samuel VV. Milkes
requested that the Court permit defendant to explain the prior conviction to the
Court and the jury. The judge refused Milkes's request. Defendant was found
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guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Driving With a BAC of .10% or
Greater and Driving Under Suspension. Defendant was found not guilty of
Careless Driving.
The Court now re-addresses this matter because defendant is appealing
on the basis of two issues. First, defendant contends that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence because Highlands and defendant both testified that
he was the driver of the truck. Second, regarding her prior conviction for
Unsworn Falsification to Authorities, defendant contends the Court should have
permitted her to submit testimony to explain the prior conviction or place it in
context after it was allowed into evidence.
Discussion
Defendant contends that the verdict was contrary to the weight of evidence
when Highlands testified he, not defendant, was the driver. A claim that the
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict, but contends, nevertheless, that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Hod.qe, 441 Pa. Super.
653, 658, 658 ^.2d 386, 388 (1995). The decision whether to grant a new trial
because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence rests within the trial
court's discretion. Id. Only when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the weight of
evidence as to shock one's sense of justice should a new trial be awarded.
Commonwealth v. Haiqht, 332 Pa. Super. 269, 270, 481 A.2d 357, 358
(1984)(citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 303 Pa. Super. 504, 450 A.2d 40 (1982)).
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The role of the appellate court in reviewing the weight of the evidence is to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. Where the evidence
is conflicting, the credibility of the witnesses is solely for the jury, and if its finding
is supported by the record, the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial will not
be disturbed. Id.
In the instant case, Michael Highland testified that he, not defendant, drove
the truck from the Three Pines into the Sheetz lot. Notes to Testimony at Trial
(hereinafter N.T.), p. 77. The jury nevertheless found defendant guilty. In so
finding, the jury determined that Highland's and defendant's credibility was
lacking. Such a determination was properly within the jury's function when
evidence conflicted. Commonwealth v. Hai.qht, 332 Pa. Super. at 270, 481 A.2d
at 358 (1984)(citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 303 Pa.Super. 504, 450 A.2d 40
(1982)). The jury delivered a verdict consistent with the weight of the evidence in
this case. The weight of the evidence supports the guilty verdict, particularly in
light of the testimony of two unbiased witnesses and two police officers.
Defendant also contends that she should have been permitted to submit
testimony regarding her prior conviction for Unsworn Falsification to Authorities,
to provide "context" for that conviction. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
crime, whether by verdict or by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement. Pa. R. E. 609(a). In
addition, evidence of prior convictions can be introduced if the witness's day of
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conviction or last day of confinement is within ten years of trial date.
Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410, 415, 528 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1987). The
prerequisites for the use of a record of prior convictions to impeach the credibility
of a criminal defendant include, inter alia, clear proof, 1) that such record is
authentic and accurate, and 2) that the present defendant is the same person as
that to whom the convictions refer. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 463 Pa. 343, 351,
344 A.2d 864, 868 (1975).4
At common law, courts have limited the party presenting the prior
conviction of a defendant or other witnesses to revealing the name of the
offense, the time and place of the crime and the sentence imposed.
Commonwealth v. O.qlesby, 274 Pa. Super. 586, 592, 418 A.2d 561,564 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Washin.qton, 274 Pa. Super. 560, 566, 418 A.2d 548, 551
(1980). The Superior Court held that a trial court did not err when it refused to
permit the defendant to offer evidence that the prior conviction was the result of a
guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Washin.qton, 274 Pa. Super. 560, 566, 418 A.2d
548, 551 (1980).
In this case, defendant took the stand in her own defense. While on
redirect, defense counsel Milkes presented defendant's prior conviction for
Unsworn Falsification to Authorities. N.T., p. 67. Defense counsel apparently
Defense counsel did not have to follow this procedure because the defendant admitted
to the prior conviction in open court.
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anticipated entry of the prior conviction by the Commonwealth. Defense counsel
followed standard procedure in bringing out the bad news first. Commonwealth
v. Harner, 377 Pa.Super. 229, 245-246, 546 A.2d 1241, 1249 (1988). The
conviction was admissible because it involved a false statement. Pa. R. E. 609.;
Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. at 415, 528 A.2d at 1329 (1987). The
conviction also was admissible under Randall because it took place fewer than
ten years ago. Id.2 Defendant has not contested the accuracy of her prior
conviction record, nor has she alleged its invalidity. Moreover, defendant
admitted the prior conviction in open court. However, defendant is not entitled to
provide details of that conviction beyond the name of the offense, the time and
place of the crime and the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. O~lesbv, 274
Pa. Super. at 592, 418 A.2d at 564 (1980); Commonwealth v. Washington, 274
Pa. Super. at 566, 418 A.2d at 551 (1980). When defendant communicated to
the jury and this Court that, although having pled guilty, she was innocent of the
prior conviction, she had stated more than she was entitled to speak. Id.
Therefore, this Court properly refused to permit defendant to submit additional
testimony regarding her prior conviction for Unsworn Falsification to Authorities.
2 Defendant pled guilty to Unsworn Falsification to Authorities on September 15, 1994.
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