HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-0818 criminalCOMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PENNSYLVANIA : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Vo
: NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
ROBERT A. BANKS,
Defendant
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MOTION
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, ~ ~~ 1999, after careful
consideration of all issues Defendant's Post-Trial Motion is denied.
By the Court,
Jaime M. Keating, Esquire
Chief Deputy District Attorney
For the Commonwealth
Samuel C. Stretton, Esquire
301 S. High Street
P.O. Box 3231
West Chester, PA 19381
For the Defendant
COMMONWEALTH OF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PENNSYLVANIA : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
: NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
ROBERT A. BANKS,
Defendant
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MOTION
OPINION
HOFFER, P.J.:
In this opinion, the court shall address all issues raised in defendant's post tdal
motions. The defendant, Robert A. Banks, was involved in a motor vehicle accident
which resulted in criminal charges being filed against him. On March 13, 1998, the
defendant was convicted of (1) ddving under the influence, a violation of 75 Pa. C.S.A.
§3731; (2) homicide by vehicle while ddving under the influence, a violation of 75 Pa.
C.S.A. §3735; (3) homicide by vehicle, a violation of 75 Pa. C.S.A. §3732; (4)
involuntary manslaughter, a violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2504; and (5) vadous summary
offenses related to his operation of the vehicle.
A jury tdal was held March 9 through March 13, 1998. The facts, elicited at tdal,
which gave dse to defendant's conviction, follow. During the evening of March 26,
1997, witnesses saw one person, alone, in a Hyundai Accent ddving south on
Interstate-81 in Silver Spdng Township, Cumberland County at an extremely high rate
of speed? One witness testified that he, the witness, was travelling at approximately 75
The defendant's cousin, Earl Arter, was the owner of the Hyundai and he testified that
he loaned the car to the defendant that same day.
NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
miles per hour when the Hyundai "flew" by in the left hand lane. The Hyundai was
seen swerving between the lanes of traffic, passing cars. The driver of the Hyundai
then lost control of the vehicle. The Hyundai nearly hit other cars in the
southbound lanes. Two witnesses had to slam on their brakes to avoid collisions.
The Hyundai crossed over the median, launched into the air, sheared off the roof of
a vehicle travelling north on 1-81, killing the driver, and careened down a steep
embankment on the far side of the northbound lanes. When the Hyundai came to
rest, witnesses saw the defendant lying next to the vehicle. Witnesses went down
the embankment to help the defendant. They asked him if anyone was with him;
he said yes, but no other person was seen.
At trial, witnesses, who drove or rode in southbound cars, testified that they
saw only one person in the Hyundai at the time the accident occurred. Paul
Jacobsen-Rains, a passenger in a southbound car, testified that, "[f]rom what I
could tell, yes, that there was only one person in that car." (Notes to Trial
Testimony, hereinafter "N.T.", Vol. I, p. 106). Jenny Clouse, driver of a vehicle
nearly hit by the Hyundai, told the jury, "1 saw one individual in the driver's seat."
(N.T., Vol. II, p. 186).
A northbound car, driven by Nelson Dougherty, Jr., was hit by the Hyundai.
Mr. Dougherty died at the scene of severe head trauma caused when the Hyundai
tore the roof from his car. Forensic personnel had to identify Mr. Dougherty from
his dental records, because his head was so mangled by the collision.
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Soon after the crash, fire and rescue workers arrived on the scene.
Witnesses told them that the defendant said another person was with him at the
time of the accident. Firefighters searched the woods but found no one. The
defendant remained seated next to the Hyundai and Timothy Knepp, Hampden
Township Fire Chief, approached him. Chief Knepp saw no apparent injuries on
the defendant but noticed the odor of alcohol. The defendant told Chief Knepp that
he was driving the Hyundai at the time of the accident and that no one else was
with him. The defendant was then hoisted up the embankment. When the
defendant reached the top, he again claimed that another person was with him at
the time of the accident.
When the first police officer, Corporal Timon Moore of the Pennsylvania
State Police, arrived on the scene, he first confirmed that Mr. Dougherty was
deceased and checked on the defendant's car. The corporal then spoke with the
defendant. The defendant told him that he was not the driver of the Hyundai but
that "Anthony Mower" was the driver. The corporal noted that the defendant had
an odor of alcohol and slurred speech. The corporal then went in search of the
second "mystery" man. Again, no one was found. The corporal returned to speak
with the defendant and he noticed a clearer smell of alcohol and saw that
defendant's eyes were glassy.
The defendant was taken to the hospital and a blood sample was drawn one
hour and fifteen minutes after the accident. Testing revealed that the defendant's
blood alcohol content was .12% at the time the sample was taken. Several
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troopers attempted to interview the defendant at the hospital. All witnessed the
defendant exhibiting classic signs of intoxication. The troopers testified that they
believed the defendant to be incapable of safe driving.
Early in the morning of March 27, 1997, within hours of the crash, the
defendant's mother received a call from the hospital informing her that her son was
a patient. At 2:30 a.m., Mrs. Banks arrived at the hospital. She found her son, the
defendant, lying in bed, wearing a neck brace. He had a red knot-like bruise on his
head. He was hooked up to an I.V. and had a tube down his throat. The defendant
was extremely upset and told his mother that he wanted to go home. Mother
agreed and the defendant checked himself out of the hospital and returned home
with his mother.
On March 28, 1997, the defendant was arrested and taken into custody. The
arresting officers took the defendant back to the hospital because he was
complaining of pain. At the hospital, a trooper overheard the defendant tell his
girlfriend, "1 didn't mean to hurt anybody." (N.T., Vol. III, p. 598).
As part of the investigation, Trooper Palmero of the Pennsylvania State
Police, an accident reconstructionist, was called to the accident scene. Using
calculations based upon the coefficient of friction and marks left on the roadway,
the trooper determined that the defendant's vehicle was travelling at 89 miles per
hour when he lost control. The trooper found no mechanical defects in the car. He
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determined that the defendant's vehicle crashed through the windshield of Mr.
Dougherty's car and killed him.2
At trial, the defendant stipulated that his blood alcohol content was .12% at
the time of testing. The Commonwealth's expert in forensic toxicology, Dr. G.
Thomas Passananti, testified that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
the defendant's blood alcohol content was .14% at the time of the accident. The
jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle
while driving under the influence, homicide by vehicle, and involuntary
manslaughter.
The defendant appeared for sentencing on April 14, 1998. The court
sentenced the defendant to 3% to 7 years in the state correctional facility for
homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence and 2 to 5 years for homicide
by vehicle. The sentences were to run consecutively. The driving under the
influence charge merged with the homicide by vehicle while driving under the
influence charge and the involuntary manslaughter charge merged with the
homicide by vehicle charge. But the homicide by vehicle while driving under the
influence charge did not merge with the homicide by vehicle charge. Therefore, no
additional sentence was imposed.
Upon the defendant's arrest, he was represented by Allen Welch, Esquire. A
conflict arose and Mr. Welch was forced to withdraw. Defendant obtained new
counsel, Patrick Lauer, Esquire, who represented him at trial. Mr. Lauer's
2 Tissue from Mr. Dougherty's body was found on the underside of the Hyundai.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
representation of the defendant concluded after sentencing. William Braught,
Esquire, of the Cumberland County Public Defender's Office filed a post trial motion
on the defendant's behalf, April 24, 1998.
On May 7, 1998, the Court issued two orders: (1) refusing defendant's
motion to vacate sentence and be resentenced and (2) granting defendant's
request for trial transcripts and allowing time after the transcripts were issued to file
a supplemental post sentence motion containing claims of ineffectiveness of
counsel. On June 8, 1998, the Court vacated the order refusing defendant's
motion to vacate sentence and be resentenced and deferred all decision on
defendant's post sentence motion until a supplemental post sentence motion was
filed. On August 20, 1998, defendant's current counsel, Samuel C. Stretton,
entered his appearance on behalf of defendant. Stretton immediately filed for an
extension of time to file the supplemental post sentence motion. Stretton's motion
was timely filed on September 28, 1998. On September 30, 1998, Stretton filed a
motion to transcribe the opening and closing statements and for time to file an
amendment to defendant's supplemental post sentence motion once he received
the transcripts. The amendment was filed January 22, 1999.
The Court, at the request of defendant, conducted an ineffectiveness of
counsel hearing on March 5 and 19, 1999. At the conclusion of the hearing,
Stretton again asked for extra time to submit a follow-up brief due to his out-of-state
trial sct~edule. He was given until June 26, 1999 to file the brief and the
Commonwealth was given time to respond. At this time, the record is complete.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
This opinion addresses all issues raised in the complete series of motions and
briefs filed by defendant.
Discussion
The defendant's supplemental and amended supplemental post trial motions
incorporated the initial post trial motion filed by the Cumberland County Public
Defender's Office. The issues raised in all three motions are as follows:
(1) The verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
(2) There was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.
(3) The Commonwealth erred in disposing of the Hyundai before
defendant was given access to the vehicle to conduct tests and
prior counsel were ineffective for failing to secure the
preservation of the vehicle.
(4) The Commonwealth erred in bringing out the testimony of
defendant's refusal to answer police questions and trial counsel
was ineffective for failure to object at the time the testimony was
heard.
(5) The Commonwealth erred in withholding possibly exculpatory
evidence of boots and/or sneakers found in and around the
Hyundai at the accident scene; trial counsel was ineffective for
continuing to admit that defendant was the driver after the
possibly exculpatory evidence was revealed; and the trial court
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
erred in allowing hearsay testimony from a police officer
concerning the ownership of the boots and/or sneakers.
(6) Trial counsel was ineffective for not preserving for appeal the
issue of references to defendant being in jail and being
untruthful and the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial.
(7) The trial court erred and trial counsel was ineffective when
jurors affiliated with Mothers Against Drunk Driving were
accepted on the jury panel.
(8) The trial court erred and trial counsel was ineffective when
juror #42, who claimed bias against those who drive in excess
of the speed limit, was seated on the panel.
(9) The trial court erred and trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object when an alternate juror sat with the panel in
deliberations.
(10) The trial court's instructions to the jury were not an accurate
reflection of the law.
(11) The trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive
sentences.
(12) Improper and prejudicial comments were made by the
prosecution during opening and closing statements and trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object or properly preserve
the issue for appeal.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
(13) The District Attorney committed unfairly prejudicial
prosecutorial misconduct by initiating contact with the defendant
without the knowledge of the defendant's attorney.
Because the defendant has alleged numerous incidents where he
believes the trial court or the Commonwealth committed error and his
counsel was ineffective, we will set out the ineffective assistance of
counsel standard here. This standard shall be applied to all of the
defendant's ineffectiveness of counsel claims. At the outset, it is important
to note that counsel's representation is presumed to be effective.
Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258, 267, 710 A.2d 31, 35 (1998)
(citations omitted). In order to successfully present an ineffectiveness of
counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate three things: (1) counsel's
conduct, by act or omission, was legally unsound; (2) counsel had no
reasonable basis to believe that such conduct would effectuate the client's
interest; and (3) the conduct produced an adverse effect on the results of
the proceedings. Id.
(1) and (2): Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support the verdict and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Because of the close relationship between these two allegations, they will be
addressed together.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
In testing the sufficiency of evidence, a court must view all of the evidence in
a light most favorable to the verdict winner, the Commonwealth, and determine if
that evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 336 Pa. Super. 120, 124, 485 A.2d 459, 461 (1984).
In making an insufficiency claim, a defendant argues that there was not enough
evidence to convict him.
When ruling on whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or
not, a trial court presupposes that there was sufficient evidence to convict but
questions whether the evidence was so untrustworthy that a conviction based upon
such evidence is reliable. Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 692 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.
Super., 1997). A new trial should be awarded only when the jury's verdict is so
against the weight of the evidence that one's conscience is shocked by the
outcome and the only fair result would be to give a defendant a new trial.
Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 547 Pa. 295, 310, 690 A.2d 203, 211 (1997). The trial
court must use its discretion in determining whether to grant a new trial because
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the court's decision to deny
a request for a new trial will only be overturned upon a showing of abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Rucci, 543 Pa. 261, 276, 670 A.2d 1129, 1137
(1996).
A. Driving Under the Influence
To successfully prove a defendant guilty of a violation of 75 Pa. C.S.A.
{}3731, driving under the influence, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a
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reasonable doubt that the defendant was operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving.
Commonwealth v. Feathers, 442 Pa. Super. 490, 500-01,660 A.2d 90, 95 (1995).
In the case at bar, sufficient and credible evidence was presented by the
Commonwealth to support the charge. Witnesses testified that defendant was the
driver of the Hyundai. Fire Chief Knepp and a number of Pennsylvania State
Police Troopers testified that defendant was under the influence to the point that he
was incapable of safe driving. They smelled alcohol on his breath and noticed that
his eyes were glassy. Thus, the evidence presented was both of ample weight and
sufficient enough to support defendant's conviction.
B. Homicide by Vehicle While Driving Under the Influence-
In order to successfully prosecute the crime of homicide by vehicle while
driving under the influence, a violation of 75 Pa. C.S.A. {}3735, the Commonwealth
must demonstrate "(1) a driving under the influence conviction; (2) the death of
another person; and (3) that the death was a direct result of driving under the
influence." Commonwealth v. Caine, 453 Pa. Super. 235, 239, 683 A.2d 890, 892
(1996). Here, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence. Mr.
Dougherty died as a result of the collision between his car and the defendant's. If it
were not for defendant's inability to drive safely, as a result of consumption of
alcohol, the accident would not have occurred. As a result of defendant's driving
while under the influence of alcohol, Mr. Dougherty died. Thus, the elements of
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homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence were sufficiently proven with
credible evidence.
C. Homicide by Vehicle
In order to prove that a defendant committed homicide by vehicle, in violation
of 75 Pa. C.S.A. {}3732, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant violated a provision of the Motor Vehicle Code and that this
violation was a direct and substantial factor in the victim's death. Commonwealth
v. Francis, 445 Pa. Super. 353, 357, 665 A.2d 821, 823 (1995). The
Commonwealth must also demonstrate that the fatal result was not extraordinary or
remote and that the defendant was criminally negligent or reckless. Id. The
Superior Court has previously held that driving 85 miles per hour, losing control of
the vehicle, and crossing the center line is a gross deviation from the standard of
care required of reasonably prudent drivers in like circumstances. In the Interest of
Hyduke, 371 Pa. Super. 380, 538 A.2d 66 (1988).
In the case at bar, the court heard testimony that defendant was driving his
vehicle at approximately 89 miles per hour at the time he lost control, crossed the
median and struck Mr. Dougherty's car, killing him. These violations of the vehicle
code were the direct cause of Mr. Dougherty's death. Sufficient and credible
evidence was presented to justify defendant's conviction.
D. Involuntary Manslau.qhter
To prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed involuntary
manslaughter, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. {}2504, the Commonwealth must
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demonstrate that the defendant violated a provision of the Motor Vehicle Code in a
reckless or grossly negligent manner and that the victim's death was a direct result.
Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 348-49, 437 A.2d 385, 387 (1981). In the
case sub judice, defendant was seen weaving in and out of traffic at a high rate of
speed. He lost control of the vehicle and struck and killed Mr. Dougherty. It was
determined that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. It was later
discovered that defendant did not have a driver's license nor had he ever applied
for a license. Defendant committed multiple egregious violations of the Motor
Vehicle Code. His behavior was both reckless and grossly negligent. The vehicle
code violations directly resulted in Mr. Dougherty's death.Clearly there was
sufficient, credible evidence to support defendant's conviction.
(3): Disposal of the Vehicle
The defendant claims unfair prejudice and a due process violation arising
out of the Commonwealth's disposal of the Hyundai before he had a chance to
inspect the car and conduct tests to determine if any defects were present. The
defendant further argues that his prior counsel, Mr. Welch and Mr. Lauer, were
ineffective for failing to secure the car for defense inspection.
In order to demonstrate a violation of due process when evidence is lost or
made unavailable, a defendant must show bad faith on the part of the police.
Arizona v. Youn,qblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988).
Pennsylvania requires that a defendant demonstrate actual prejudice due to the
inability to inspect a vehicle. Commonwealth v. Hess, 446 Pa. Super. 222, 229,
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666 A.2d 705, 708 (1995). In Hess, a defendant was involved in a motor vehicle
accident that resulted in him being tried and convicted of homicide by vehicle while
driving under the influence. Id. At 226, 666 A.2d at 706-07. On appeal, he argued
that his due process rights were violated because the cars involved were
destroyed before he had a chance to examine them and that all testimony and
other evidence regarding the vehicles should have been excluded. Id.__~ at 228-29,
666 A.2d at 708. The Superior Court held that the defendant did not show actual
prejudice and his argument failed because the Commonwealth did provide the
defendant with copies of all of its evidence regarding the vehicle and the defendant
was able to present an expert to support his defense. Id. at 229, 666 A.2d at 708.3
In the case at bar, defendant's vehicle was destroyed before any expert
could examine it. Although unfortunate, the defendant did not suffer undue
prejudice because the vehicle was destroyed. As noted by his counsel, defendant
received all evidence the Commonwealth had concerning the Hyundai. He has not
shown any examples of bad faith on the part of the police and/or the
Commonwealth. The defendant's argument on this point is without merit.
The defendant's claim that his prior counsel provided ineffective assistance
because they failed to secure the Hyundai for inspection also fails. Applying the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, it is clear that defendant's counsel
were not ineffective. Although they failed to secure the vehicle for examination
3 The defendant presented this case to the court but argues that, despite the factual
similarities, his case is different because there was specific testimony by Commonwealth
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
without justification, defendant, as discussed above, did not suffer undue prejudice
by this omission. Counsels' conduct did not have an adverse effect on the
outcome of the trial.
(4): Testimony of Defendant's Refusal to Answer Question-~
Defendant argues that he was unfairly prejudiced and his due process rights
denied because the Commonwealth erred in bringing out testimony of the fact that
the defendant did not cooperate with law enforcement and refused to answer
questions given him at the hospital. Defendant further alleges that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object at the time the testimony was presented. Defendant
claims that the Commonwealth unfairly used his post-arrest silence to prejudice the
jury. The Commonwealth asserts that it presented only defendant's pre-arrest
silence.
The use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence does not violate his Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Jenkins v. Anderson., 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct.
2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). Pennsylvania follows the same rule that pre-arrest
silence may be used to impeach a defendant. Commonwealth v. Monahan, 378
Pa. Super. 623, 549 A.2d 231 (1988).
Upon thorough review of the record, we agree with the Commonwealth that
only defendant's pre-arrest silence was presented to the jury. Trooper Kevin Fink
told the jury that defendant would not answer most of his questions, using the
responses "1 don't know" and "1 don't remember". (N.T., Vol. III, p. 413). A
witnesses concerning their investigations of the vehicle.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
complete reading of the Trooper's testimony reflects that he was referring to
defendant's pre-arrest silence? Therefore, defendant was not unfairly prejudiced
when testimony of his pre-arrest silence was presented. Because defendant's
rights were not violated when the Commonwealth presented testimony of his pre-
arrest silence, defendant's trial counsel had no duty to object when the evidence
was presented. Applying the standard for ineffectiveness of counsel, it is clear that
defendant's claim is without merit.
(5): The Commonwealth's Withholding of the Boots and/or Sneakers
Defendant claims that the Commonwealth committed prejudicial error by
withholding evidence of boots and/or sneakers, found at the scene, in violation of
its duty to turn over all exculpatory evidence. Defendant further alleges that the
court erred in allowing hearsay testimony from the Commonwealth concerning the
boots and/or sneakers. Defendant's final allegation on this topic is that his trial
counsel was ineffective for stipulating that he was the driver of the Hyundai.
If the boots and/or sneakers evidence can be characterized as exculpatory,
the Commonwealth has violated the terms of Pa. R. Crim. P. 305 which requires
the Commonwealth to turn over "[a]ny evidence favorable to the accused which is
material either to guilt or to punishment, and which is within the possession or
control of the attorney for the Commonwealth." Pa. R. Crim. P. 305(B)(1)(a).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1964), reflects the
Trooper Fink's testimony can be found in N.T.,Vol. III, pp. 408-66.
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constitutional standard that all exculpatory evidence must be turned over to a
defendant and serves as the support for the existence of Pa. R. Crim. P. 305.
The Commonwealth did not submit the boots and/or sneaker evidence to
defendant before trial. The Commonwealth failed to do so because the evidence
did not appear to be exculpatory? At the scene of the accident, defendant told
some people that he was the driver of the Hyundai and others that he was not.
Witnesses testified that only one person was in the Hyundai. Police and rescue
personnel conducted an extensive search for a second person and no one was
found. That same night, police contacted the true owner of the Hyundai,
defendant's cousin Earl Arter, Jr., and asked him about the boots and/or sneakers.
(N.T., Vol. II, p. 275). Mr. Arter told the officer that the shoes were his. (N.T., Vol.
II, p. 276). The information about the shoes was relayed to the jury through
testimony from Corporal Moore.
The Commonwealth did not err in failing to submit the evidence to the
defendant. Before trial, the Commonwealth continued to submit discovery to the
defendant. The boots and/or sneakers evidence was missed because it was
neither exculpatory nor material. The Commonwealth committed no error.
After Corporal Moore presented the boots and/or sneakers evidence, the
Commonwealth's attorney, defense counsel and Corporal Moore met with Mr.
5 It appears that the Commonwealth's attorney was as surprised by the evidence as the
defense. However, this fact is irrelevant because the evidence came from a
Commonwealth witness and therefore we will assume it was in the control of the
Commonwealth's attorney.
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Arter. Mr. After told the group that he did not remember saying that the boots
and/or sneakers were his. A conference was held in the judge's chambers to
discuss the shoe evidence. While there, the district attorney and Mr. Lauer agreed
to present a stipulation to the jury. It stated that Mr. Arter did not remember talking
to the police about the shoes and that he does not remember owning shoes of such
a description.
Defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial based upon the admission of
Corporal Moore's testimony and the fact that the Commonwealth had not turned
over the evidence to the defendant. At the conference, held in chambers, the court
refused to grant a mistrial?
The defendant does allege that the court erred when it allowed the Corporal
to testify about the contact between the police and Mr. Arter. Mr. Lauer objected to
the admission of this testimony based on hearsay. (N.T., Vol. II, p. 275). The court
allowed the testimony because it came from the course of the Corporal's
investigation and he could be recalled later if necessary. (N.T., Vol. II, p. 276).
Defendant argues that the court committed prejudicial error by admitting the
testimony.
It is well established in Pennsylvania that certain out of court, hearsay.
statements are admissible if they are used to explain a course of police conduct.
Commonwealth v. Paisa, 521 Pa. 113, 117, 555 A.2d 808, 810 (1989). These
6 Defendant has not asserted that the court committed error when it failed to grant a
mistrial on this point.
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statements must not be offered for their truth but to show information upon which
the police acted. Id.
Corporal Moore's testimony about the shoes did not come in to prove that
the boots and/or sneakers were Mr. Arter's. The Commonwealth agreed to a
stipulation to the contrary, stating that Mr. Arter remembers neither speaking to the
police nor owning such shoes. The testimony was admitted to explain the course
of the police investigation. The police had conflicting reports about a second
person in the Hyundai. An extensive search was conducted but no one was found.
Speaking with Mr. Arter gave further confirmation to the police that no second
passenger would be found and they could stop the search.
Defendant's trial strategy, formulated with his attorney, was focused on
defeating the driving under the influence charges in order to secure a lighter
sentence and emphasizing to the jury that he was not impaired while driving. At
trial, defendant's counsel stipulated that he was the driver of the vehicle. (N.T.,
Vol. II, p. 193-94). Defendant now complains that his counsel was ineffective for
entering this stipulation, that the stipulation was against his wishes and that the
shoe evidence highlights his counsel's ineffectiveness in forming a defense
because it gave credence to the alternative theory that there was another driver.
At the ineffectiveness of counsel hearing, held before this court on March 5
and 19, 1999, trial counsel testified that the trial strategy always involved admitting
that the defendant was the driver because the bulk of the evidence presented
pointed to him as the driver. (N.T., Ineffectiveness of Counsel Hearing, p. 116).
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Mr. Lauer produced a letter, written January 16, 1998, sent to defendant's mother,
Kathleen Banks, and carbon copied to defendant, in which he outlined the trial
strategy. (N.T., Ineffectiveness of Counsel Hearing, p. 116). Defendant was
informed of and agreed with the trial strategy, and knew, well in advance of trial,
what it would be.
Applying the ineffectiveness of counsel standard, Mr. Lauer cannot be
deemed ineffective for his use of the stipulation. After an exhaustive search, no
second person was found at the accident scene. Defendant told some people he
was the driver of the Hyundai. Witnesses reported seeing only one person in the
Hyundai at the time of the accident. The evidence pointed to the fact that
defendant was the driver. Defense counsel made a reasonable decision, with
which defendant agreed, to stipulate to defendant's status as the driver. Mr. Lauer
was not ineffective for entering into the stipulation.
¢6): References to Defendant Being In Jail and Untruthful
Defendant requests a new trial based on his claim that references to his
being in jail and being untruthful severely prejudiced the jury. Defense counsel
stated that the defendant was incarcerated. (N.T., Vol. I, p. 60). Defendant claims
defense counsel was ineffective for making the statement. Officer Gilbert stated
that the defendant lied when talking to investigators. (N.T., Vol. III, p. 472, 473).
Defense counsel requested a mistrial upon Gilbert's statement. The trial court
denied the mistrial request. Defendant claims the trial judge committed prejudicial
error by not granting a mistrial. Officer Joynes said police reports indicated other
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officers did not believe the defendant. (N.T., Vol. III, p. 609, 610). Trial counsel
made an objection to Joynes's statement, but did not make a motion for mistrial.
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a mistrial.
A mistrial should be granted when the jury may reasonably infer from the
testimony that the accused had engaged in prior criminal activity. Commonwealth
v. Gaerttner, 335 Pa. Super. 203, 228, 484 A.2d 92, 106, (1984). A mistrial is
required when an incident is of such nature that its unavoidable effect is to deny the
defendant a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 498 Pa. 405, 415, 446 A.2d
1268, 1273 (1982). A trial judge is in the best position to observe the atmosphere
in which a trial is being conducted and to determine whether a statement in the
heat of trial by counsel or a witness has a prejudicial effect on the jury. Clark v.
Hoerner., 362 Pa. Super. 588, 596, 525 A.2d 377, 381 (1987) (citations omitted).
Whether to grant or deny a motion for mistrial, therefore, must necessarily rest
primarily in the discretion of the trial court. Id. (citations omitted).
In the present case, although defense counsel stated that the defendant was
incarcerated, the statement did not infer that the defendant engaged in prior
criminal activity: "1 told you in voir dire, he is in Cumberland County Prison on
these charges." (N.T., Vol. I, p. 60) (emphasis added). Thus, defense counsel's
statement did not prejudice the jury.
The two police officers' statements of defendant's untruthfulness were not of
such nature that they unavoidably resulted in denying the defendant a fair trial.
The trial judge appropriately exercised his discretion to determine that these
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
statements did not have a prejudicial effect on the jury. Thus, there was no
ineffectiveness of counsel nor did the trial judge commit prejudicial error in relation
to statements made by the police officers.
{7): Jurors Affiliated with MADD
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for
cause and/or not using peremptory challenges to strike jurors who were members
of or contributors to Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). Defendant claims that
the trial court erred in allowing such jurors on the jury.
Counsel is presumed effective; defendant has the burden of proving
otherwise. Commonwealth v. Hancarik, 534 Pa. 435, 445, 633 A.2d 1074, 1079
(1993). "The decision to strike for cause is within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion," Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 545 Pa. 233, 249, 681 A.2d 130, 137 (1996). Abuse of discretion is defined
as "the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill will or partiality as
shown by the evidence of the record." Commonwealth v. Kubiac, 379 Pa. Super.
402, 409, 550 A.2d 219, 223 (1988) (citations omitted). A juror should be excluded
for cause if he or she gives an answer in voir dire indicating a lack of impartiality, or
where prejudice should be presumed because the juror has a close familial,
financial, or situational relationship with any of the parties, counsel, victims or
witnesses. Commonwealth v. Stamm, 286 Pa. Super. 409, 415-16, 429 A.2d 4, 7
(1981) (citations omitted).
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
The record shows that one member of the jury had once belonged to MADD
in Massachusetts. (N.T., Vol. I, p. 29-30). When asked whether such prior
affiliation would affect the prospective juror's impartiality in this case, the
prospective juror responded that it would not. Three other final jury members had
contributed to MADD, and indicated in voir dire that they could still be fair. (N.T.,
Vol. I, p. 58-59).
Defendant claims that the prospective jurors should have been excluded for
cause or been removed by peremptory challenge because of their relationship with
MADD. Defendant alleges that these prospective jurors were prejudiced because
of their relationship with MADD, although the jurors clearly indicated they could be
fair. In this case, the jurors who had once belonged to or had contributed to MADD
did not have such a close relationship with MADD that the trial judge should have
presumed them unable to render a fair verdict. Because the prospective jurors had
indicated they could be fair and they did not have a close relationship with MADD,
counsel was not ineffective for failing to make for cause objections. Neither was
counsel ineffective for failing to use peremptory challenges to have the MADD
affiliated jurors removed. Counsel made peremptory challenges by crossing
names off of the list of prospective jurors. The record does not reflect counsel's
reasoning in exercising peremptory challenges. There is no basis to the claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to make peremptory challenges to the MADD
affiliated jurors.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
The trial judge did not err in allowing prospective jurors with MADD
affiliations on the jury. "The trial judge must interpret the demeanor of all potential
jurors to evaluate their ability and willingness to render a fair verdict according to
the evidence presented." Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 370, 393, 685
A.2d 96, 107 (1996) (citations omitted). In voir dire, the trial judge asked those
prospective jurors with MADD affiliations whether they could be fair, and found
them to be appropriate jurors when they indicated they could do so. The trial judge
also clearly asked individual jurors whether they would be able to reach a decision
based solely on the evidence, uninhibited by any preconceived notions or
associations. (N.T., Vol. I, p. 30). When the trial judge gave leave to any
prospective jurors who believed they could not reach a fair verdict in this case,
none responded (N.T., Vol. I, p. 30). In this case, the jurors who had previously
belonged to or contributed to MADD did not have such a close relationship with
MADD that the trial judge should have presumed them to be unable to render a fair
verdict. After the prospective jurors clearly indicated they could be impartial, the
trial judge correctly allowed them on the jury. There is no evidence in the record to
suggest that the trial judge abused his discretion.
{8): Juror #.42 and Stated Bias Against Speedinp
Defendant claims that the trial court erred and trial counsel was ineffective
when juror #42, who claimed bias against those who drive in excess of the speed
limit, was seated on the panel. However, whether defendant was speeding was
not a contested issue at trial. In the cross-examination of Commonwealth's
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
witness Trooper Palmero, defense counsel admitted by implication that defendant
was travelling "in the Iow eighties." (N.T., Vol. II, p. 333). Defense counsel implied
that DUI, not sPeeding, was at issue in the case. (N.T., Vol. II, p. 333). Defense
counsel later admitted that defendant was travelling "in the Iow eighties" and that
speed was not a concern of the defense counsel, "[j]ust because my client's
vehicle went into a yaw in the Iow eighties, that speed alone is not what, in fact,
caused the yaw." (N.T., Vol. II, p. 365). Defense counsel elicited from defense
witness Thomas Lacek that Defendant was travelling in the Iow eighties. (N.T., Vol.
II, p. 363).
(9): Alternate Juror Seated with Panel During Deliberations
Defendant claims that the trial judge allowed an alternate juror to sit
with the panel during deliberations. Defendant is mistaken; there is no basis
whatsoever in the record for this assertion. The alternate juror in this case was
individually sequestered from the jury and remained under the trial judge's
supervision. The altemate juror necessarily heard the trial judge's charge to the
jury, as well as the re-issuance of instructions for Homicide by Vehicle and
Involuntary Manslaughter. (N.T., Vol. IV, p. 785). However, the alternate did not
join the jury for deliberations at any point.
(10): Jury Instructions
Defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly stated the law in charging the
jury. Defendant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
instructions as given by the trial court. "The charge to the jury must clearly and
completely advise the jury of the law as it pertains to their resolution of the case
before them." Commonwealth v. Thompson, 543 Pa. 634, 645, 674 A.2d 217, 223
(1996). The trial court has discretion in choosing the manner in which the jury is so
advised. Id. (citations omitted). The trial court is not required to deliver the charge
within a prescribed pattern. Id. The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing jury
instructions, so long as the instructions adequately reflect the law. Commonwealth
v. Gibson, 547 Pa. 71, 91, 688 A.2d 1152, 1162 (1997), cert. denied, U.S. ,
118 S. Ct. 364, 139 L.Ed.2d 284 (1997).
The charge for homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence must
include that defendant was intoxicated, that death resulted, and that the death was
a direct result of defendant driving under the influence. Commonwealth v.
Molinaro, 429 Pa. Super. 29, 34, 631 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1993). The trial judge
correctly charged the jury for homicide by Vehicle while driving under the influence:
You may also find him guilty of Vehicular Homicide VVhile
Driving Under the Influence as long as you are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt of the two elements. First, that
Nelson Dougherty is dead; and, second, that the Defendant
caused the death of Mr. Dougherty as a direct result of
committing the crime of Driving Under the Influence.
(N.T., Vol. IV, p. 764-765).
The charge for homicide by vehicle must include that defendant violated the
Motor Vehicle Code, that the victim died, that the violation of the Motor Vehicle
Code was a direct and substantial factor in the death of the victim, and that
26
NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
defendant's conduct was criminally negligent or reckless. Commonwealth v. Heck,
517 Pa. 192, 198-199, 535 A.2d 575, 578 (1987). The charge to the jury for
homicide by vehicle was given before the jury began deliberations and re-issued
after the jury had begun deliberating. (N.T., Vol. IV, pp. 767-770, 780-783). The
trial judge correctly charged the jury for homicide by vehicle:
One: That the defendant committed a violation of either one,
some, or all of these sections of the Motor Vehicle Code that I
just read to you at the time of the incident. Second: That
under the circumstances the defendant acted recklessly or
with gross negligence in driving in a manner which violated
one, some, or all of these sections. Three: That Nelson
Dougherty, Jr., is dead. And, four: That the defendant's
violation of one, some, or all of these sections was a direct
cause of death.
(N.T., Vol. IV, p. 781-782).
The charge for involuntary manslaughter must include that defendant
violated the Motor Vehicle Code in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, and that
death was caused as a direct result. Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 348-
349, 437 A.2d 385, 387 (1981). The charge to the jury for involuntary
manslaughter was given before the jury began deliberations and re-issued after the
jury had begun deliberating. (N.T., Vol. IV, pp. 765-766, 778-780). The trial judge
correctly charged the jury for involuntary manslaughter:
A person commits involuntary manslaughter when he directly
causes the death of another person by reckless or grossly
negligent conduct. You may find the defendant guilty of
involuntary manslaughter if you are satisfied the following
three elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That Nelson Dougherty, Jr., is dead. 2. That the defendant's
conduct was a direct cause of Dougherty's death. And, 3.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
That the defendant's conduct was reckless or grossly
negligent.
(N.T., Vol. IV, p. 778-779). The trial court also correctly defined the terms
"reckless" and "grossly negligent:"
A defendant's conduct is reckless when he is aware of and
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
death will result from his conduct. The nature and degree of
the risk being such that it is grossly unreasonable for him to
disregard it. A defendant's conduct is grossly negligent when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
death will result from his conduct. The nature and degree of
the risk being such that it is grossly unreasonable for him to
fail to recognize the risk.
(N.T., Vol. IV, p. 779).
The instructions as given in the instant case, adequately and correctly
established the criteria necessary for the jury to find in order to render a verdict on
the charges of homicide by vehicle while DUI, involuntary manslaughter, and
homicide by vehicle. Read as a whole, the instructions to the jury correctly reflect
the law. Accordingly, as the charge was legally correct, counsel was not ineffective
for failing to object to the charge.
{11): Defendant's Sentence
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
consecutive sentences. Sentencing is vested in the sound discretion of the trial
court, and a sentence will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that
discretion. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 426 Pa. Super. 362, 372, 627 A.2d 183,
188 (1993). The sentencing court is required to state its reasons for the sentence
28
NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
on the record, so that a reviewing court can determine whether the sentence
imposed was based upon accurate, sufficient and proper information. Id. at 372-
73, 627 A.2d at 188 (citations omitted).
A court may impose consecutive sentences for convictions arising out of the
same transaction. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721. A single transaction is defined as "a crime
or crimes which were committed by a defendant at a single time or in temporally
continuous actions that are part of the same episode, event or incident, or which
are conspiracy and the object offense." Commonwealth v. Kozarian, 388
Pa. Super. 627, 630, 566 A.2d 304, 306 (1989) (citations omitted). The trial court
has the discretion to determine whether to make a sentence concurrent with or
consecutive to other sentences imposed. Commonwealth v. Hoaq, 445 Pa. Super.
455, 459, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (1995) (citations omitted). Where offenses do not
merge for sentence purposes, there is no compelling reason that criminal
defendants should get a "volume discount" for multiple criminal acts that arose out
of a larger criminal transaction. Id. (citations omitted). The crime of Homicide by
Vehicle does not merge with the crime of Homicide by Vehicle while Driving Under
Influence for sentencing purposes. Commonwealth v. Neupert, 454 Pa. Super. 62,
66, 684 A.2d 627, 629 (1996).
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
defendant to consecutive sentences for Homicide by Vehicle and Homicide by
Vehicle while Driving Under the Influence. The crimes did not merge for
sentencing purposes. At sentencing, the trial judge noted the presence of
29
NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
aggravating circumstances in this case. (Notes of Testimony at Sentencing
Hearing, p. 19-20). Defendant drove at 89 miles per hour in heavy traffic without a
license to drive, flagrantly disregarding the safety of others. Defendant lied to the
police about a nonexistent person in the car, sending police and fire police on a
wild goose chase. The trial court acted within its discretion by refusing to give
Defendant a "volume discount" for the offenses that did not merge. Defendant's
claim that the trial court abused its discretion is without merit because Defendant's
offenses were so egregious as to call for consecutive sentences.
{12): Improper Statements by the Prosecution
The defendant next turns his strabismic eye upon trial counsel, claiming
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to or preserve issues of prosecutorial
misconduct. Defendant claims the District Attorney made inflammatory and
improper statements to the jury in opening and closing statements. The defendant
claims the following statements were improper:
(a) Using the word "pulverizing" to describe the effect of defendant's
car upon the victim's head and body.
(b) Making direct comments on the defendant's right to remain silent.
(c) Telling the jury that the victim's family would not be present when
the coroner testified, implying that the family could not bear hearing
the gruesome details.
(d) Giving the personal opinion that defendant killed the victim.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
(e) Commenting that the defendant's car was free of defects when the
Commonwealth had disposed of the car before a defense expert
could examine it.
(f) Commenting that defense counsel was not working to protect
Constitutional principles, but rather to make money --"take a look
at his Rolex."
(g) Commenting that the jury should convict the defendant because the
law required it.
(h) Making an incomplete statement of the elements for Homicide by
Vehicle.
A new trial should be granted due to prosecutorial misconduct if the
prosecution's comments "so prejudice the jury that it was unable to render a fair
verdict according to the evidence." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 372 Pa. Super.
349, 362, 539 A.2d 829, 836 (1988). A prosecutor may use oratorical flair in
summarizing evidence, but may not deliberately attempt to destroy the fact finder's
objectivity. Commonwealth v. Raqan, 538 Pa. 2, 37, 645 A.2d 811, 828 (1994).
Trial counsel cannot be found to be ineffective for failing to assert a meritless
argument. Commonwealth v. Yaqer, 454 Pa. Super. 428, 436, 685 A.2d 1000,
1004 (1996).
We shall now address each of defendant's claims of error.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
(a) In the present case, the district attorney described the effect of
defendant's car on the victim's head as "pulverizing". (N.T., Openings and
Closings, p. 4). Using the word "pulverizing" was an accurate depiction of the
manner of the victim's death. This statement did not destroy the fact finder's
objectivity.
(b) The prosecution made direct comments on defendant's silence in
response to police questioning. (N.T., Openings and Closings, p. 7-8). However,
defendant was not under arrest at the time of questioning. The right to remain
silent only attaches after arrest. Commonwealth v. Monahan, 378 Pa. Super. 623,
628-29, 549 A.2d 231,233-234 (1988). The defendant's behavior before he was
placed under arrest is part of the record. (N.T., Vol. III, p. 408-422). Thus, there
was no misconduct by the prosecution in commenting on defendant's silence prior
to his arrest.
(c) The prosecution implied that the details of the victim's death would be
too gruesome for the victim's family to hear. (N.T., Openings and Closings, p. 10-
11). Such an implication was not improper because it resulted from a plain
statement of the case. The details of the victim's death were gruesome. Thus, the
prosecution's statements did not destroy the fact finder's objectivity.
(d) The prosecution's statements that the defendant killed the victim did not
prejudice the finder of fact. The statements were not personal opinion; they were
characterizations of what the evidence had shown. The district attorney told the
jury, "[t]hat man right there killed Nelson Dougherty, Jr." (N.T., Openings and
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
Closings, p. 60). The district attorney also said, "[h]ere are the scrape marks that
the car made after he killed Nelson. Here is the indentation where he lost his
wheel after he killed Nelson." (N.T., Openings and Closings, p. 71). These
statements were a mere summary of the fact that the defendant drove the car that
killed the victim. Thus, the statements did not destroy the fact finder's objectivity.
(e) The prosecution argued to the jury that the defendant's car was free of
defects. (N.T., Openings and Closings, p. 67). Although the car was destroyed
and defense experts were unable to inspect it, defense counsel received copies of
the reports produced by the Commonwealth's experts. There was no attack on the
reports by the defense counsel. Thus, hearing that the car was free of defects did
not prejudice the finder of fact.
(f) The prosecution remarked that defense counsel's representation was
motivated by money rather than Constitutional ideals ("take a look at his Rolex").
(N.T., Openings and Closings, p. 78). Although intemperate, this comment did not
rise to the level of denying Defendant a fair trial. The remark did not prevent the
jury from fairly weighing the evidence.
(g) The prosecution's statement to the jury that the law required a conviction
was appropriate when read in context. The prosecution's full statement was:
Convict Robert Banks not because you are mad at him,
convict him not because you feel sorry for his family or
Nelson's family, convict him not because of suspicion.
Convict him because the evidence supports a conviction
as charged. Convict him because that is what the law
requires. Convict him because that is what justice
demands.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
(N.T., Openings and Closings, p. 78).
(h) The prosecution's statement defining Homicide by Vehicle incompletely
stated the law. (N.T., Openings and Closings, p. 64). However, juries are
presumed to follow the court's instructions as to the applicable law.
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 374, 701 A.2d 492, 503 (1997). See also
Commonwealth v. Baker, 531 Pa. 541, 559, 614 A.2d 663, 672 (1992). As
discussed above, the court's instructions to the jury accurately reflected the law.
As such, the jury received proper instructions and were not prejudiced by the
district attorney's alleged misstatement of the law.
Because arguments addressing any of the issues above would have been
without merit at trial, Defendant cannot claim that defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to make such arguments.
¢13}: Prosecutorial Misconduct for Initiatin.q Contact with the Defendan:
The defendant alleges that District Attorney Ebert ("Ebert") committed
prosecutorial misconduct by initiating contact and eliciting information from the
defendant without the knowledge of Allen C. Welch, Jr., ("Welch"), the defendant's
attorney at the time. The defendant claims violations of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rules 4.2, 3.8, 1.9(b), and 1.10. The defendant alleges that
he told Ebert details of his crime that could prejudice him, including the entire
circumstances of the wreck and who was driving the car.
34
NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
"The trier of fact may bring to bear his or her sensory observations,
experience, common sense and logic upon the witness to assess credibility and to
determine the truth and accuracy of... in-court testimony." Commonwealth v.
Brady, 507 A.2d. 66, 69, 510 Pa. 123, 129 (1986). The Court listened as the
defendant maintained several significant falsehoods throughout his testimony,7
including the fallacy that the defendant did not drive the car at the time of the
collision. After hearing testimony at trial and the testimony of the defendant and
other witnesses during the Ineffectiveness of Counsel Hearing, the Court
determined that the defendant was not telling the truth about meeting with Ebert.
According to Welch, the defendant initiated contact with Ebert to cut a deal
on his sentence. Welch testified, "1 received a phone call from Mr. Ebert... Mr.
Ebert indicated that Mr. Banks had sent word to him that he wanted to be brought
to the courthouse because he had information that he wanted to... give to Mr.
Ebert regarding another case in hopes that it would get him some leniency in his
case." (Notes of Testimony In re: Ineffectiveness of Counsel (hereinafter "N.T.I.C.")
p. 18). "1 discovered that, in fact, [Banks] had contacted the D.A.'s office because
he had information about a gun that had been used in a shooting." (N.T.I.C.p. 16).
"[Ebert] also indicated to me that Mr. Banks had told him he wouldn't give him any
information at all unless Ebert was willing to give him a one year minimum
sentence." (N.T.I.C.p. 19). "Mr. Ebert told me that he was not at all prepared to do
that and he wasn't about to." (N.T.I.C.p. 19).
Given at the after-trial "ineffectiveness" hearing.
35
NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
The defendant claims that when he met with Ebert without assistance of
counsel, Ebert violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and defendant's right to
counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and
the Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, §9. The defendant claims that his meeting
with Ebert deprived him of counsel. Defendant alleges violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct concerning representation by counsel. Each rule cited by the
defendant exemplifies violations where a prosecutor or an attorney contacted a
defendant or other represented persons or prosecuted or questioned an
unrepresented person. Because defendant initiated contact with Ebert, creating
the conflict that led to the withdrawal of his counsel, no violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct were committed.
The standard when reviewing claims of violations of the sixth amendment
right to counsel, in the context of an intrusion into the defense camp, is whether
there has been "a very real likelihood of prejudice to the defendant."
Commonwealth v. Scarfn, 611 A.2d 242, 267, 416 Pa. Super. 329, 377 (Pa. Super.,
1992). Defendant cites .Scarfo, a case involving multiple defendants, where a
defendant gave information to the prosecution that was useful in another case and
the defendant became a prosecution witness. Id. The other defendants in the
Scarfo case successfully contended that prejudice resulted for them. Id. Even if
there is no strategic information given to the prosecution by the defendant, the
uncertainty must be resolved in favor of the other defendants in a multi-defendant
case. Id.
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NO. 97-0818 CRIMINAL
Ebert did not interfere with the defendant's right to counsel because the
defendant initiated contact with the District Attorney. The defendant' actions, not
Ebert's, brought about the conflict of interest for Welch. The defendant's incorrectly
relies on the Scarfo case. In the case at bar, the defendant gave no useful
information to the prosecution. No deal was made. (N.T.I.C.p. 19). The
defendant did not become a prosecution witness in this case or in an unrelated
case. Also, this case does not involve other defendants, where the likelihood of
prejudice would increase. Thus, because the defendant initiated contact and did
not give any incriminating evidence against himself, the Court finds no support for
the defendant's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.
37