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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-471 civilERNEST E. MORRIS, JR., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V, : : NO. 99-471 CIVIL GIANT FOOD STORES, INC., : Defendant : IN RE.' DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS Before HOFFER, P.J., HESS, J. and GUIDO, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, June 8, 1999, after careful consideration and pursuant to the Opinion filed on this date, Defendant's Preliminary Objections are granted and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. By the Court, Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire Irwin, McKnight & Hughes 60 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, PA 17013-3222 For the Plaintiff Andrew L. Levy, Esquire Schaun D. Henry, Esquire McNees, Wallace & Nurick 100 Pine Street P.O. Box 1166 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166 For the Defendant ERNEST E. MORRIS, JR., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. ~ :NO. 99-471 CIVIL GIANT FOOD STORES, INC., : Defendant IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS Before HOFFER, P.J., HESS, J. and GUIDO, J. OPINION HOFFER, P.J.: In this opinion, the Court shall address defendant's Preliminary Objections. The allegations of the complaint begin that plaintiff, Ernest E. Morris, Jr., was employed as a truck driver for defendant, Giant Food Stores, Inc., from mid December 1995 through late January 1998. On January 15, 1998, plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle crash while driving a tractor trailer, owned by defendant, on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. The accident was investigated by the State Police and no citations were filed against plaintiff or the driver of the other vehicle. The trooper classified the accident as non-reportable. Defendant fired plaintiff from his job January 22, 1998. Plaintiff alleges that his employment with defendant was wrongfully terminated because of his involvement in the accident. Plaintiff relies upon defendant's Company Policy Number 103, (hereinafter "Policy 103"), a driver/operator incident policy, to claim: (1) that he was wrongfully discharged because defendant failed to follow the provisions of Policy 103 and (2) 99-471 CIVIL that defendant breached the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant that was created by Policy 103. Policy 103 states the following: Non-chargeable and non-preventable accidents. Associates involved in non-chargeable and non- preventable accidents are not subject to disciplinary action. However, all accidents must be discussed and documented with the appropriate supervisor and Director of Distribution. Accident reports and reports of occupational injury will be filled out when circumstances warrant. Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit B. The policy defines a non-chargeable accident as "an accident involving a vehicle and associate of Giant for which the Giant associate is not responsible as determined by the Distribution Center management." Id. (emphasis added). A chargeable accident is "an accident for which the Giant associate is found responsible as determined by the police and/or Distribution Center management." Id__~. (emphasis added). Non- preventable accidents are "accidents occurring in which one or more of the following are involved: the vehicle was legally parked; the driver was under the direction of a Law Enforcement Officer; or the driver/operator did everything reasonable to prevent an accident." Id. Plaintiff filed his complaint January 26, 1999. It contains two counts: one for wrongful discharge and the other for breach of contract. On February 16, 1999, 99-471 CIVIL defendant filed the preliminary objections currently addressed by the Court. Discussion Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should only be sustained if the complaint does not establish the pleader's right to relief. Willet v. Pennsylvania Medical Catastrophe Loss Fund, 549 Pa. 613, 619, 702 A.2d 850, 853 (1997). All material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom are admitted as true. The question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt is resolved in favor of overruling it. McMahon v. Shea, 547 Pa. 124, 129, 688 A.2d 1179, 1181 (1997). Therefore, a preliminary objection, in the nature of a demurrer, may only be granted "in cases that clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Willet at 619, 702 A.2d at 853. Wrongful Discharge In Pennsylvania, employment is presumed to be at-will and either the employer or the employee may terminate the employment for any or no reason, absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary. Geary v. U.S. Steel, 99-471 CIVIL 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974). See also Brozovich v. Dugo, 651 A.2d 641,643 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). The presumption of at-will employment may be rebutted if "the employee provided additional consideration apart from the detriments commensurate with those incurred by all manner of salaried professionals." Brozovich at 643. "The employer's privilege to dismiss an employee with or without cause is not absolute, however, and may be qualified by the dictates of public policy." Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 595, 716 A.2d 1231, 1233 (1998). Public policy is set by a virtual unanimity of opinion in the community and establishes a policy for what is just and right related to public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Shick at 600, 716 A.2d at 1235-36 (citations omitted). Pennsylvania courts have recognized the following examples of public policy trumping the presumption of at-will employment: (1) a cause of action in wrongful discharge existed because public policy was violated where employee terminated for filing for unemployment compensation, a statutory right~; (2) a violation of public policy occurred where employment was conditioned upon taking a polygraph test even though Pennsylvania law expressly prohibits such a condition on ~ Highhouse v. Avery Transport, ,!.'!.3 Pa. Super. 120, 660 A.2d 1374 (1995). 4 99-471 CIVIL employment2; (3) public policy was violated where employee denied employment based upon a conviction that had been pardoned despite the fact that such action was impermissible under the Pennsylvania Constitution3; and (4) employee had a cause of action for wrongful discharge because employment terminated for serving jury duty, a violation of public policy because of the existence of the statutory requirement to serve jury dutyn. In the case at bar, plaintiff is not able to overcome the presumption that his employment with defendant was at-will. Nothing has been pled claiming that plaintiff provided any additional consideration to defendant beyond that which ordinary employees provide. Therefore, defendant's privilege to terminate plaintiff for any or no reason remained intact. Plaintiff does not claim that his firing was in violation of public policy. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that he was wrongfully discharged because defendant incorrectly characterized the January 15, 1998 accident and, therefore, failed to follow the provisions set out in Policy 103. Although Policy 103 clearly states that employees are not subject to discipline for non-chargeable and non-preventable Kroen v. Bedway Sec. A.qency, Inc., 430 Pa. Super. 83, 633 A.2d 628 (1993). Hunter v. Port Authority, 277 Pa. Super. 4, 419 A.2d 631 (1980). Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 235 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978). $ 99-471 CIVIL accidents, the discretion to determine whether an accident is non-chargeable is left solely in the hands of defendant's Distribution Center management. Under Policy 103, characterizing an accident as chargeable or not is a decision left to the police or the Distribution Center management. Plaintiff claims that defendant's investigation of the accident was not thorough enough, in light of the trooper's characterization of the accident as non- reportable, to allow defendant to terminate plaintiff's employment. As discussed above, plaintiff's employment with defendant was at-will and the provisions of Policy 103 did not alter the fact that defendant maintained the right to terminate plaintiff, its at-will employee, for any or no reason. Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption of at-will employment. No violation of public policy occurred when plaintiff was terminated from his job. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for wrongful discharge upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, defendant's Preliminary Objection, in the form of a demurrer to count one of plaintiff's complaint, is granted. Breach of Contract Plaintiff further alleges that the termination of his employment was carried out by defendant in breach of an employment contract between the parties that was created by Policy 103. Plaintiff argues that Policy 103 transformed his 6 99-471 CIVIL employment from at-will into a contractual relationship, to be terminated only upon violations of defendant's stated employment policies. As stated above, employment in Pennsylvania is presumed to be at-will, absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary. Geary v. U.S. Steel, 456 Pa. 171,319 A.2d 174 (1974). In order to rebut the presumption of at-will employment, a party must establish one of the following: (1) an agreement for a definite duration; (2) an agreement specifying that the employee will be discharged for just cause only; (3) sufficient additional consideration; or (4) an applicable recognized public policy exception. Luteran v. Loral Fairchild Corp., 455 Pa. Super. 364, 370, 688 A.2d 211, 214 (1997). Plaintiff, in the case at bar, has not pointed to an agreement for a definite duration, additional consideration, or a violation of public policy as evidence to rebut the presumption of at-will employment. Plaintiff relies solely on Policy 103 to claim that defendant could not terminate his employment absent just cause, as defined in Policy 103. Plaintiff claims that the handbook, in which Policy 103 is found, created a binding contract between the parties, even though it was issued unilaterally by defendant. The policy also allowed defendant to unilaterally change any or all provisions of the policy. Furthermore, the policy does not include an express provision stating that employees may only be terminated for just cause. 7 99-471 CIVIL A handbook is enforceable against an employer if a reasonable person in the employee's position would interpret its provisions as evidencing the employer's intent to supplant the at-will rule and be bound legally by its representations in the handbook. The handbook must contain a clear indication that the employer intended to overcome the at-will presumption. We have held that it is for the court to interpret the handbook to discern whether it contains evidence of the employer's intention to be bound legally. Luteran at 371,688 A.2d at 214-15 (citations omitted). Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption of at-will employment. Policy 103 includes no clear indication of defendant's intent to create a contractual relationship with plaintiff and supplant the at-will rule. Policy 103 merely reflects defendant's company policy of promoting the reporting of accidents and presents proposed methods for dealing with accidents and subsequent discipline.5 Defendant issued the policy and maintained the right to unilaterally change its provisions. Nothing has been pled and no evidence can be pointed to that supports plaintiff's allegation that he can be terminated only for just cause. Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract. Therefore, defendant's demurrer to count two of 5 Even if a binding contract was formed, defendant followed the provisions of Policy 103 when it conducted an investigation and used its permissible discretion to determine that plaintiff's employment was to be terminated. 8 99-471 CIVIL plaintiff's complaint is granted. 9