HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-0991 criminalCOMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.
NICHOLAS ALBERT PRACHT, : NO. 98-0991 CRIMINAL TERM
Defendant
OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R. APP. P. 1925
HOFFER, P.J.: <Y-
In this opinion, the Court addresses Defendant's appeal to the Superior
Court from a judgment of sentence imposed December 10, 1998. Defendant,
Nicholas Albert Pracht, was charged with: (1) four counts of involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse with a person less than sixteen years of age, pursuant to 18 Pa.
C.S.A. §3123; (2) four counts of statutory sexual assault, pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A.
§3122.1; and (3) four counts of corruption of minors, pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A.
§6301.
Defendant, determined by the Court to be indigent, was assigned a court
appointed counsel on May 28, 1998. Defendant was unhappy with the
representation and a second court appointed counsel was assigned July 21, 1998.
Defendant again came in conflict with his counsel and asked the Court for
permission to represent himself at trial. On October 13, 1998, Defendant's motion
to represent himself was granted and his second court appointed counsel was
ordered to remain as stand-by counsel at trial.
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A jury trial was held in this matter, October 26 through 28, 1998. Before the
case was sent to the jury for deliberation, the statutory assault charges were
dismissed. Defendant was found guilty of all other counts charged. For each of the
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse counts, the Court imposed concurrent
sentences of imprisonment for six to fifteen years in a state correctional institution.
Defendant was also ordered to pay the costs of prosecution for each involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse count and one charge of corruption of minors.1
After trial, Defendant's stand-by counsel asked to withdraw from the case.
On December 23, 1998, counsel's motion to withdraw was granted and a new
counsel was assigned to handle Defendant's appeals. Defendant chose not to file
a post sentence motion before this Court. The Court received notice of direct
appeal to the Superior Court on January 7, 1999 and ordered Defendant to file a
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. After the statement was
received, the Court directed Defendant to clarify some of his allegations by an
order dated January 20, 1999. As of this date, the Court has not received
clarification from Defendant. We will address the matters set out in Defendant's
original statement as directly as possible.
~ The Court combined the four corruption of minors counts into one charge for
sentencing purposes.
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Allegation One: Sentence Imposed Was Outside Sentencing Guidelines and
Mandatory Minimum Should Not Have Applied
Defendant claims that the sentence he received was outside the sentencing
guidelines and that the mandatory minimum should not have applied. This Court
disagrees.
The sentencing guidelines provide a starting point for setting sentences. See
Commonwealth v. Jones, 433 Pa. Super. 266, 276, 640 A.2d 914, 919 (1994).
The Pennsylvania Code governs sentencing guidelines. 204 Pa. Code §303.1 et
seq. The Code states:
(a) The procedure for determining the guideline sentence
shall be as follows:
(1) Determine the Offense Gravity Score as
described in §303.3 and §303.15.
(2) Determine the Prior Record Score as described
in §303.4 - §303.8.
(3) Determine the guideline sentence
recommendation as described in §303.9 - §303.14,
including Deadly Weapon Enhancement and
Youth/School Enhancement (§303.10) and aggravating or
mitigating circumstances (§303.13).
204 Pa. Code §303.2. A basic sentencing matrix, integrating all three steps, can
be found at 204 Pa. Code §303.16.
Defendant, in the case at bar, was charged with and convicted of involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse, an offense with an Offense Gravity Score of 12.
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Defendant's Prior Record Score was determined to be 2. Using the sentencing
matrix, Defendant's standard sentence range was 60 to 78 months. Defendant
received a sentence of 72 to 180 months in a state penitentiary, clearly within the
sentencing guidelines. No error was committed by the Court.
Mandatory sentencing provisions are constitutional. See Commonwealth v.
Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985). The mandatory sentence for the crime
of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, committed against a person under 16
years of age, is imprisonment of not less than five years. 42 Pa. C.S.A.
§9718(a)(1). "The legislature has left no room in the statute for prosecutorial or
judicial discretion to sentence to a lesser term. Commonwealth v. Heath, 528 Pa.
316, 391,597 A.2d 1135, 1136 (1991).
In the case at bar, Defendant's victim was under 16 at the time the crimes
charged were committed. Pursuant to the statute, the Court was required to
impose the mandatory minimum sentence. Although the actual sentence imposed
exceeded the mandatory minimum by 12 months, the Court did not err in imposing
a minimum 72 month term that was well within the sentencing guidelines.
Allegation Two: Ineffective Assistance of Pre-trial Counsel
Defendant's Statement of Matters alleges that his pre-trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to fully prepare for trial and for failing to negotiate a
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reasonable plea bargain. Defendant is presenting this claim for the first time on
appeal. The issue of presenting for the first time on appeal a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel has been addressed in a number of appellate decisions.
See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 434 Pa. Super. 14, 641 A.2d 1176 (1994)
(holding that no waiver occurs if issue raised at earliest opportunity; remand for
evidentiary hearing unnecessary if appellate record sufficient to facilitate review);
Commonwealth v. Thuy, 424 Pa. Super. 482, 623 A.2d 327 (1993) (holding that
remand for evidentiary hearing proper where appellate record not sufficient to
facilitate review). This Court has not previously ruled on nor reviewed Defendant's
claim of ineffective assistance of his pre-trial counsel. Because the issue is now
before the Superior Court on direct appeal, it is no longer appropriate for this Court
to express an opinion on the merits of Defendant's claim.
Allegation Three: Failure to Sequester Commonwealth Witnesses
Defendant claims that the Court's failure to sequester Commonwealth
witnesses unfairly prejudiced him. The purpose of sequestration is to prevent a
witness from molding his testimony with that presented by other witnesses. See
Commonwealth v. Henry, 550 Pa. 198, 361,706 A.2d 313, 320 (1997). A request
for sequestration must be specific and supported by a showing that the interests
of justice require it. See id. The decision to sequester witnesses is left to the
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discretion of the trial judge. See Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 218, 161
A.2d 861,870 (1960). Granting a request for sequestration is appropriate in cases
where there are several witnesses to the same event, and each witness sees
something slightly different. Sequestration would prevent a witness from tailoring
his or her testimony to that of another witness who has testified earlier.
In the present case, the Court did not make a decision to sequester
Commonwealth witnesses because a request for sequestration was never made.
This was a case of the word of the victim against the word of Defendant. The
victim's testimony could not have been molded by testimony presented by other
witnesses because the victim testified first: Consequently, there was no need to
sequester witnesses and Defendant was not unfairly prejudiced.
Allegation Four: Failure to Conduct An Individual Voir Dire
Defendant complains that he was unfairly prejudiced by the Court's failure
to conduct an individual voir dire of all prospective jurors at the time of jury
selection. Instead, the Court used a list system of challenges method, questioning
prospective jurors as a group about their fitness for service on a jury.
The purpose of voir dire is to impanel a fair and unbiased jury. See
Commonwealth v. Paolello, 542 Pa. 47, 69, 665 A.2d 439, 450 (1995). "In capital
cases, the individual voir dire method must be used unless the defendant waives
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that alternative." Pa. R. Crim. P. 1106(e). In non-capital cases, the individual voir
dire method or the list system of challenges method may be used to select jurors
and alternates. Id. The trial court has discretion to determine in non-capital cases
whether voir dire will be conducted individually or in a group. See Commonwealth
v. Hathaway, 347 Pa. Super. 134, 144-45, 500 A.2d 443, 448 (1985).
The case at bar was not a capital case. Defendant was charged with
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and corruption of minors. No excessive pre-
trial publicity tainted the jury pool against Defendant. The Court exercised its
discretion by employing the list system of'challenges method for selecting a fair
and unbiased jury. Defendant was not unfairly prejudiced in the voir dire process.
Allegation Five: Failure to Include Defendant's Caselaw on Credibility
in the Charge to the Jury
Defendant alleges that the Court committed error when it failed to include
Defendant's caselaw on credibility in the charge to the jury. Defendant informed
the Court before the charge to the jury was given that he had relevant caselaw on
credibility that he wished included in the charge. Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 438.
The Court told Defendant that it would give a credibility instruction. Id~ Through
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his stand-by counsel, Defendant agreed to inform the Court after the charge was
given of any additions or changes that he would like included in the charge. Id._~.
After the charge was completed, Defendant informed the Court that he was
satisfied with the charge given. Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 454.
In reviewing jury instructions, the instructions must be looked at as a whole.
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 547 Pa. 71, 91, 688 A.2d 1152, 1162 (1997), cert.
denied, _ U.S._, 118 S. Ct. 364, 139 L. Ed.2d 284 (1997). "The trial court has
broad discretion in its phrasing of jury instructions so long as the instructions given
adequately reflect the law." Id.
When viewed as a whole, the chargb given to the jury accurately reflected
the applicable law. Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 442-45. The Court correctly
instructed the jurors that they were "the sole judges of the credibility of each and
every witness who has testified." Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p.445. No abuse of
discretion occurred when the Court gave the jury an instruction that adequately
reflected the law.
Allegation Six: Denial of Defendant's Request to Raise An Affirmative
Defense of Mental Infirmity or Diminished Capacity
Defendant claims that he should have been allowed to raise the affirmative
defense of mental infirmity or diminished capacity. Defendant filed notice of his
intent to use a defense of diminished capacity on August 17, 1998. Defendant
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requested permission to raise the defense before trial began. Transcript of
Discussion before Jury Selected, hereinafter "Discussion Transcript", p. 24. The
Court informed Defendant that diminished capacity was not a defense to
Defendant's crimes and that no testimony would be heard on the matter.
Discussion Transcript, pp. 24-25. After revieWing all of Defendant's requests, the
Court reiterated that a defense of diminished capacity was improper and would not
be allowed. Discussion Transcript, pp. 42-43.
A defendant must give notice of his intent to raise a defense of diminished
capacity or mental infirmity. Pa. R. Crim. P 305(C)(1)(b). The Pennsylvania Rules
of Criminal Procedure seem to contemplate'that the defense of diminished capacity
results from mental infirmity, therefore the defense of diminished capacity is
recognized, not the defense of mental infirmity. Pa. R. Crim. P. 311, Cmt.
Diminished capacity is available as a defense in very limited circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Legg, 551 Pa. 437, 444, 711 A.2d 430, 433 (1998). In
Pennsylvania, diminished capacity is only available to a defendant who is
"attempting to prove that he was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill; if
the defendant is successful first degree murder is mitigated to third degree." Id.
See also Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352 (1996), cert.
denied 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S.Ct. 931,133 L. Ed.2d 858 (1996). In employing the
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diminished capacity defense, a defendant in a murder case admits general criminal
culpability in attempting to reduce the degree of guilt from first degree to third
degree. Le__~gg at 444, 711 A.2d at 433.
In the case at bar, the defense of diminished capacity was unavailable to
Defendant. Before and during trial, Defendant made no admissions of guilt as
required by the defense. Defendant was charged with involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse and corruption of minors. He was not charged with first degree murder,
the only crime in which Pennsylvania allows the defense of diminished capacity.
No error was committed by the Court when it denied Defendant the use of the
diminished capacity defense.
Allegations Seven: Suppression of Defense Evidence
Defendant claims that the Court erred when it suppressed evidence he
planned to use at trial. Because Defendant did not clarify his statement of matters
complained of on appeal as requested, the Court must assume that Defendant is
alleging that the Court erred when it refused to allow Defendant to present
witnesses and visual aids related to a diminished capacity defense. "The
admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and
an appellate court may reverse only upon a showing that the trial court clearly
abused its discretion." Commonwealth v. Bardo, 551 Pa. 140, 153, 709 A.2d 871,
]0
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877 (1998).
Defendant did not file an omnibus pre-trial motion before trial was to begin.
He arrived on the first day scheduled for trial with a list of requests, in the form of
a pre-trial motion, that the Court dealt with point by point, on the record, before jury
selection began. See Discussion Transcript. Defendant requested: (1) a chance
to speak with the witnesses he subpoenaed because he could not speak to them
from jail2; (2) an exception from the "rape shield" law to allow him to attack the
victim's credibility by showing the victim's long history of lying; (3) copies of
transcripts from a Protection from Abuse hearing and a pre-trial hearing in an
earlier adjudicated corruption of minors ch~.rge; (4) a copy of the victim's criminal
record; (5) a copy of the transcript from Defendant's preliminary hearing in this
matter; (6) an order issued to the Cumberland County Prison that Defendant be
able to use glue and scissors, have more that thirty Xerox copies per week and get
extended law library time for preparing his defense; (7) that the fourth count of
each of the charges filed against him be quashed; (8) an inventory list of all items
confiscated from Defendant's home; (9) suppression of the preliminary hearing
which he claimed contained an "illegal confession" by the victim; (10) that the Court
2 Before trial, Defendant was being held in the Cumberland County Prison for
previous parole violations.
]]
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accept his proposed witness list; and (11) that the Court obtain and allow
Defendant to use stage props to aid in his defense. Discussion Transcript, pp. 4-
12.
The Court made the following rulings on Defendant's requests: (1)
Defendant, aided by his stand-by counsel, was permitted to speak to the
subpoenaed witnesses, have access to glue, scissors and moro than thirty Xerox
copies per week, and, if possible, listen to any audio taped proceedings related to
this case; (2) Defendant was not given copies of transcripts from earlier
proceedings or the preliminary hearing held in this matter because the Court found
none to be in existence; (3) Defendant's mo[ion to suppress the preliminary hearing
was denied; (4) the fourth counts of each charge were not quashed or dismissed
because the Commonwealth had sufficient evidence to go forward; and (5) the
Court and the District Attorney agreed that the "rape shield" law did not apply
under these circumstances and Defendant was allowed to attack the victim's
credibility as part of his defense. Discussion Transcript, pp. 12-20. Before trial
began, the District Attorney gave Defendant copies of the victim's criminal record
and the inventory of the items confiscated from Defendant's home.
Defendant presented the Court with a list of eighteen potential witnesses.
The Court took an offer of proof on each witness before ruling on admissibility.
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The Court did not allow Defendant to present any witnesses whose testimony was
related to the defense of diminished capacity. Discussion Transcript, pp. 21-40.
For instance, the Court ruled that Defendant could not present: (1) Madame Lola,
a psychic, who was to testify that abused persons develop hypersensitivity to other
abused persons; (2) Sergeant York, a bomb expert, who would compare
relationships between lovers with the results of a fusion bomb explosion; and (3)
a series of doctors and mental health experts who would discuss Defendant's love
addiction and his inability to conform his behavior to the social norm because of
his own history of sexual abuse. Id.
Defendant also requested the use'of stage props to aid in his defense.
Discussion Transcript, p. 8. The Court did not allow Defendant to use the props
requested, a two-bulb lamp and two clear water glasses, because the props were
designed to further the diminished capacity defense.
As discussed above, the defense of diminished capacity was unavailable to
Defendant. Consequently, the Court did not allow Defendant to present witnesses
or employ stage props in support of a diminished capacity defense. The Court did
not abuse its discretion in ruling on the admissibility of Defendant's witnesses and
stage props.
Allegation Eight: Failure to Suppress Commonwealth Evidence
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Defendant's final allegation is that the Court failed to suppress evidence
used by the Commonwealth at trial. Without the aid of an omnibus pre-trial motion
or a clarification of Defendant's statement of matters complained of on appeal, it
is not clear what evidence Defendant believes was admitted in error. In
discussions held before trial, Defendant did request suppression of his preliminary
hearing and a copy of the inventory of items seized from his home during a search.
Defendant may be alleging error because the Court denied his request to suppress
and did not exclude any evidence taken from Defendant's home. Also, various
exhibits presented by the Commonwealth were admitted at trial. It is possible that
Defendant is alleging that additional error ~ccurred at this stage of trial.
Defendant claimed that the preliminary hearing contained an "illegal
confession", made by the victim to police, without the victim's mother being
present. Discussion Transcript, p. 10. The Court refused to suppress the
preliminary hearing. Discussion Transcript, p.12. Suppression is only proper
where the reliability of evidence is called into serious question or government
conduct is so egregious that suppression represents the only solution.
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 537 Pa. 464, 477-78, 644 A.2d 1175, 1182 (1994). In
the case at bar, the victim testified at trial and the jury had the opportunity judge
his reliability. Suppression of the preliminary hearing was not necessary to protect
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Defendant's interests.
After receiving a copy of the inventory, Defendant made no request to
suppress anything taken from his home. Trial testimony reflects that the
Commonwealth, admittedly, took nothing useful to the case from Defendant's
home. Discussion Transcript, pp. 207-13. No evidence seized from Defendant's
home was used against him therefore suppression was not necessary and no error
occurred.
The Commonwealth's exhibits, including letters written by and to Defendant,
were marked for identification without objection from Defendant. See Trial
Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 84, 122, 157-60. At'the time of identification the content of
the letters was discussed and Defendant failed to object. Id. At the close of the
Commonwealth's case in chief, the District Attorney moved for the admission of
Commonwealth exhibits 1 through 27. Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 271. At that time,
Defendant objected to the admission of Commonwealth exhibits 9, 10, 16, 18, 19,
20, 21,22, and 23. Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 273-74. All exhibits, including those
objected to by Defendant, were admissible, enabling both the District Attorney and
Defendant to refer to the contents in closing arguments. Trial Transcript, Vol. I, pp.
277-79. At the close of trial, the Court again discussed the Commonwealth
exhibits with Defendant and the District Attorney. Trial Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 455-
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58. All exhibits were deemed admissible but the Court did not allow the jury to
take Commonwealth exhibits 6 through 23 with them into deliberations, in
recognition of Defendant's objections. Id. Defendant did not object to the Court's
treatment of the exhibits. The jury's access to the exhibits was limited because
some exhibits contained impermissible references to Defendant's mental state.
Suppression was not requested or necessary.
The admission of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and
will only be overturned with a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.
Commonwealth v. Bardo, 551 Pa. 140, 153, 709 A.2d 871,877 (1998). Because
the Court had sound reasons to deny Defendant's motion to suppress the
preliminary hearing and to admit exhibits offered by the Commonwealth, no abuse
of discretion occurred.