Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-2108 civil (2)LETTERMEN, INC. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Appellants OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, v. PENNSYLVANIA TOWNSHIP OF SILVER SPRING No.99-2108 Civil Term Appellee Land Use Appeal LESTER S. MILLER, ET AL, Intervenor LESTER S. MILLER, ET AL, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Appellants OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. No. 99-2119 Civil Term BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF Land Use Appeal SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP Appellee LETTERMEN, INC. Intervenor : IN RE: Land Use Appeal From Silver Spring Township Board of Supervisors' Grant of Conditional Use Approval Before HOFFER, P.J. and OLER, J. ORDER AND NOW, this I d"~'~y of January, 2000, it is hereby ordered and decreed that, the appeal of Lester $. Miller, et al., from the Decision of the Silver Spring Township Board of Supervisors dated March 10, 1999, is dismissed. The appeal of Lettermen, Inc. is upheld to the limited effect of annulling Condition 5 of the Board's Decision; but in all other respects, Lettermen, Inc.'s appeal is dismissed. By the Court, Steven J. Fishman, Esquire 95 Alexander Spring Road, Ste. 3 Carlisle, PA 17013 For Lettermen, Inc. C. Grainger Bowman, Esquire 114 North Second Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 For Lester S. Miller, Jr., et al. Richard C. Snelbaker, Esquire 44 West Main Street, PO Box 318 Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 For Silver Spring Township Board of Supervisors LETTERMEN, INC. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Appellants OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, v. PENNSYLVANIA TOWNSHIP OF SILVER SPRING No.99-2108 Civil Term Appellee Land Use Appeal Ve LESTER S. MILLER, ET AL, Intervenor LESTER S. MILLER, ET AL, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Appellants OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. No. 99-2119 Civil Term BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF Land Use Appeal SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP Appellee LETTERMEN, INC. Intervenor Land Use Appeal From Silver Spring Township Board of Supervisors' Grant of Conditional Use Approval HOFFER, P.J.: Statement of Facts and Procedural History Lettermen, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation with offices at 153 South Hanover Street, Carlisle, is the equitable owner of the subject property and developer of a proposed golf course. Lettermen, Inc. sought and obtained approval from the Silver Spring Township Board of Supervisors to construct a golf course at the subject property. The subject property is 194 acres of generally unimproved farmland. The property is transected by Rich Valley Road and bounded by Interstate 81, Conodoguinet Creek, 10 single-family residences and the farmland of Jack K. and Jeanne N. Sunday. Decision of the Silver Spring Township Board of Supervisors (hereinafter "Decision") at 3. Section 202 of the Zoning Ordinance governs the use of property in a Rural Residential (R) zoning district, within which the subject property is located. Decision at 3. On September 23, 1998, the Board approved Lettermen's rezoning request that the subject property be rezoned from Agricultural (A) to Rural Residential (R). On October 22, 1998, Lettermen, Inc. applied for conditional use approval. On December 10, 1998, the Township Planning Commission recommended to the Board that the Board deny the conditional use. In their Decision on March 10, 1999, the Board granted Lettermen, Inc. a Conditional use to construct a golf course subject to 11 "Specific Conditions." In Lettermen, Inc. v. Township of Silver Spring, Lettermen, Inc. appealed conditions imposed by the Board in the Board's conditional use approval. Lester S. Miller, Jr. and other neighbors to the subject property appealed the conditional use approval in Lester S. Miller, Jr., et al v. Township of Silver Spring. The cases have been consolidated here. The subject property has improvements consisting of a dwelling house, two barn-type buildings and various sheds and other farm related outbuildings. The application for conditional use approval proposes to use the property for a 21-hole golf course and driving range to be constructed on both sides of Rich Valley Road (S.R. 1009) on approximately 174.2 acres; and sixteen 'lots for single-family dwellings on approximately 19.5 acres on the east side of Rich Valley Road ("Residential Subdivision"). The application proposes: - to build a golf driving range of 400 yards, terminating at 1-81, to be illuminated for night use. - to illuminate the driving range with lighting that will project away from (opposite) the existing residences. - to convert an existing barn as a "clubhouse restaurant." Applicant proposes the removal or conversion of other farm outbuildings to storage and maintenance facilities for usage incidental to the golf course. Applicant proposes to use the house for a golf course office and residence. - to draw all irrigation water from the Conodoguinet. The Applicant abandoned the possibility of on-site wells at the hearing. Rich Valley Road (S.R. 1009) is a two-lane macadam "collector-type" road under PennDOT jurisdiction and runs generally between Carlisle Pike (S.R. 11) on the south and Wertzville Road (S.R. 944) on the north, and has intersections with feeder roads. Carlisle Pike is a major 4-lane highway under PennDOT jurisdiction bisecting Silver Spring Township. The intersection of Rich Valley Road and Carlisle Pike, which is more than a mile from the subject property, presently has only a stop sign and no electric traffic signal. Wertzville Road, approximately one mile from the subject property, is a 2-lane highway and major transportation route under PennDOT jurisdiction. General Approval Issues The zoning change from Agricultural (A) to Rural Residential (R) on September 23, 1998 will not be reviewed. Section 909.1(a) of the Municipalities Planning Code, 53 P.S. §10909.1(a), provides the zoning hearing board with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and render adjudication in matters of substantive challenges to the validity of any land use ordinance or validity challenges raising procedural questions. Procedural challenges must be raised by an appeal taken within 30 days of the effective date. See Sharp v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Radnor, 157 Pa. Cmwlth. 50, 628 A.2d 1223, appeal denied, 536 Pa. 629, 637 A.2d 290 (1993). The time limitation on appeals to the zoning change here was 30 days. No such appeal was or has been made concerning the zoning of the subject property in this case. However, the parties appeal the Board's decision based on the following contentions. Contentions of the Parties Lester S. Miller, Jr., et al, appeals the grant of conditional use approval for a golf course use. Lester S. Miller, Jr., et al, contends: A. A golf course use is inconsistent with the purpose of the Rural Residential zoning district, because a golf course's characteristics are not rural, thus detracting from the use and peaceful enjoyment of property for the neighbors. B. The banquet facilities in the Letterman conditional use application are unreasonably oversized and will be a commercial use inconsistent with the Rural Residential zone. C. The lighted driving range will cause light pollution in the neighborhood. D. The golf course will generate an unnecessarily large volume of traffic in the neighborhood, contrary to the character of the zone; and public facilities, such as Rich Valley Road, are not adequate to serve a golf course. E. The proposed plans will alter watercourses, detaining water from fragile wetlands, contrary to Section 231 of the Zoning Ordinance. F. The proposed withdrawal of water from the Conodoguinet may result in excessive water withdrawal and could threaten neighbor's access to water, particularly during drought. Lester S. Miller Jr., et al, requests that this Court reverse the Decision of the Board and deny Lettermen, Inc.'s conditional use. Lettermen, Inc. appeals conditions the Board attached in granting Lettermen, Inc.'s conditional use approval for a proposed golf course. Lettermen, Inc. contends that the following conditions were arbitrary, discriminatory, not supported by evidence and contrary to law: A. Condition 3 restricts the hours of operation of driving range lights beyond the standards of the Township Ordinances. B. Condition 4 requires Lettermen, Inc. to provide a traffic study and fund improvements to address the increase in traffic resulting from the golf course. C. Condition 5 requires Lettermen, Inc. to fund roadway improvements and install electric traffic signals at the intersection of Rich Valley Road and Carlisle Pike. D. Condition 6 restricts the golf course clubhouse to the existing interior dimensions of the existing barn, while section 428.5 of the Zoning Ordinance permits a clubhouse to include a restaurant, snack bar, lounge, banquet facilities, locker and rest rooms, pro shop, administrative offices and fitness and health equipment. E. Condition 7 restricts the reasonable use of the proposed premises. F. Condition 8 requires substantial completion of the golf course on the southeast side of Rich Valley Road prior to commencing construction of any "structures" in the Residential Subdivision. Enorcement of this condition would preclude construction of storm sewer pipes, culverts, roads, signs, and the like, until construction is substantially completed. DISCUSSION We now must determine whether the Board abused its discretion, committed an error of law or made findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence. POA Co. v. Findlay Township Zoning Hearing Board, 551 Pa. 689, 698, 713 A.2d 70, 75 (1998). An abuse of discretion occurs when the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. POA Co., 551 Pa. at 698,713 A.2d at 75. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion that was reached. Id. 551 Pa. at 698, 713 A.2d at 75. A trial court, having determined that the Board committed neither an abuse of discretion nor error of law, is bound to affirm the decision of the Board as long as the Board's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. Spargo v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Municipality of Bethel Park, 128 Pa. Cmwlth. 193, 204, 563 A.2d 213, 217 (1989) reh'g denied. A trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board, absent a manifest abuse of discretion. B & B Shoe v. Manheim Borough, 28 Pa. Cmwlth. 275 (1977). The law regarding conditional use permits states that a conditional use permit must be granted if the applicant meets the specific requirements in the ordinance, unless the use will be detrimental to public health, safety or welfare. Wheaton v. Zoning Hearing Board of Municipality of Penn Hills, 130 Pa. Cmwlth. 201,204-205, 567 A.2d 779, 781 (1989). The burden then shifts to the protestants to present evidence that the proposed use has a detrimental effect on health, safety and welfare. Id. A Board of Supervisors may attach such reasonable conditions and safeguards, in addition to those expressed in the zoning ordinance, as it may deem necessary to implement the purposes of the MPC in the zoning ordinance. MPC §603(c)(2); Levin v. Board of Supervisors of Benner Township, Centre County, 669 A.2d 1063, 1073 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Additionally, a township board of supervisors may properly require conditional use applicants to bear the cost of improvements which address concerns arising from the applicant's proposed use, if the requirement is intended to promote conditions favorable to the township's general health, safety and welfare. Pitcher v. Heidelberg Township Board of Supervisors, 161 Pa. Cmwlth. 505, 508, 637 A.2d 715, 716 (1994). See also, Tobin v. Radnor Township Board of Commissioners, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 567, 584-85, 597 A.2d 1258, 1266-1267(1991). Any conditions that the Supervisors wish to impose upon the proposed conditional use must be upheld if the conditions are reasonably related to the health, safety or welfare of the public. Clinton County Solid Waste Authority v. Wayne Township, 164 Pa. CmwIth. 632, 646-647, 643 A.2d 1162, 1169 (1994) (Requiring inspection of incoming waste and requiring construction of cyclone fence to protect site were held to be reasonable conditions imposed in a landfill conditional use). See also Mosside Associates, Ltd. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Municipality of Monroeville et al., 70 Pa. Cmwlth. 555, 557, 454 A.2d 199, 201 (1982) (Conditional use appropriately granted with 13 attached conditions). We now look to whether the Board has abused its discretion in rendering its Decision regarding the following issues: 1. Whether a golf course use in a rural residential zone violates the Silver Spring Township Zoning Ordinance. Lester S. Miller, Jr., et al, contends that a golf course use is inconsistent with the purpose of a Rural Residential zoning district. The ordinance governing the present case is the 1995 Zoning Ordinance for Silver Spring Township §428, which permits golf courses as a conditional use in a Rural Residential zone and prescribes specific criteria for golf courses. Section 202.1, which defines the purpose of a Rural Residential zone, allows farmland to be developed while preserving the "rural character" of an area. As the 1995 Silver Spring Township Zoning Ordinance §202.4.1 specifically provides for the conditional use of a golf course in the Rural Residential Zone, it is clear that the drafters of the Zoning Ordinance believed golf courses would not detract from the "rural character" of an area. In additiOn, the record shows that the golf course use will not be detrimental to public health, safety or welfare. Thus, we affirm the Board's decision permitting the proposed golf course at the subject property. 2. Whether the Susquehanna River Basin Commission's (SRBC) approval of irrigation water withdrawal from the Conodoguinet River will sufficiently guard the health, safety and welfare of the township residents and neighbors of the subject property. Lester S. Miller, et al, contends that Lettermen's withdrawal of water from the Conodoguinet '~,'ill endanger the health, safety and welfare of nearby residents due to the lowering of the water level in the creek. Pending final approval from the SRBC, the issue here of withdrawing water from the Conodoguinet River is totally within SRBC jurisdiction. We do not address issues here that the Board of Supervisors .would be unable to address. Citizens have the option of carrying their concerns to the SRBC, should any concerns arise. 3. Whether the golf course plans will alter watercourses, detaining water from fragile wetlands, contrary to Section 231 of the Zoning Ordinance. Lester S. Miller, Jr., et al contends that the proposed plans will alter watercourses, detaining water from fragile wetlands, contrary to Section 231 of the Zoning Ordinance. Lettermen, Inc.'s Exhibit 11, which contains the plans for the proposed golf course, clearly shows that the subject property partially lies within a flood plain. Section 231.7 allows golf courses in a floodplain zone: "Permitted Uses - The following uses and no others are permitted in the Floodplain Zone: 9. Recreational use, ... such as parks, camps, picnic areas, golf courses, fishing areas, ..." Silver Spring Township Zoning Ordinance of 1995. The record shows that the golf course use will not be detrimental to public health, safety or welfare. Lettermen's plans for the proposed golf course show that the wetlands area will not be eliminated as a result of the proposed plans. l0 Lettermen, Inc.'s Exhibit 11, Section 4. Thus, we affirm the Board's decision permitting the proposed golf course in a floodplain zone. 4. Whether public facilities are adequate to serve the golf course. Lester S. Miller, Jr., et al contends that the public facilities, such as Rich Valley Road, are not adequate to serve a golf course. Vehicular traffic must be considered and accommodated by the Board's decision, but lawful development of land cannot be prohibited per se by possibly inadequate existing public roads. The construction of other fully permitted uses in the R zone would produce as much or more traffic than a golf course. A golf course, in contrast, will result in increased traffic only during the seasons when people would want to golf. The existing on-site wells and sewerage facilities, electrical, telephone and other public utility services will be adequate to meet the golf course use needs. Due to the nature of a golf course, we agree with the Board that the course will require few other public facilities. We affirm the Board's decision that Lettermen, Inc. need not construct additional public facilities. 4. Whether Condition 5, requiring that Lettermen, Inc. fund traffic signals and road improvements to an area more than a mile away from the subject property if warranted by PennDOT, is a permissible condition.~ ~ Silver Spdng Township made a stipulation regarding whether Lettermen, Inc. met Condition 4 of the Decision, that Lettermen, Inc. provide a comprehensive traffic analysis. "Applicant has provided Township with the required comprehensive traffic analysis as prepared by Grove Miller Engineering, Inc. dated June 29, 1999 as supplemented by report dated August 20, 1999." Letter from Township's Counsel, Richard C. Snelbaker, September 23, 1999. Thus, we do not address Condition 4 of the Decision here. Lettermen, Inc. contends that Condition 5 is an error of law. Condition 5 provides, That if warranted by PennDOT, Applicant shall provide the funds necessary to improve the roadway and install electric traffic signals at the intersection of Rich Valley Road and Carlisle Pike. Applicant's funding requirements shall be reduced by the amount, if any, of prior developer-contributions made specifically for such purpose at said intersection. Decision at 14. The law in Pennsylvania does not allow a Board to require off-site improvements. Municipality of Monroeville v. Prin, 680 A.2d 9, 13-14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). In Municipality of Monroeville v. Prin, the court held that an attempt to impose conditions of off-site improvements violated 53 P.S. §10503(A)(b), stating that such an imposition constituted an error of law. Id. The Prin court found the requirement of improvements to traffic intersections at least one mile from the subject property to be an error of law. Id. The Prin court stated that § 503-A(b) of the MPC (53 P.S. §10503(A)(b)), prohibited off-site conditions. However, the Prin court permitted conditions that required on-site improvements. Id. A Board may appropriately require on-site improvements, so long as the improvement will improve the health, safety or welfare of citizens. Pitcher v. Heidelberg Township Board of Supervisors, 161 Pa. Cmwlth. 505, 508, 637 A.2d 715, 716, 717 (1994). The court in Pitcher v. Heidelberg Township Board of Supervisors held that an applicant for a subdivision approval was properly required to pay to widen an abutting road. Id, The improvement would correct an existing hazardous condition immediately adjacent to the subject property in that case (emphasis added). Id. The Board in Pitcher anticipated that the applicant's subdivision plan would increase traffic on the road in question. Id. at 509, 637 A.2d at 718. See also, Tobin v. Radnor Township Board of Commissioners, 142 Pa. Cmwlth. 567, 584-85, 597 A.2d 1258, (1991) (holding that a municipality may condition use approval on improvements to a road). Here, Lettermen, Inc. has provided a comprehensive traffic study demonstrating that traffic on the road will increase as a result of the proposed use. 2 The Board of Supervisors conditioned approval of the golf course on the Lettermen's funding of traffic signals at the intersection of Rich Valley Road and Carlisle Pike, if warranted by PennDOT. A situation whereby PennDOT would warrant such improvements may not come about for many years. However, if PennDOT requires such improvements, the Board then would seek provision of funds from whoever owns the golf course. At present we do not know whether PennDOT warrants or will warrant such improvements. The Board is attempting to preface approval on a condition that may never come into effect, or may come into effect 20 or 30 years from now. Notwithstanding an indefinite time period, the Pennsylvania Code does not provide for offsite improvements, regardless of when such improvements would be required. 53 P.S. 10503(A)(b); Municipality of Monroeville v. Prin, 680 A.2d 9, 13-14 (Pa. CmwIth. 1996). Offsite improvements to the intersection of Rich Valley Road and Carlisle Pike eventually be warranted by PennDOT and possibly could improve health, safety and welfare in the township by controlling the increased traffic a golf course would create. Nonetheless, such improvements would clearly be far removed from the subject property and a condition requiring such improvements is per se impermissible and an error of law. We hereby annul Condition 5 of the Board's grant of conditional approval. 5. Whether the glare reduction on the driving range lights as conditionally approved in the plans is an appropriate condition; and whether it will sufficiently protect the health, safety and welfare interests of the residents. Lester S. Miller, Jr., et al contends that the golf course lights will cause light pollution, create a commercial appearance and detract from the neighbor's use and enjoyment of their property. Lettermen, Inc. contends that Condition 3, restricting the hours of operation of the driving range lights, is beyond the standards of the Township Ordinances. Section 428.5(2)(a) of the Zoning Ordinance allows a "driving range," provided that the applicant shall furnish expert evidence that all lighting has been arranged to prevent glare on adjoining properties and streets. Silver Spring Township Zoning Ordinance, 1995. The township has required glare shields. Lettermen, Inc. has furnished expert evidence explaining the function of glare shields. Lettermen, Inc.'s Exhibit 11, Section 5. The shields are intended to prevent direct glare, but ambient light would still be a factor. For this reason, the Board has set a 9:30 p.m. "lights off" ~ Lettermen, Inc.'s Exhibit 11, Section 5. t4 condition in Condition 3 of the Decision. This requirement is reasonably required to protect the health, safety and welfare of nearby residents. The Board has met its duty to the neighbors and the Zoning Ordinance with this requirement. The driving range is a permitted accessory use and the 9:30 p.m. "lights off" provision is reasonable. Thus, we are bound to affirm the Board's decision permitting the proposed driving range. 6. Whether it is reasonable and not an abuse of discretion for the Township Board of Supervisors to require in Condition 8 that the portion of the golf course on the southeast side of Rich Valley Road be substantially completed before construction on any "structures" in the Residential Subdivision begins. Lettermen, Inc. contends that requiring substantial completion of the golf course on the southeast side of Rich Valley Road prior to commencing construction of any "structures" in the Residential Subdivision is an arbitrary, discriminatory and irrational condition. Condition Eight provides: That the portion of the golf course on the southeast side of Rich Valley Road shall be substantially completed before commencing the construction of any structures in the Residential Subdivision. Decision at 15. Lettermen, Inc. does not yet have the Board's approval to construct a "Rural Cluster" housing development within the golf course. Section 451 of the Zoning Ordinance permits Rural Clusters in a Rural Residential zone subject to conditional use approval. Lettermen, Inc. must yet obtain such approval. While this proposed use is not at issue in this Decision, its permitted nature is recognized under the first criterion of {}704.2. Decision at 7. Lettermen, Inc. appealed Condition 8 in the Decision on the basis that construction on the golf course later would need to be re-done to install necessary utility pipes for the proposed Residential Subdivision. The Board addressed this complaint in the Brief of Silver Spring: Lettermen, Inc. quibbles with the Board of Supervisors's language in regulating the order of development. Specifically, it attempts to split hairs over the word 'structures'. As explained informally to Lettermen, 'structures' means buildings, houses, homes. At no time has any indication that the term means 'storm sewer pipes, culverts, roads, signs, etc. Lettermen, Inc. knows that the Township insisted that the golf course be substantially completed before the housing development began. It is sheer common sense that houses would sell independent of the golf course, but that the houses were incidental to the primary use of a golf course .... If the golf course development requires "storm sewer pipes, culverts, roads, signs, etc.," they must be installed of sheer necessity .... The Court is assured that "structures" means "houses" in the context of Condition 8. Brief of Township of Silver Spring at 13-14. We find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in requiring substantial completion of the golf course prior to the commencement of housing construction. Lettermen, Inc. must yet obtain approval for a residential subdivision. As provided for in the Brief of Township of Silver Spring, the Board's allowance for the inclusion of such items as "storm sewer pipes, culverts, roads, signs, etc.," in the course of the golf course construction eliminates the possibility of an unreasonable reading of the Board's decision. Thus, we are bound to affirm the Board's decision requiring that the golf course be substantially completed prior to the commencement of housing construction. 16 7. Whether the golf course banquet facilities are unreasonably oversized or unreasonably restricted to the footprint of the existing facilities, in light of the permitted inclusion of a restaurant: snack bar, lounge, banquet facilities, locker rooms, rest rooms, pre shop, offices and fitness equipment. Lester S. Miller, et al, contends that the proposed clubhouse features an unreasonably oversized banquet facility, arising from the concern that the facility will allow a large restaurant use. Lettermen, Inc. contends that Conditions 6 and 7 unreasonably limit the proposed facility to the footprint of the existing buildings on the subject property and unreasonably limit the use of the facility. Conditions 6 and 7 provide: 6. That except for an outside entrance canopy, the proposed adaptation of the barn structure nearest Rich Valley Road denoted for clubhouse purposes must be limited and confined to the existing interior dimensions (width, length, height, area and volume) of said structure and within the 'footprint' therof. 7. That restaurant and dining facilities of the clubhouse shall not be used for banquet purposes except in conjunction with principal golf- related activities on the day of said activities. Decision at 14. According to the Clubhouse Schematics, the combined gross square footage of the ground floor and the first floor of the facility would be 8,350 feet. However, this area is contained entirely within the footprint of the existing buildings, upon which Silver Spring conditioned approval. The plans are part of the record, and from our own examination of the plans, we estimate the building to be approximately 120 feet by 100 feet. The facility contains 3 partitioned rooms with rough measurements of 25 feet by 30 feet, 25 by 40 feet, and 12 feet l? by 25 feet. If Lettermen, Inc. constructed the course and the facilities as proposed and conditionally approved, the seating in the banquet facility would far exceed the number of possible players at the course. If all four players on each of the holes were to eat simultaneously in the banquet facility, only 84 seats would be required (4 x 21 = 84). Clearly, this is not a large-scale restaurant operation. It is irrelevant that there would be more seats in the banquet facility than there could be players on the golf course. According to the Clubhouse Schematics, the facility will be constructed entirely within the footprint of the existing buildings. The Board conditioned approval on such a plan. The existing buildings are a barn and farmhouse; the area therein is not an unreasonably large accommodation for the golf course restaurant, snack bar, lounge, banquet facilities, locker rooms, rest rooms, pro shop, offices and fitness equipment. Also, the area within the footprint of the existing buildings is not so small as to be unreasonably restrictive of the proposed facility. The proposed facility, as evidenced by the Clubhouse Schematics in the record, allows all of the above-mentioned uses. The Board appropriately limits the facility to the footprint of the existing buildings to prevent the possibility of a large-scale restaurant use. Therefore, we conclude that the Board's condition limiting the clubhouse and banquet facility to the footprint of the existing buildings to be a reasonable condition, and we affirm.