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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-4306 civilCERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT :IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LLOYDS OF LONDON as :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA subrogee of L.G. DEWlTT TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff v. :NO. 98-4306 CIVIL TERM PLEASANT INNS and SUPER 8 MOTEL, Defendants IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Before HOFFER~ P.J. OLER~ J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, ~~'~. ~ ,2001, pursuant to the opinion filed on this date, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. By the Court,  p.j. James P. Carfagno, Esquire Stuart, Clark & Wells, P.C. The Lewis Tower Building 225 South 15 th Street, 27th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102 Attorney for Plaintiff Stephen E. Geduldig, Esquire Michele J. Thorpe, Esquire Thomas, Thomas, & Haler, LLP 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Attorney for Defendants CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT :IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LLOYDS OF LONDON as :CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA subrogee of L.G. DEWlTT TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiffs v. :NO. 98-4306 CIVIL TERM PLEASANT INNS and SUPER 8 MOTEL, Defendants IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Before HOFFER, P.J., OLER, J. OPINION HOFFER, J.: In this opinion, we address Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This suit arises from the July 30, 1997, theft of an L.G. Dewitt Trucking Company, Inc. trailer, containing Hershey's chocolate products, from a motel parking lot. Plaintiffs Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, as subrogee of L.G. Dewitt Trucking Company, Inc. paid Hershey for the stolen chocolate and its insured, DeWitt, for the stolen trailer. The total loss due to the theft was $99,481.80. On August 19, 1998, plaintiffs filed a Complaint against defendants, alleging that defendants are responsible under breach of contract, bailment, and negligence theories for the theft. The Complaint states that defendants had a duty to provide adequate security for the trailer and failed to fulfill that duty. Defendants filed an Answer with New Matter on November 23, 1998. Discovery was subsequently completed, and this motion for summary judgment followed. Discussion Parties may move for summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any necessary element of the cause of action or a defense to the action. Pa.R.Civ. P. 1035.2. The courts have stated that "an entry of summary judgment may be granted only in cases where the right is clear and free from doubt." Demmler v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 448 Pa. Super. 425, 430, 671 A.2d 1151, 1153 (1996) (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co.., Inc., 522 Pa. 3671 370, 562 A.2d 279, 280 (1989)). When considering summary judgment, the court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. "[T]he trial court must accept as true, all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party's pleadings...giving the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom." Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 370 Pa. Super. 115, 117, 535 A.2d 1177, 1178 (1988). Furthermore, "[i]n a summary judgment proceeding, the court's function is not to determine the facts, but only to determine if a material fact exists." Kelly v. Ickes, 427 Pa. Super. 542, 547, 629 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1993). Through the Court's independent research, we have found a case that is direCtly applicable to the case sub judice. In Dune.qan v. Apico Inns of Green Tree, Inc., 356 Pa. Super. 386, 514 A.2d 912 (1986) the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an owner of a motor inn was not required to safeguard patron's vehicle against theft by third-persons, and thus was not liable for theft of patron's automobile. A duty to protect one's automobile from theft will arise only if a responsibility was undertaken for safeguarding the vehicle as part of a contractual agreement between the parties. See Sparrow v. Airport Parking Co. of America, Inc., 221 Pa. Super. 32, 289 A.2d 87 (1972). Under the circumstances of the instant case, there could be no liability on behalf of the innkeeper to safeguard plaintiffs' vehicle from theft. The driver did not surrender possession of the vehicle to the defendants, he retained the keys to the vehicle, and the vehicle was accessible to the driver throughout his stay. Plaintiffs were granted no more than a privilege to park the vehicle on the lot because of the driver's patronage of the inn. Under these circumstances, the legal relationship existing between the defendants and the plaintiffs was that of a licensor-licensee. As a licensor, the owner of a motor inn is under no duty to protect the vehicles of its guests from theft. Dune.qan, 356 Pa. Super. 386, 392,514 A.2d 912,914. Therefore we find, after thorough examination of the case at bar, that there are no disputed issues of material fact, and therefore summary judgment must be granted.