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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-4990 civil ELOISE LEMMON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFF, v. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-4990 DANIEL ERNST DEFENDANT, IN RE: PLAINTIFF LEMMON'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAl o.o.. cou. AND NOW, ~A ~," , 2002, upon careful consideration of Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial and Defendant's response thereto, it is hereby ordered that the Motion is DENIED. By the Court, James DeCinti, Esquire 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 For the Plaintiff Jeffrey B. Rettig, Esquire Thomas, Thomas & Haler, LLP 305 North Front Street PO Box 999 Harrisburg, PA 17108 For the Defendant ELOISE LEMMON, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFF, v. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 99-4990 DANIEL ERNST DEFENDANT, IN RE: PLAINTIFF LEMMON'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAl OPINION HOFFER, P.J.: In this opinion the Court addresses plaintiff Eloise Lemmon's motion for New Trial. At trial on July 16, 2001 the jury returned a verdict finding that defendant Daniel Ernst's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff claims that there was uncontroverted evidence presented at trial that she was injured by the defendant's negligence and that the jury's verdict was so contrary to the evidence that she should be granted a new trial. The Court disagrees and the motion for new trial is denied. Factual and Procedural Backqround This case arose from a minor rear end collision on September 20, 1997, between defendant's car and the car in which plaintiff was a passenger. Both defendant's BuiCk and the Camaro in which plaintiff was a passenger, were stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of Shepardstown Road and Route 114. (N.T. 1 at 13.) The Camaro began to pull forward and the defendant's car followed. The Camaro came to a stop before pulling out in to traffic and the defendant was unable to stop his car before impacting the rear bumper of the Camaro. (N.T. 1 at 14.) The defendant claims that at the time of the impact he was traveling about five miles per hour and that he was "late with the brakes." (N.T. 1 at 14.) The testimony of the defendant and his wife described the accident as a "sudden bump" (N.T. 2 at 6) that did not cause the airbag to deploy (N.T. 2 at 15) or their seatbelts to grab. (N.T..2 at 7, 15.) Both the defendant and his wife testified that they did not sustain any bruises, contusions or anything else that could be characterized as an injury as a result of this accident. (N.T. 2 at 7, 15-17.) Further, the damage to both vehicles from the impact was negligible. (See Exhibits 4A, 4B, 5.) The plaintiff describes the accident as a "violent collision" in which the Camaro was hit "really hard" and "slammed forward." (N.T. 1 at 38-39.) She testified that the seatbelt tightened and dug into her hip and that the impact caused her head to move "like a loose cannonball, just going wherever the force was throwing it." (N.T. 1 at 6-7, 40-41.) After the accident the plaintiff claims that she developed a headache and numbness and later developed severe neck and back pain. (N.T. 1 at 8-9.) The plaintiff seeks damages for injuries including herniated disks, sciatica, and carpal tunnel syndrome. (See Complaint at 2.) Discussion "A new trial should be granted only where the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice [and not] where the evidence is 2 conflicting [or] where the trial judge would have reached a different conclusion on the same facts." Davis v. Mullen, 565 Pa. 386, 390, 773 A.2d 764, 766 (2001). "Thus, a jury verdict is set aside for inadequacy when it appears to have been the product of passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or where it clearly appears from the uncontradicted evidence that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff." .Id. at 391,773 A.2d at 766. "Hence, a reversal on the grounds of inadequacy of the verdict is appropriate only where the injustice of the verdict stands forth like a beacon." Id_. In support of her motion for new trial the plaintiff relies primarily upon the contention that Drs. Hartman, Fultz and Goodman testified that the plaintiff was injured in the incident on September 20, 1997. (See Deposition Transcripts: Hartman at 20; Fultz at 36-37; Goodman at 22-23.) Both Drs. Fultz and Hartman, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, testified that the herniated disks, sciatica and carpal tunnel syndrome, for which plaintiff seeks compensation, were caused by and directly related to the accident of September 20, 1997. (Fultz Deposition at 20; Hartmen Deposition at 36-37.) Dr. Goodman, who appeared on behalf of the defendant, testified that the plaintiff was injured in the accident. (Goodman Deposition, at 22-23.) His opinion was that the plaintiff had sustained a cervical strain and aggravation of a previously existing arthritic condition. (Id.) Dr. Goodman did not, however, testify that the accident caused the serious injuries to her neck, back and wrists for which the plaintiff seeks compensation. (Id.) After admitting some injury to the plaintiff in the accident, Dr. Goodman further testified that the plaintiff had recovered from these injuries and the pain she complained of during his examination was more likely the result of her degenerative arthritic condition. (Goodman Deposition at 24-25.) Unlike the testimony of Drs. Hartman and Fultz, Dr. Goodman stated that, more than seven months after the accident, any discomfort the plaintiff was feeling "would best be explained by factors o~her.than a single episode of trauma" and were more likely the result of the degenerative conditions that existed before the accident. (See, Goodman at 24-25.) Therefore, although Dr. Goodman admitted an injury to the plaintiff in the accident, the testimony presented as to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries from the accident was not uncontroverted. In addition to the testimony of Dr. Goodman, refuting the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant presented the testimony of two engineers, Mark Cannon and Bradley Probst. Cannon and Probst testified that the forces affecting the plaintiff's body at the time of the collision were relatively minor, .3 to .7 Gs. (N.T. 3 at 33, 73.) Since the plaintiff seeks compensation not for the cervical strain and aggravation Dr. Goodman testified that she sustained as a result of the accident, but for serious injuries, including herniated disks, sciatica, and carpal tunnel syndrome, it is reasonable, based on the evidence presented by the defendant, that the jury could have determined that the defendant's negligence did not cause the serious injuries for which the plaintiff seeks compensation. 4 The determination of whether the plaintiff suffered a "compensable injury" is one for the jury to decide. See Davis., 773 A.2d at 769. "The existence of compensable pain is an issue of credibility and juries must believe that plaintiffs suffered pain before they compensate for that pain." .!d. The .Davis jury compensated the plaintiff for his medical expenses, but did not award damages for pain and suffering. Id_.~. In .Davis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Trial Court's denial of a ne.w trial, holding that "a jury's award of compensation for medical expenses but not pain and suffering should not be disturbed where the trial court has a reasonable basis to believe that: (1) the jury did not believe that the plaintiff suffered any pain and suffering, or (2) that a preexisting condition or injury was the sole cause of the alleged pain and suffering." .!d. at 767. The court looked to the specific facts and circumstances and determined that the jury's verdict did not "shock one's sense of justice." id. at 766. Here, as in Davis, there was ample evidence and testimony presented that would allow the jury to determine that the serious injuries alleged by the plaintiff were not caused by the negligence of the defendant. Also supporting the denial of a new trial for plainitff Lemmon is the Superior Court decision in Maiczvk v. Oesch. 2001 Pa. Super 378 (Pa. Super Ct. 2001). In Majczyk~ the Superior Court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant the plaintiff a new trial where the plaintiff was involved in a minor rear end motor vehicle collision while both vehicles were waiting for a traffic light to change. Id. at *'19. There was evidence that the collision occurred at five miles per hour or less and the impact caused no damage to either vehicle, id. From this accident the plaintiff claimed that she suffered a herniated cervical disk. id. at *'1. The jury found for the defendant and plaintiff appealed claiming the jury verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence presented at the trial because two of defendant's expert witnesses had conceded that she was injured in the accident. Id._= at **2-4. However, the plaintiff was not seeking compensation for the cervical strain that the. defendant's experts conceded she suffered, but rather for the ongoing pain and suffering from a herniated disk..Id, at **5. The Superior Court recognized that the plaintiff presented contradictory testimony as to the severity of the impact and the extent and duration of her injuries; however, "a jury is always free to believe all, part, some or none of the evidence presented." Id. at** · . 20, citing Neison v. Hines, 539 Pa. 516, 520, 653 A.2d 634, 637 (1995). "Thus, while the jury may have concluded that [plaintiff] suffered some painful inconvenience for a few days or weeks after the accident, it may also have concluded that [plaintiff's] discomfort was the sort of transient rub of life for which compensation is not warranted." Id. citing Bopqavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 167, 542 A.2d 516, 518 (1988). The facts and circumstances presented in the case at bar are similar to those presented in Majczyk. Here, the plaintiff seeks compensation for serious, long term injuries. There was conflicting evidence presented as to the extent and severity of the plaintiff's injuries and force of the impact. The evidence of her injuries was not uncontroverted. Therefore, the decision to accept "all some, or d none of the testimony presented" was properly the jury's and a jury's verdict should not be lightly disturbed. Based on the foregoing the grant of a new trial is not warranted and the plaintiff's motion for new trial is denied.