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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-4450 civil SHARON A. STITES and IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF STEVEN STITES, as Parents · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA and Natural Guardians of KENNETH STITES, a minor, NO. 00-4450 CIVIL TERM Plaintiff THE CENTER FOR WOMEN'S : CIVIL ACTION - LAW HEALTH AND WELLNESS, HOLY SPIRIT HOSPITAL, and ANNE MARIE MANNING, M.D. : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendants, IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS ORDER HOFFER, P.J.: AND NOW, January 18, 2002, after careful consideration of all issues raised, defendants' remaining Preliminary Objections in this matter are denied and dismissed. By the Court, Timothy A. Shollenberger, Esq. Steven D. Snyder, Esq. Shollenberger and Januzzi, LLP Mette, Evans & Woodside 1820 Linglestown Road 3401 North Front Street P.O. Box 60545 P.O. Box 5950 Harrisburg, Pa 17106-0545 Harrisburg, Pa 17110-0905 Attorney for Plaintiffs Attorney for Defendants SHARON A. STITES and IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF STEVEN STITES, as Parents : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA and Natural Guardians of KENNETH STITES, a minor, NO. 00-4450 CIVIL TERM Plaintiffs V, THE CENTER FOR WOMEN'S : CIVIL ACTION - LAW HEALTH AND WELLNESS, HOLY SPIRIT HOSPITAL, and ANNE MARIE MANNING, M.D. : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendants, IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OPINION HOFFER~ P.J.: The plaintiffs, Sharon A. Stites ("Mrs. Stites") and Steven Stites ("Mr. Stites"), as Parents and Natural Guardians of Kenneth Stites, a minor, commenced a medical malpractice action against the defendants, The Center of Women's Health and Wellness ("The Center"); Holy Spirit Hospital; and Anne Marie Manning, M.D. ("Dr. Manning"). On October 10, 2000, the defendants filed preliminary objections to plaintiffs' complaint. In an order iss~ued on June 25, 2001, this Court entered a decision upon several of defendants' Preliminary Objections and indicated that we would address separately an order on all remaining Preliminary Objections, which include the following: (A) The demurrer of the defendants to the corporate negligence claims set forth in Counts IV and V of the Complaint; (B) The preliminary objections in the nature of a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more specific complaint with respect to paragraphs 18; 30-34; 34(a), (d); 37-41; and 41(a) and (d); and (C) The demurrer to paragraphs 14, 16, and 18 to the extent they purport to assert individual claims on behalf of Sharon A. Stites and Steven Stites, individually. T..he following addresses the three above-mentioned issues: Issue 1' The demurrer of the defendants to the corporate negligence claims set forth in Counts IV and V of the Complaint. The standards for a demurrer in Pennsylvania are well-established. A demurrer to a complaint must be granted where the court is certain that, as a matter of law, there could be no recovery upon the alleged facts. See e.g., Wurth v. Philadelphia, 136 Pa. Commw. 629, 584 A.2d 403 (1990). It must be noted that all material facts set forth in a Complaint, as well as all inferences reasonably deductible therefrom, are admitted as true and the question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, ~he law says with certainty that no recovery is possible, and further when doubt exists as to whether demurrer should be sustained, doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it. Moser v. Heistand, 545 Pa. 554, 681 A.2d 1322 (1996). Only in cases when the plaintiff has clearly failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted will a demurrer be sustained. Sevin v. Kelshaw, 417 Pa. Super 1,611 A.2d 1232 (1992). As such, a demurrer should not be sustained if there is any 2 doubt as to whether the complaint adequately states a claim for relief under any theory. Id. Based upon the forgoing standard, when the allegations set forth in the plaintiffs' complaint are taken in the light most favorable to the same, the court concludes that we are neither certain nor free from doubt that plaintiffs cannot recover on any theory of corporate negligence. It is clear that plaintiffs have sufficien.,tly pled a cause~of action under corporate negligence. Accordingly, defendants' demurrer is overruled. ISSUE 2: The preliminary objections in the nature of a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more specific complaint with respect to paragraphs 18; 30- 34; 34(a), (d); 37-41; and 41(a) and (d). Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form." Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a). The courts have elaborated upon this provision, noting that it is designed to define the issues clearly and to apprise the opposing party of what the pleading party intends to establish at trial. See Laursen v. General Hospital of Monroe County, 259 Pa. Super. 150, 393 A.2d 761 (1981). Specifically, "[p]leadings serve the function of defining issues and giving notice to the opposing parties of what the pleader intends to prove at trial so that the opposition may, in turn, prepare to meet such proof with its own evidence." Id. at 160, 393 A.2d at 766. 3 The defendants assert that the above noted paragraphs do not contain the factual specificity required under Pennsylvania law. To the contrary, plaintiffs have met their obligation under Rule 1019(a). Plaintiffs have specifically incorporated all preceding factual averments into each count of their Complaint. As such, defendants have enough material facts to adequately defend against each count asserted in the plaintiffs' complaint. Therefore, these objections are dismissed. ISSUE 3: The demurrer to paragraphs 14, 16, and 18 to the extent they purport to assert individual claims on behalf of Sharon A. Stites and Steven Stites, individually. Defendants claim that the Court should dismiss with prejudice the individual claims of Mr. Stites and Mrs. Stites, including paragraphs 14, 16 and 18 because the case caption does not indicate that this action is brought by them individually. Under Pennsylvania law, if an injury not resulting in deatl~ is inflicted ~upon a minor and causes of action therefore accrue to the minor and also to the parent or parents of the minor, they must be enforced in one action brought by the parent or parents and the child. Pa. R.C.P. 2228(b). Additionally, Pa.R.C.P. 2028(a) states that "an action in which a minor is a plaintiff shall be entitled "A minor, by guardian," against the party defendant." It is important to note that comments to Rule 2228 state that "when the interest of a minor is involved under subdivision (b), Rule 2028(a) shall apply. As such, defendants' Preliminary 4 Objections regarding Paragraphs 14, 16, and 18 should be dismissed because plaintiffs have set forth their cause of action in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and the Comments thereto. 5