Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-4227 equity termDONALD E. ADAMS AND IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CATHY A. ADAMS, his wife, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFFS Vo MARY LOUISE RAMSAY WOLF, RICHARD W. RAMSAY, LARRY M. RAMSAY, MARGHERITA R. RAMSAY, LYNN ANN WHITE t/d/b/a W. R. RAMSAY PROPERTY AND RENTALS, DEFENDANTS 99-4227 EQU I,TY .TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT MARY LOUISE RAMSAY WOLF TO PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND OLER, J.. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this _~O~'' day of June, 2000, IT IS ORDERED: (1) The preliminary objections of defendant, Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf, to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for specific performance and plaintiffs' claim for breach of an agreement of settlement, ARE DENIED. (2) The preliminary objection of defendant, Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf, to the joinder of plaintiffs' legal claim for breach of a settlement agreement with plaintiffs' claim in equity for specific performance of real estate, IS GRANTED. Pursuant to Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1509(c), plaintiffs' claim for breach of a settlement agreement is 99-4227 EQUITY TERM transferred to the law side of the court. Edgar B. Bayley, J. Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire For Plaintiffs Allen C. Warshaw, Esquire For Defendant Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf C. Roy Weidner, Esquire For Defendants Richard Ramsay, Larry M. Ramsay, Lynn Ann White and Margherita R. Ramsay :saa 99-4227 EQUITY TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~-~cc' day of June, 2000, IT IS ORDERED: (1) The preliminary objections of defendant, Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf, to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for specific performance and plaintiffs' claim for breach of an agreement of settlement, ARE DENIED. (2) The preliminary objection of defendant, Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf, to the joinder of plaintiffs' legal claim for breach of a settlement agreement with plaintiffs' claim in equity for specific performance of real estate, IS GRANTED. Pursuant to Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1509(c), plaintiffs' claim for breach of a ~ettlement agreement is transferred to the law side of the court. Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire / For Plaintiffs Allen C. Warshaw, Esquire For Defendant Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf C. Roy Weidner, Esquire For Defendants Richard Ramsay, Larry M. Ramsay, Lynn Ann White and Margherita R. Ramsay :saa -5- DONALD E. ADAMS AND IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CATHY A. ADAMS, his wife, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFFS V. MARY LOUISE RAMSAY WOLF, RICHARD W. RAMSAY, LARRY M. RAMSAY, MARGHERITA R. RAMSAY, LYNN ANN WHITE t/d/b/a W. R. RAMSAY PROPERTY AND RENTALS, DEFENDANTS 99-4227 EQUITY-TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT MARY LOUISE RAMSAY WOLF TO PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND OLER, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., June 26, 2000:-- Plaintiffs, Donald E. Adams and Cathy A. Adams, filed an amended complaint in equity against defendant, Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf, Richard W. Ramsay, Larry M. Ramsay, Margherita R. Ramsay, Lynn Ann White t/d/b/a W.R. Ramsay Property and Rentals. Count I, against all defendants, is designated as a claim for specific performance to convey real estate. In paragraph 16, plaintiffs seek an order requiring: a. The conveyance to the plaintiff of the real estate consisting of 65 mobile home pads and 41 apartments located at 107 Old York Road, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania 17070. b. The payment of the reasonable counsel fees and costs of the 99-4227 EQUITY TERM plaintiffs. c. The payment of rents and income received by the defendant from February 5,1999, to the present. d. An accounting of all income and expenses as well as any equipment, personal property, or other items conveyed by the defendant to themselves or any third party from February 5, 1999 to present. e. The payment of all profits gained by the subject real estate from the date the defendant conveyed the property to the defendant Mary Louise Wolf. f. Any other relief deemed appropriate by the Court. Count II of the complaint is designated as a claim for "Breach of Settlement Agreement and Breach of Contract Against All Defendants." Plaintiffs allege that they and defendants reached a settlement for the failure to convey the real estate that is the subject of the claim for specific performance in Count I. Plaintiffs allege that their settlement with defendants was for Richard W. Ramsay, Larry M. Ramsay, Margherita R. Ramsay, Lynn Ann White t/d/b/a W.R. Ramsay Property and Rentals to convey the real estate to the defendant, Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf, provided that $27,500 was paid by defendants to plaintiffs. Defendant, Mary Louise Ramsay Wolf, filed preliminary objections to the amended complaint which were briefed and argued on May 31, 2000.' Defendant maintains that plaintiffs' claims in equity and law cannot be joined. Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1509(c) provides: The objection of the existence of a full, complete and adequate non-statutory remedy at law shall be raised by preliminary objection. If ' The other defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint with new matter and a cross-claim. -2- 99-4227 EQUITY TERM the objection is sustained, the court shall certify the action to the law side of the court. If not so pleaded, the objection is waived. In Lustig v. Lustig, 652 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super. 1995), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that: [t]here is no authority in the Rules of Civil Procedure permitting the joinder of an action at law with an action in equity. The subject matter of both the equitable and legal claims herein arise out of the failure to transfer real estate. While facially appealing, that fact is not controlling on the issue of whether the separate claims in equity and at law must be severed. In City of Philadelphia v. Pennrose Management Co., 142 Pa. Commw. 627 (1991), the City commenced an action at law for damages against Pennrose Management Co., alleging that it failed to pay wage taxes and incorrectly paid taxes to a collection agency. The fifth count of the complaint sought various forms of equitable relief arising out of the same subject matter. The trial court sustained a preliminary objection of defendant, finding that the City's claims for both legal and equitable relief in the same complaint constituted a misjoinder of causes of action. On appeal, the city claimed that Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1020 requires that all causes of action against a person arising from a single transaction or occurrence be joined in a single action. Notwithstanding, because there is no authority in that Rule or any other Rule permitting the joinder of an action at law with an action in equity, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the -3- 99-4227 EQUITY TERM equitable claim had to be severed from the complaint with leave for the City to assert that claim in a separate civil action? In the case sub judice, plaintiffs have alleged a claim in equity seeking specific performance for the sale of real estate and a claim at law seeking damages for breach of a separate agreement to settle the dispute. This is not a situation involving a collateral claim for damages, where equitable relief may be warranted. In fact, such collateral claims for damages have been made by plaintiffs in paragraph 16 of their equity count. Rather, this is a case of a claim for damages arising out of a completely separate contract of settlement. Accordingly, as in City of Philadelphia, supra, the legal claim must be severed from the equitable claim. Under Rule 1509(c), we will certify the action in law to the law side of the court. Defendant also preliminarily objects to plaintiffs' amended complaint averring that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for (1) specific performance for the sale of real estate and (2) damages for an alleged breach of an agreement of settlement. Both causes of action have been adequately stated, thus we will allow both to proceed separately. 2 While Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1509(c) allows a legal claim in a complaint in equity to be certified to the law side of the court, there is no corresponding Rule in a complaint at law to certify an equitable claim to the. equitable side of the court. Accordingly, the remedy in the City of Philadelphia was to sever the equitable claim from the complaint at law, with leave to assert the claim in a separate civil action in equity. -4-