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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-2740 criminalCOMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Vo EDWARD GERALD SNYDER 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE BAYLEY, J, ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this. ~_'~/~t~._ day of March, 2000, the motion of defendant to dismiss the within prosecution, IS DENIED. By lhe COu~:~ B.~Bi Edgar Michael Ferguson, Esquire ~ For the Commonwealth Darrell C. Dethlefs, Esquire For Defendant :saa COMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. EDWARD GERALD SNYDER 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE BAYLEY, J.. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., March 23, 2000:-- Defendant, Edward Gerald Snyder, is charged with counts of burglary,~ criminal trespass? theft? a second count of theft,4 and criminal conspiracy to commit burglary, criminal trespass and theft? The allegations forming the basis of the burglary, criminal trespass and misdemeanor two theft counts are that on March 21, 1999, defendant entered John's Mobile Repair Service, Inc., in South Middleton Township, Cumberland County, with the intent to commit a theft, and did steal some inspection stickers and a set of keys to a 1985 Chrysler New Yorker. The basis of the felony three theft count is that defendant stole a 1985 Chrysler New Yorker owned by Susan Ann Schock that she felony two under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502. felony three under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(i). felony three under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). misdemeanor two under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). felony two under 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM had left for service at John's Mobile Repair Service, Inc. The basis of the conspiracy count is that defendant committed all of these crimes in conspiracy with Tonya McCole. On March 26, 1999, defendant and McCole were found in Schock's stolen Chrysler New Yorker in the Borough of Lansford, Carbon County, Pennsylvania. They were charged in Carbon County with felony three receiving of the stolen Chrysler New Yorker, and felony three conspiracy to receive that vehicle with Tonya McCole. An information was filed against defendant on May 26, 1999. Defendant pled guilty to the count of receiving stolen property, regraded as a misdemeanor of the first degree, in satisfaction of the conspiracy count, and on August 31, 1999, he was sentenced to a state correctional institution for not less than fifteen months or more than thirty months. On September 2, 1999, a Pennsylvania state trooper filed the within charges against defendant in Cumberland County. An information was filed on January 11, 2000. On February 16, 2000, defendant filed an omnibus pretrial motion to dismiss all of the charges against him. He avers that the prosecution is barred under Section 110 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. SECTION 110 ANALYSIS The Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. Section 110, provides: When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances: (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a -2- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for: (i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution; (ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and. was within the jurisdiction of a single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or (iii) the same conduct, unless: (A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or (B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began. (2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an acquittal or by final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense. (3) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination is defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly terminated. In Commonwealth v. Rippy, 732 A.2d 1216 (Pa. Super. 1999), defendant was convicted of the theft of a Chrysler LeBaron automobile on July 8, 1997, and receiving that stolen property when it was found in his possession on July 9, 1997. Both offenses occurred in Lackawanna County. Defendant was sentenced to not less than one year or more than two years imprisonment for the theft and to not less than one year or more than two years for receiving stolen property, the sentences to run concurrently. The -3- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM Superior Court reversed the sentence for receiving stolen property, stating: As for Appellant's convictions for receiving stolen property and unlawful taking, it is clear that the offense arose from a single criminal act. However, while the Pennsylvania appellate case law is inconsistent on this issue, the weight of authority indicates that the crime of receiving stolen property is a lesser-included offense of theft by' unlawful taking. See Commonwealth v. VWlson, 312 Pa. Super. 77, 458 A.2d 244 (1983) (holding that the crime of theft by receiving stolen property is a lesser included offense of theft by unlawful taking); Commonwealth v. Yancey, 301 Pa. Super. 427,447 A.2d 1041 (1982) (same); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 233 Pa. Super. 547, 336 A.2d 624 (1975) (same). But see Commonwealth v. Bailey, 250 Pa. Super. 402, 378 A.2d 998 (1977) (holding that the offenses do not merge for sentencing purposes). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions for sentence purposes. (Emphasis added.) In Commonwealth v. McPhail, 692 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1997), the defendant, on two occasions in June, 1990, sold small amounts of cocaine to an undercover agent of the Pennsylvania State Police in Washington County. On the second occasion, the trooper asked to buy a larger quantity, and defendant told him they would have to go to Allegheny County to obtain such a quantity. The following day, the defendant and the trooper drove to Allegheny County and the defendant sold him additional cocaine. Defendant made a final sale of a smaller amount of cocaine to the trooper in Washington County several weeks later. The charges were filed in the two counties for the offenses which took place therein. The defendant pled guilty to the offenses in Washington County, and then moved to dismiss the Allegheny County charges on the basis of Section 110 of the Crimes Code. The trial court granted the motion, the Commonwealth appealed, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, and the -4- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM Supreme Court of Pennsylvania allowed an appeal to review the application of Section 110 of the Crimes Code to the prosecution. The Chief Justice, with one Justice concurring and another Justice concurring in the result, there being two dissenting Justices, concluded that the court of common pleas in Washington County had subject matter jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed by the defendant in Allegheny County. Therefore, the prosecution in Allegheny County was barred under Section 110 of the Crimes Code because of the prior prosecution in Washington County where all of the offenses in both counties arose from the same criminal episode. The plurality concluded that in such a situation all charges arising from that single criminal episode must be tried in one county. In Commonwealth v. Anthony, 717 A.2d 1015 (Pa. 1998), defendant, age 20, picked up several juveniles on March 28, 1994, in Corry, Erie County, Pennsylvania. Together they burglarized a garage in which they stole some beer. They then drove to Erie committing two more burglaries on the way. After staying the night in Erie they drove to Florida. They were apprehended in Florida on April 1, 1994. Defendant was returned to Erie County, Pennsylvania and charged by the Corry County police with interference with the custody of children, three counts of corruption of minors, and the consumption and transportation of brewed beverages. On September 2, 1994, defendant pled guilty to the three counts of corruption of minors in which he was charged with transporting the juveniles to the state of Florida during which time he enticed them to commit the burglaries and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to -5- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM prison for not less than five months or more than eleven months. On December 6, 1994, the Pennsylvania state police charged defendant with burglary, criminal trespass, criminal conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking and criminal mischief with respect to his activities on March 28, 1994, at a residence in Union Township, Erie County, which is where one of the burglaries occurred as the group drove from Corry to Erie. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court, and from which he took an interlocutory appeal by right to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court; however, the Supreme Court reversed under Section 110 of the Crimes Code and dismissed the charges. The issue addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the charges filed by the state police arose from the same criminal episode as the charges for which defendant had been charged by the Corry County police and pled guilty and was sentenced. The Supreme Court stated: As this court stated in I-lude, [520 Pa. 482 (1983)], 'in defining what acts constitute a single criminal episode, not only is the temporal sequence of events important, but also the logical relationship between the acts must be considered.' 500 Pa. at 491,458 A.2d at 181. In our consideration of the temporal and logical relationship between the criminal acts, we are guided by the policy considerations that § 110 was designed to serve: (1) to protect a person accused of crimes from governmental harassment of being forced to undergo successive trials for offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; and (2) as a matter of judicial administration and economy, to assure finality without unduly burdening the judicial process by repetitious litigation. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. [24] 29, 425 A.2d [346] 348 [(1981)]; Commonwealth v. Holmes, 480 Pa. 536, 541,391 A.2d 1015, 1017 (1978); Commonwealth v. Tarver, 476 -6- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM Pa. [401] 408, 357 A.2d [539] 542 [(1976)]. 'By requiring compulsory joinder of all charges arising from... [the same criminal episode], a defendant need only once 'run the gauntlet' and confront the awesome resources of the state.' Commonwealth v. [ * * '12] Campana (Campana I), 452 Pa. [233] 251,304 A.2d [432] 440-441 [(1973)]. Hude, 500 Pa. at 489, 458 A.2d at 180. With these policy considerations in mind we review the temporal and logical relationship between the charges in the first Information and those within the second information. In the first Information appellant is charged with corrupting the morals of Steven, Lucas and Sue Ann by removing them from Corry, Pennsylvania on March 28, 1994, encouraging their participation in various criminal acts, including burglary and theft, and transporting the juveniles to Florida where they were apprehended. The first information does not specify the location of the burglaries referenced in connection with the corruption charges. However, even without a specific delineation of which burglaries were at issue in the first Information, the burglary in Union City on the night of March 28, 1994 is temporally connected to the crimes appellant has already been convicted of, as the first Information charged criminal acts spanning from March 28, 1994 through April 1, 1994. The Commonwealth argues that the crimes in the present information are not logically related to the prior charges as they do not involve the same conduct. Here, the Commonwealth focuses on the nature of the criminal acts: corrupting the morals of minors versus burglary and theft. This argument has surface appeal, but lacks substance. A logical relationship is not conditioned upon the duplication of identical criminal acts. A logical relationship exists where the sequence of criminal acts reveals a substantial duplication of issues of law and fact. Bracalielly, 540 Pa. at 460, 658 A.2d at 755. In the present case, such a substantial duplication of issues of law and fact exists. The evidence to support appellant's original conviction is the statement of appellant as taken by the Corry Police; the testimony and/or statements of Steven, Lucas and Sue Ann and Angela; the parents of the juveniles; and the Corry Police officers involved in the investigation. In the present prosecution all of the above witnesses will again be required to present the same testimony. Given that a high percentage of the testimony from the first trial must be repeated in the second trial, a substantial duplication of factual issues is obviously present. The only additional witnesses that would be called in the present trial, that were not needed in the first trial are the victim of the burglary -7- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM and the State Police. Although two different police departments are involved there is nothing of record indicating that two different investigations were ongoing, independent of each other, which led to the two separate prosecutions. To the contrary, the Corry Police were in possession of all relevant incriminating information regarding all the criminal activity set forth in both Informations prior to any involvement by the State Police. The Corry Police chose to forward the information to the State Police. The dual involvement of two different law enforcement offices is not sufficient to preclude joinder of charges given the facts of this case. Cf. Bracalielly. As for the legal issues, appellant's first conviction for corrupting the morals of the minors was grounded on his encouraging and enticing the minors to commit burglaries and thefts. The second Information also charges burglary and theft, the variation in the form of the criminal charges cannot disguise the commonality of the legal issues within the two informations. Thus, we find that the present charges did arise from the same criminal episode as the first set of charges as all of the criminal acts are temporally and logically related. Accordingly, we find that all four factors necessary to bar the present prosecution under § 110 have been met. Returning to the policy considerations which guide our review of this question, it is undeniable that the policy goals of § 110 would be thwarted by separate trials in this instance. Appellant will be forced to undergo two criminal prosecutions when all the evidence necessary to support both prosecutions was within the hands of the Commonwealth at the same time. The vast majority of the witnesses will be forced to give up their time and again undergo the pressure of courtroom testimony, to repeat in the second trial virtually everything that was stated in the first trial. Both trials tax the resources of the same District Attorney, almost identical law enforcement personnel, and the same judicial system. The Commonwealth offers no reason for the unnecessary duplication caused by the failure to join the charges in this matter. Having found the four factors of § 110(1)(ii) to be met in this case, we further find that the purpose of the compulsory joinder rule would be violated by permitting the present prosecution to go forward. (Emphasis added.) Applying the analysis in Anthony to the case sub judice, the possession by defendant of Susan Schock's stolen Chrysler on March 26, 1999, in Carbon County was temporally connected with his alleged theft of that car in Cumberland County five -8- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM days earlier on March 21, 1999. Whether a logical relationship exists between the receiving stolen property and defendant's alleged theft of the car and the other crimes committed on March 21st, rests on whether there is a substantial duplication of issues of law and fact. Certainly the alleged theft of the keys to the Chrysler during the burglary and criminal trespass of John's Mobile Repair Service, Inc. is logically connected to both the alleged theft of the car during the same incident and defendant being in illegal possession of that stolen car five days later. Thus, the alleged burglary and criminal trespass of the repair shop is logically related to the theft of those keys which were then used to steal the vehicle which defendant was later found guilty of illegally possessing. The car had to be stolen for defendant to have been charged with receiving stolen property and conspiracy in Carbon County. Therefore, the police in Carbon County had to have known of the theft of the car in Cumberland County in order to properly prepare for the prosecution of defendant in that county on the charge of receiving stolen property. On these facts, there is a substantial duplication of the issues of law and fact in the two prosecutions. To prove the underlying theft of the car to support the charge of receiving stolen property in Carbon County, and the conspiracy that was alleged between defendant and Tonya McCole, would have required a duplication in that case of much of the testimony of what will have to be presented in this case. See also Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482 (1983). Notwithstanding this temporal and logical connection between the two cases, Section 110 of the Crimes Code is still not applicable. In Commonwealth v. -9- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755 (Pa. 1995), the defendant was charged with four drug related offenses occurring between August 7 and August 20, 1990. Two of the transactions occurred in Allegheny County and two occurred in Butler County. The defendant entered pleas of guilty to the charges in Butler County and filed a motion based on Section 110 of the Crimes Code to dismiss the charges against him in Allegheny County. The motion was denied. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the denial noting that the critical factor in: [t]he conclusion that the transactions in Butler County and Allegheny County were not part of the same criminal episode is the independent involvement of the two distinct law enforcement entities, for it prevents the substantial duplication of issues of law and fact ·.. for the transactions to be deemed logically related .... [n]o law enforcement officer from Allegheny County participated in the Butler County transactions, and no law enforcement officer from Butler County participated in the Allegheny County transactions. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.) Those are the facts in the case sub judice, when no law enforcement officer from Cumberland County participated in the Carbon County transaction where defendant was arrested in that county for receiving stolen property and conspiracy to commit that crime. Commonwealth v. Rippy, supra, involved multiple offenses occurring in one county and the issue was the merger of those offenses for sentencing purposes. The facts in Commonwealth v. McPhail, supra, unlike the facts in Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, supra, and the case sub judice, involved sales of drugs to a single undercover Pennsylvania state police officer in two counties. Therefore, not only is the plurality holding in McPhail not precedent, the facts are -10- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM different from the present case in which the facts are consistent with those in Bracalielly. Bracalielly is precedent that Section 110 of the Crimes Code does not prohibit the within Cumberland County prosecution because of the independent involvement of two distinct law enforcement entities in Carbon and Cumberland Counties. Commonwealth v. Couch, 731 A.2d 136 (1999). CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS Defendant maintains that the within prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This provision protects an individual against successive punishments and successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). The overlapping of proof in the within prosecution that defendant while in Carbon County was in unlawful possession of the car stolen in Cumberland County does not constitute a double jeopardy violation. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (1992). The burglary and criminal trespass of John's Mobile Repair Service, Inc. in Cumberland County and the theft of the keys to Susan Schock's Chrysler from inside that building was not the same offense as defendant committed by being in unlawful possession of the Chrysler in Carbon County. Nor is the theft of that car in Cumberland County the same offense as being in possession of that stolen property in Carbon County, although Commonwealth v. Rippy, supra, dictates that those offenses merge for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, prosecuting defendant on the charges in Cumberland County -11- 99-2740 CRIMINAL TERM does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the context of the facts of this case, Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not afford any rights broader than the rights in the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Hockenbury, 549 Pa. 527 (1997). For the foregoing reasons, the following order is entered. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this '~--~- day of March, 2000, the motion of defendant to dismiss the within prosecution, IS DENIED. By the Edgar B. ~a~ley,'~. Michael Ferguson, Esquire / For the Commonwealth Darrell C. Dethlefs, Esquire For Defendant :saa -12-