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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-788 Support.1.A29010/00 COLLEEN M. RANNEY, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Appellant : PENNSYLVANIA V. : ]EFFREY T. RANNEY, : Appellee : No. 328 IVlDA 2000 Appeal from the Order Entered December 22, 1999 In the Court of Common Pleas of CUMBERLAND County Civil, at No. 788 Support 1998 BEFORE: CAVANAUGH, DEL SOLE and TAMILIA, .1.1. MEMORANDUM: ~ I L E I~ SEP 0 8 2000 This appeal is from an order for support of the parties' two minor sons. Appellant-Colleen M, Ranney (mother) seeks review of the portion of the order that eliminates the obligation of appellee-Jeffrey T. Ranney (father) to pay the costs of parochial school education and of extra-curricular activities and to reimburse mother for the costs of recent phychological services provided to one son. Mother's complaint for support resulted in an order from the Domestic Relations Section of the Court of Common Pleas for spousal and child support entered November 4, 1998. This award provided that husband would pay 100% of the parochial school tuition and 70% of the boys' extra- curricular activities. Father was also ordered to pay 70% of any unreimbursed expenses for psychiatric and/or psychological counseling for them. Each party requested a hearing de novo, which was conducted on J.A29010/00 November 29, 1999. Both mother and father testified at the hearing. The order at issue was filed on December 3, 1999, and provided in relevant part: (2) From January 1, 1999 through March 31, 1999, defendant, Jeffrey T. Ranney, shall pay spousal support for plaintiff, Colleen M. Ranney, in the amount of $361.34 per month, and child support for his children Nicholas Edward Ranney, born January 8, 1984, and Kyle James Ranney, born April 4, 1986, in the amount of $990.32 per month, for a total support obligation as calculated in Exhibit A of $1,351.66 per month. (3) Effective April 1, 1999, pursuant to the calculations in Exhibit B, defendant shall pay spousal support in the amount of $301.68 per month, and child support in the amount of $1,112.15 per month, for a total support obligation of $1,413.83 per month. (4) Defendant shall not, in the future, be required to pay for the cost of a parochial school education for his children.~ (5) Defendant shall not be required to reimburse plaintiff for the balance of any unreimbursed costs for the recent psychological services provided for Nicholas. (6) Defendant shall be required to pay seventy percent and plaintiff thirty percent of all unreimbursed medical expenses for plaintiff and children; however, defendant shall not, without his consent, be required to contribute to such expenses voluntarily incurred by non-participants in the parties' HMO medical plan. (7) From January 1, 1999 to this date defendant shall pay seventy percent and plaintiff thirty percent of the costs of the children's extracurricular activities. Effective this date defendant shall not be required to make such a contribution. Defendant has already paid such costs for the 1999/2000 school year. -2- ].A29010/00 Upon denying wife's petition for reconsideration the court stated the following in its order: The order for child support and spousal support entered on December 1, 1999, is based on the current financial status of the parties. Any additional support to be paid by the father for the children's extracurricular activities is appropriately voluntary. A decision of the parties as to whether they can afford to continue to send their children to parochial school is a voluntary decision between them as it would be if they were still living together. We find no support for the position of the mother that the father should be forced to pay the cost of a parochial school education for their children in addition to the amount he is legally obligated to pay in child support and spousal support. In its opinion, the lower court stated that it would not be reasonable to order husband to pay the future costs of parochial school simply because the children have been going to such schools. "To hold otherwise would require contribution for private schooling in every case where, consistent with the parties' status when they were living together, the children have already been attending private school." Lower court opinion at 8. We review support orders pursuant to the following standards: Our scope of review in child support cases is well settled. "When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse the trial court's determination where the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground." Calabrese v. Calabrese, 682 A.2d 393, 395 (Pa. Super. 1996). We will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of that discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. Xd. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment -3- 3.A29010/00 exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, discretion has been abused. Depp v. Holland, 636 A.2d 204, 205-206 (Pa. Super. 1994). See also Funk v. Funk, 545 A.2d 326, 329 (Pa. Super. 1988). In addition, we note that the duty to support one's child is absolute, and the purpose of child support is to promote the child's best interest. Depp, 636 A.2d at 206. Elkin v. Williams, 2000 PA Super 180, ¶7 (6/27/2000). Divorced parents have a duty to provide for their minor child's private school education as long as such an education is a reasonable expense. Pellish v. Gerhart, 701 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. 1997); Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16- 6(d) (formerly 1910.16-5(I)). It is error to eliminate in its entirety a father's obligation to pay for private school tuition where he only challenges payment for part of the total tuition expense. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 603 A.2d 633 (Pa. Super. 1992). We find that the lower court misapplied the law in ordering that father had no further obligation to contribute, in whole or in part, towards the parochial school education of his sons. The record does not establish that father contested the reasonableness of this expense, only that he felt that he should not be required to pay for the entire amount. When asked by his attorney his position regarding his ability to continue making further payments on parochial school tuition, father testified: My contention is one of two, either Colleen and I can work out the payments or through the support payments and the alimony -4- 3.A29010/00 payments that I make that she can make the payments. N. T., 11/29/99, at 26. Father did not dispute mother's testimony that both Nicholas, age 15, and Kyle, age 13, have attended parochial schools since they moved to central Pennsylvania some nine years ago. He offered no evidence that the schooling was not beneficial for his sons. Absent evidence that the established educational program of sending the boys to parochial school was no longer reasonable, the court erred in not allocating the tuition expense between the parties, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(d). Its statements that tuition payments are properly voluntary in nature are incorrect under the law. Father, as a divorced parent of minor children, has a legal obligation to provide for private education distinct from that of a father in an intact family. The lower court's failure to apply the correct legal standard requires remand on this issue. We reach the same result regarding father's obligation to contribute towards the boys' extra-curricular expenses. The lower court stated that the extra-curricular activities at issue, participation in soccer programs, do not fall within the "other needs" category of Rule 1910.16-6(d). "The demands of support litigation will mushroom out of control if courts are required to referee such collateral disputes." Lower court opinion at 9. Although we are not unsympathetic to the lower court's preference for voluntary resolution of support issues between the parties, when agreement is not forthcoming, it = 5 - 3.A29010/00 devolves to the court to resolve contested issues. The court may not abdicate its responsibility to adjudicate matters properly brought before it as part of ongoing support litigation. Both trial and appellate courts are routinely faced with support issues pertaining to payments for recreation and other pastimes. See eg. Holland v. Holland, 663 A.2d 769 (Pa. Super. 1995) (daughter's equestrian activities); Marshall v. Marshall, 591 A.2d Pa. Super. 1991) (cello and dance lessons and swimming and racquet club memberships); Com. ex tel. Stinson v. Stinson, 323 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. 1974) (hearing required on support modification petition based upon increased needs including, inter alia, summer camp and musical instruments and lessons). The lower court erroneously failed to consider the standard of living of the parties, as it related to their sons' education, prior to the separation. Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1196-1197 (Pa. 1994); Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16- 5(b)(7). A child's reasonable needs include any expenditure that will reasonably further his welfare. Ball, supra, at 1197. By misapplying the law regarding a parent's obligation to support his children's extra-curricular activities, the lower court committed reversible error. Finally, regarding father's obligation to contribute towards the unreimbursed costs for recent psychological service for Nicholas, we find that the record supports a finding of no abuse of discretion in denying mother's request for reimbursement. Mother did not consult with father prior -6- JiA29010/00 to retaining the non-emergency services. Nor did the evidence demonstrate a compelling need for services by a provider who did not participate in father's HMO plan. This portion of the order is affirmed. Order vacated in part; affirmed in part. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished. Del Sole, J. files a concurring memorandum statement. Date: -7- 3. A29010/00 COLLEEN IVl. RANNEY, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : V. 3EFFREY T. RANNEY, : : Appellee : No. 328 IVlDA 2000 Appeal from the Order entered December 22, 1999 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Civil, at No. 788 Support 1998. BEFORE: CAVANAUGH, DEL SOLE and TAMILIA, 33. CONCURRING MEMORANDUM STATEMENT BY DEL SOLE, 3.: I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the claim for private school tuition. The pertinent rule regarding private school tuition requires the trial court to determine whether such a need is reasonable and, if so, to allocate the expense between the parties in proportion to their net incomes. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6. In order to determine reasonableness, the trial court should consider, first, whether the children were in private school prior to the separation and, second, whether the economic realities of the separation continue to permit private school tuition. Here, there is no dispute that the children attended private schools prior to the parties' separation. On remand, however, the trial court must still determine the reasonableness of the expenditure, i.e., whether it is in the best interest of the child to continue in private school. See Pellish v. Gerhart, 701 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. 1997) (private school education ma~/ be ]. A29010/00 a reasonable need if it is demonstrated that the child will benefit from it and if it is consistent with the family's pre-separation standard of living). Once the court makes the determination that private schooling is a reasonable need under the above standard, the court should then determine whether the parties' respective incomes and expenses permit the continuation of private schooling and what percentage of the tuition each parent should contribute. -2-