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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-0015 civil termANN M. HARKESS, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Mo JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, DEFENDANTS Vo RICHARD J. COYNE AND ROSEMARY COYNE, ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS : 97-0015 CIVIL TERM IN RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND GUIDO, J.. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this /:~'~-- day of January, 2000, IT IS ORDERED: (1) The motion of plaintiff, Ann M. Harkess, for partial summary judgment against defendant, Jackson National Life Insurance Company, IS DENIED. (2) The motion of defendant, Jackson National Life Insurance Company, for summary judgment against plaintiff, Ann M. Harkess, IS GRANTED. (3) The motion of defendant, Prudential Insurance Company of America, for summary judgment against plaintiff, Ann M. Harkess, IS GRANTED. (4) The motion of additional defendants Richard J. Coyne and Rosemary Coyne, for summary judgment, IS GRANTED. 97-0015 CIVIL TERM Edgar B. Bayley, J. R. James Reynolds, Jr., Esquire For Ann M. Harkess James J. Kutz, Esquire For Jackson National Life Insurance Company John McN.Cramer, Esquire For Prudential Life Insurance Company of America Arthur T. McDermott, Esquire For Richard J. Coyne and Rosemary Coyne :saa ANN M. HARKESS, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY AND PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, DEFENDANTS V. RICHARD J. COYNE AND ROSEMARY COYNE, ADDITIONAL DEFENDANTS : 97-0015 CIVIL TERM IN RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND GUIDO, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., January '12, 2000:-- THE LAWSUIT Plaintiff, Ann M. Harkess, filed a writ of summons on January 2, 1997, and a complaint on July 14, 1997, against defendants, Jackson National Life Insurance (Jackson) and Prudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential). Plaintiff alleges in: Count I - Breach of Contract against Jackson; Count II - Negligence/Intentional Tort against Jackson; and Count III - Negligence against Prudential. In Count I, plaintiff alleges that Jackson breached an annuity contract issued to Mary V. Coyne (Mary) when it recorded a change of beneficiary of that contract from plaintiff, who was 97-0015 CIVIL TERM the beneficiary designated by Mary V. Coyne, to Richard J. Coyne, Mary's nephew, and his wife Rosemary Coyne. The change in beneficiary was made by Jackson on the basis of an Annuity Service Request form signed by Richard J. Coyne pursuant to the power of attorney granted him by Mary V. Coyne. Plaintiff seeks damages of $313,075.05, plus interest, representing the proceeds of an annuity issued by Prudential in exchange for the Jackson annuity which proceeds were paid to Richard J. Coyne and Rosemary Coyne upon the death of Mary V. Coyne. Jackson filed a complaint joining Richard J. Coyne and Rosemary Coyne as additional defendants. Jackson, Prudential and Richard and Rosemary Coyne filed motions for summary judgment, and plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Jackson only with respect to the breach of contract claim in Count I. The motions were briefed and argued on December 8, 1999. THE FACTS The following facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff met Mary V. Coyne on May 1, 1973, and they became friends. They both lived in a condominium complex in Skokie, Illinois, until plaintiff moved to Canton, Ohio, on October 14, 1981. When they lived in Illinois, plaintiff helped Mary with her business affairs and finances. After she moved to Ohio, she was in contact with Mary on a regular basis by telephone and mail. That contact continued until the spring of 1990. On April 21, 1982, pursuant to an Application made by Mary to Jackson on April 19, 1982, Jackson, in consideration for a single premium payment of $149,925, issued -2- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM to Mary, as owner and annuitant, a Group Single Premium Deferred Annuity Contract No. 2371630 with a maturity date of April 21,2000. The application for the annuity filed by Mary set forth that the Owner retains the right to change the beneficiary. The annuity provided that "[a]ny proceeds payable because of the death of Annuitant will be paid to the Beneficiary. The Beneficiary, unless changed by the Annuitant, shall be designated in the application for this Certificate." No beneficiary was designated by Mary in the application. On August 6, 1988, Mary signed a Beneficiary Designation Form provided by Jackson in which she designated the beneficiary of the annuity as plaintiff, Ann M. Harkess, whom she set forth was a "Friend." The form was signed by Mary in Skokie, Illinois, in the presence of three witnesses and was recorded by Jackson on August 30, 1988. Mary sent the original Jackson annuity to plaintiff after designating her as the beneficiary. At the same time Mary designated plaintiff as the beneficiary of this annuity she also signed and delivered to Jackson beneficiary designation forms for three other annuities issued by Jackson which she owned. On those three annuities she designated as beneficiaries Richard J. Coyne, additional defendant herein, and Marie Coyne, Richard Coyne's aunt and Mary's sister-in-law. Those beneficiary designations were also recorded by Jackson on August 30, 1988. Mary began living year-round in Florida in 1989. Additional defendant, Richard J. Coyne, testified in a deposition that (1) he went to Florida in 1990, to see Mary because his aunt Marie told him that Mary was not taking care of herself; (2) although -3- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM he told Mary that he would take her to Skokie, Illinois, he drove her to his home in Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County; and (3) Mary was confused when she arrived in Mechanicsburg. Shortly thereafter, at the insistence of Richard and Rosemary Coyne, Richard's daughter took Mary to the office of Attorney Allen Smith in Steelton, Dauphin County, for the purpose of executing a power of attorney in favor of Richard Coyne. Richard and Rosemary Coyne were not present. Smith had represented Richard Coyne in various legal matters. Smith testified in a deposition that he met with Mary for approximately one-half hour prior to preparing a power of attorney. He did not specifically discuss with her whether she wanted to grant an attorney-in-fact the authority to change the beneficiaries designated on any of her annuities. He did, however, tell her that a power of attorney is a very broad and powerful document that authorizes the attorney-in-fact to do, literally, anything that the individual would be able to do themselves. Smith testified that he was of the opinion that the power of attorney he drew for Mary is sufficiently broad to authorize the attorney-in-fact to change the beneficiary on an annuity. He further testified that he was satisfied that Mary understood the concept of and the depth and scope of the power of attorney she signed in his office on May 3'1, '1990, in favor of Richard J. Coyne. Five days after the Power of Attorney was executed, Richard Coyne appeared in the offices of the Jackson Life Insurance Company in Meadows, Illinois, where he completed and signed an Annuity Service Request Form requesting that the beneficiary under the annuity issued by Jackson, on which Mary had designated plaintiff, Ann M. -4- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM Harkess, as the beneficiary, be changed from p~aintiff to Richard and his wife Rosemary as primary beneficiaries with two of P, ichard's children as contingent beneficiaries. Richard signed the form "Richard J. Coyne, Power of Attorney." Richard testified in his deposition that he does not recall any representative of Jackson questioning him about the power of attorney when he submitted it to Jackson. Thereafter, at its home office in Lansing, Michigan, an employee of Jackson, designated as a processor of beneficiary and ownership changes, who was not an attorney, made a determination that the power of attorney was broad enough to effectuate the change of beneficiary. The change was recorded by Jackson on June '12, '1990.' Thereafter, Richard Coyne withdrew some money from the annuity, as well as other annuities owned by Mary, which he used to purchase a home for her across the street from where he and his wife lived in Mechanicsburg. On January 4, '199'1, pursuant to a petition filed in this court by the Cumberland County Office of Aging, Mary was declared incompetent. The Office of Aging was appointed plenary guardian of her person and Fulton Bank was appointed plenary guardian of her estate. An order was entered revoking the power of attorney given to Richard J. Coyne. On February '14, '199'1, Fulton Bank, as guardian of Mary's estate, and pursuant to Section 1035 of the ~ An Annuity Service Request Form for another Jackson annuity owned by Mary Coyne, No. 2040710, was subsequently signed by Mary Coyne as owner in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, and dated July 2?, '1990. Jackson processed this form and on August 8, 1990, changing the primary beneficiary as requested to Richard J. Coyne and Rosemary Coyne. -5- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM Internal Revenue Code, made a tax free exchange of the Jackson annuity for an annuity issued by the Prudential Insurance Company of America. Fulton Bank dealt with Prudential's agent, Richard Harper. The application for the Prudential annuity, signed by Fulton Bank, listed Richard Coyne as the primary beneficiary and the estate of Mary as the contingent beneficiary. A second application, signed by Fulton Bank, to change the type of instrument from a variable annuity to a fixed annuity, listed the estate of Mary as the primary beneficiary? Mary died on January 2, '1994, of Alzheimer's Type Dementia. The computer system at Prudential showed that Mary's estate was the beneficiary of the Prudential annuity. However, Richard Coyne advised Prudential that he and his wife Rosemary were the beneficiaries. Richard Harper was informed that Richard Coyne had used a power of attorney to exchange the beneficiary of the Jackson annuity to himself and his wife. Jackson supplied Harper with a copy of an Annuity Service Request form signed by Mary naming Richard and Rosemary Coyne as the beneficiary on Annuity No. 2040710. This, however, was the annuity for which Mary named Richard and 2 Richard Harper testified in a deposition that the second application was submitted because Prudential's legal department took the position that the annuity had to be issued as a fixed, rather than a variable annuity, as that was the type of annuity surrendered by Jackson. Harper further testified that when making a Section 1035 exchange, which permits an annuity contract owner to move the proceeds from an existing annuity to an annuity with another insurer without losing the tax advantage status of the annuity, that both annuities must be the same. Notwithstanding, Keith Hylind, the Director of Annuity Services for Prudential, testified in a deposition that there is no requirement that the beneficiaries be the same, only the owner and annuitant need be the same to qualify for a Section 1035 exchange. -6- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM Rosemary Coyne, beneficiary, not the Jackson Annuity No. 2371630 for which the beneficiary was changed by Richard Coyne from plaintiff, Ann M. Harkess, to himself and his wife. On May 6, 1994, Prudential paid the remaining proceeds of the annuity in the amount of $313,075.05 to Richard J. Coyne and Rosemary Coyne. THE POWER OF ATTORNEY The power of attorney signed by Mary V. Coyne in the law office of Allen Smith in Steelton, Pennsylvania on May 31, 1990, provides: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that i, MARY V. COYNE, do make, constitute and appoint my nephew, RICHARD J. COYNE, my true and lawful attorney for me and in my name to my use. 1. To ask, collect, demand, sue for and receive all sums of money, interest, dividends, deposits, shares, securities, accounts, pensions, annuities, rents, the proceeds of insurance of every kind, retirement benefits, bonds, and building and loan or savings and loan shares, Social Security and Medicare, now due or which may hereafter become due and payable to me in any manner whatsoever, and upon receipt of same to sign, seal, execute and deliver all necessary acquittances and discharges therefor; 2. To sell, assign and transfer any stocks, bonds, claims, shares, accounts, deposits or other securities now standing or that may hereafter stand in my name on the books of any and all corporations, national, state, municipal or private; 3. To invest and reinvest in such securities as my said attorney deem safe and judicious to hold for my account; 4. To endorse notes, checks, drafts or other negotiable instruments payable to my order which may require endorsement for deposit as cash or for collection, and to make or enter into any agreement or agreements for the management of my affairs and property; -7- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM 5. To draw checks against or otherwise effect withdrawals from checking or savings funds or other accounts standing in my name, in any bank, savings institution or building and loan association; 6. To pay, discharge and settle all accounts, debts and demands which are now or which may hereafter become due and payable by me; to pay all my bills, including those for my real estate, home, living, housekeeping, medical, hospital, nursing, room and board, care, and all charges in any nursing or convalescent home, and taxes, which may now or hereafter be due, owing or payable by me; 7. To represent me and in my behalf to vote and act, in person or by proxy, for me at all meetings connected with any company in which I may own stocks or bonds or be interested in any way whatsoever; 8. To enter and take possession of my safe deposit box, and the contents thereof, and to file all income tax and other tax returns and claims for refunds on my behalf; 9. To take charge of all my property of every nature and to pay all bills in connection with the same; 10. To sign all medical release documents both for doctors and for hospitals in my behalf and to consent to an operation and the administration of anaesthetic or blood transfusion; 11. To maintain and make all necessary repairs on all real estate owned by me, including 5220 Oakton Street, Skokie, Cook County, Illinois and to pay all bills in connection with the maintenance of said property; to let, demise and rent any real estate owned by me, or in which I have any interest, including said property, at such rents and on such terms as my said attorney shall deem proper and expedient; to receive, demand, collect and recover all rents and arrears of rents which may hereafter be due to me; to take all lawful ways and means for the recovery thereof including entering upon said premises, distresses, suits and confessions, and other proceedings at law; 12. To grant, bargain and sell all my real estate, or in which I have any interest, including 5220 Oakton Street, Skokie, Cook County, Illinois, at either public or private sale, at such time and for such price and upon such terms and conditions as my said attorney shall think proper, and for -8- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM me and in my name to grant and convey said real estate to the purchaser or purchasers thereof so that good and sufficient title to the same be given to said purchaser or purchasers, and for that purpose to make, execute, acknowledge and deliver good and sufficient contracts, deeds in fee simple, and conveyances for the same, with either covenants of general or special warranties, which may be requisite or proper to effectuate the same; to ask, demand, recover and receive all sums of money, which shall become due and owing to me by means of such bargain or sale, and to take all lawful ways and means for the recovery thereof, and to execute and deliver sufficient discharges and acquittances therefor, and upon the sale of said property to pay all taxes, water and sewer rents and other liens and all expenses of the sale; giving and granting unto my said attorney, Richard J. Coyne, full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully, to all intents and purposes, as I might or could do if personally present, with full power of substitution and revocation; hereby ratifying and confirming all that my said attorney, Richard J. Coyne, shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof. It is expressly understood that no action by me in doing in person any of the acts herein authorized to be done subsequently to the taking of this instrument shall be treated as a revocation of the same. This power of attorney shall continue in force and may be accepted and relied upon by anyone to whom it is presented despite my purported revocation of it or my death, until actual written notice of either of such events is received by such person. In the event of my incompetency, from whatever cause, this power of attorney shall not thereby be revoked but shall thereupon become irrevocable and may be accepted and relied upon by anyone to whom it is presented despite such incompetency, subject only to it becoming void and of no further effect only upon receipt by such person either of (1) written evidence of the appointment of a guardian (or similar fiduciary) of my estate following adjudication of incompetency, or (2) written notice of my death. (Emphasis added.) -9- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM THE CLAIM AGAINST JACKSON Plaintiff maintains that as a matter of law the power of attorney did not authorize the attorney-in-fact to make a gift to himself and his wife by changing the beneficiary on the Jackson annuity. Jackson argues in its brief that "the following language in the power of attorney, especially as contained in paragraph 2, is sufficiently clear as a matter of law to establish that Richard Coyne, as Mary's attorney-in-fact, had the authority to change the beneficiary on the Jackson annuity:" 1. To ask, collect, demand, sue for and receive all sums of money, interest, dividends, deposits, shares, securities, accounts, pensions, annuities, rents... 2. To sell, assign and transfer any.., claims, shares, accounts now standing or that may hereafter stand in my name on the books of any and all corporations .... 4. To endorse notes, checks..., which may require endorsement for deposit as cash or collection and to make or enter into any agreement or agreements for the management of my affairs and property. 9. To take charge of all my property of every nature and to pay all bills in connection with the same. All parties agree that because Mary executed the power of attorney in Steelton, Pennsylvania, on May 31, 1990, that the law of Pennsylvania as it existed at that time applies to the issue of whether Richard Coyne had the authority to change the beneficiary on the Jackson annuity from Ann M. Harkess to himself and his wife, which change was recorded by Jackson on June 12, 1990, -10- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM THE CASE LAW Jackson maintains that Estate of Reifsneider, 531 Pa. 19 (1992); Brenner v. Manmiller, 78 Berks L.J. 310 (1986); and Taylor v. Vernon, 438 Pa. Super. 479 (1995), support its position that Richard Coyne had authority to change the beneficiary on the annuity to himself and his wife. In the Estate of Reifsneider, supra, there was a challenge to an election to take against a will by an attorney-in-fact using a power of attorney. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the type of powers that may be granted to attorneys-in-fact as specifically set forth by the Legislature, "[d]oes not limit the subjects that may be properly addressed by powers of attorney, nor does it confine the way such powers may be defined? The Supreme Court concluded that the following power of attorney "[I]eaves no doubt that.., the claiming of an elective share of the estate of the principal's deceased spouse--is within the class of activities that the attorney-in-fact was authorized to perform," because: Paragraph 7 authorizes the attorneys-in-fact '[t]o commence, prosecute, discontinue and defend all actions or other legal proceedings touching my estate or any part whatsoever, or touching any matter in which I or my estate may be in any way concerned,.., as he/she in his/her sole discretion shall deem best .... ' (Emphasis added). Paragraph 10 empowers them '[i]n general, to do all other acts, deeds, matters and things whatsoever in or about my estate, property and affairs and things herein, either particularly or generally described, as fully and effectually to all intents and purposes as I could in my own proper person .... ' And Paragraph 12 states even more broadly that the attorneys-in-fact '[i]n addition to the powers and discretion herein specifically given and conferred upon him/her and notwithstanding any usage or custom to the 3 The statutory law then applicable to powers of attorney was at 20 Pa.C.S. Section 5601-5603. -11- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM contrary, to have the full power, right and authority to do, perform and cause to be done and performed all such acts, deeds, matters and things in connection with my property and estate as he/sh~ i~ his/her sole discretion, shall deem reasonable, necessary and proper, as fully, effectually and absolutely as if he/she were the absolute owner and possessor thereof.' (Page citations to the record omitted). (Emphasis added.) In Brenner v. Manmiller, supra, Brenner moved in with his grandson and his grandson's wife, Brenda Manmiller. He subsequently executed a power of attorney appointing Brenda Manmiller as his attorney-in-fact. The power of attorney authorized the attorney-in-fact inter alia: To make disbursements of monies belonging to me, in such manner, at such times and for such purposes as my said attorney may, in her sole unrestricted discretion and judgment, deem best for my benefit and welfare and further for the maintenance, storage, upkeep and repair of any real or personal property owned by me. (Emphasis added.) In addition to all of the powers of my attorney hereinbefore stated, I empower my attorney to exercise all of the powers including the broadest set forth in section 5602(a) of the Probate Estates and Fiduciaries Code, as amended. After Brenner's death, and pursuant to the power of attorney, Brenda Manmiller closed one of the decedent's savings accounts and transferred the proceeds totaling $32,310.47 into her personal account. Upon the death of the decedent, some of his beneficiaries filed an action in equity to recoup the amount which Manmiller had transferred into her account. The Court of Common Pleas of Berks County held that the power of attorney was insufficient to vest in the attorney-in-fact the authority to -12- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM make gifts. The order of the trial court was affirmed per curiam by the Sup~:ior Court of Pennsylvania at 389 Pa. Super. 644 (1989). However, the Suio~eme Court of Pennsylvania at 531 Pa. 209 (1992), reversed per curiam the Superior Court and the trial court, citing only to its decision in Estate of Reifsneider, supra. In Taylor v. Vernon, supra, George R. Hixon, on May 5, 1992, directed his attorney to prepare a deed transferring his real estate to himself and his daughter Lois E. Vernon, appellant, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. On May 26, 1992, Hixon executed a power of attorney naming Vernon as his attorney-in-fact. The document contained the following language: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that I, GEORGE R. HIXON, residing at R.D. #1, Jefferson, Pennsylvania, do hereby nominate, constitute, and appoint Lois E. Vernon, residing at R.D. # 1, Jefferson, Pennsylvania, my true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for me and in my name, place and stead, and for my use and benefit: For me and in my name, to make, seal, and deliver, bargain, contract, agree for, purchase, receive, and taken lands, tenements, hereditaments, and accept the possession of all lands, and all deeds and other assurances, in the law therefore, and to lease, let, demise, bargain, sell, remise, release, convey, mortgage, and hypothecate lands, tenements, and hereditaments upon such terms and conditions and under such covenants as she shall think fit; GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said attorney-in fact full power and authority to do and perform every act necessary, requisite, or proper to be done in and about the premises as fully as I might or could do if personally present, with full power of substitution and revocation, hereby ratifying and confirming all that my -13- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM said attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof. This Power of Attorney shall not be affected by the disability of the principal subsequent to the execution thereof. (Emphasis added.) A half-month later on June 10, Hixon's health deteriorated and he was hospitalized. On June 18, appellant, signed the deed that had been prepared at the request of her father by her father's attorney, for her father as grantor and as joint grantee pursuant to the power of attorney, and also in her own name as joint grantee, transferring the father's real estate into a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. The lawyer who drafted the power of attorney testified that decedent had directed him to draft the deed because appellant had agreed to care for him for the rest of his life. The executrix of the decedent's estate filed a suit in equity seeking to set aside the conveyance to appellant, arguing that the father's power of attorney to appellant did not give her authority to convey property as a gift. After a detailed review of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Estate of Reifsneider, supra, and the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County in Brenner v. Manmiller, supra, which was reversed per curiam by the Supreme Court, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, noting that the power of attorney as in Estate of Reifsneider similarly required the attorney-in-fact to act for the principal's "benefit and welfare," concluded that: [t]he inquiry into whether a power of attorney confers a benefit on the principal without conferring a benefit on the attorney-in-fact is irrelevant. Rather, this case turns on whether the principal intended to empower the attorney-in-fact to make the gift at issue. Estate of Reifsneider, supra. The power of attorney which Hixon executed authorized appellant to 'convey... lands, tenements, and hereditaments upon -14- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM such terms and conditions and under such covenants as she shall think fit.' The document does not limit the types of conveyances or the purposes for which conveyances can be made. Instead, the document allows the attorney-in-fact to makes conveyances as she sees fit. Further, the concluding paragraph of the power of attorney accords the attorney-in-fact 'full power and authority to do and perform every act necessary, requisite, or proper to be done in and about the premises as fully as [Hixon] might or could do if personally present.' Although the power of attorney utilizes general language, we find that it sufficiently evidences the principal's intent to allow appellant to make gifts consisting of property conveyances. We arrive at this conclusion because the power authorized her to use her discretion in deciding how to conduct her father's affairs. (Emphasis added.) DISCUSSION In the next to the last unnumbered paragraph in the power of attorney executed by Mary there is the same general language as there is in the power of attorney in Taylor v. Vernon, supra. That language is: [g]iving and granting unto my said attorney, Richard J. Coyne, full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully, to all intents and purposes, as I might or could do if personally present, with full power of substitution and revocation ... The similar language in Taylor is: GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said attorney-in fact full power and authority to do and perform every act necessary, requisite, or proper to be done in and about the premises as fully as I might or could do if personally present, with full power of substitution and revocation... In her brief, plaintiff argues that "This general power only relates to the specific power to sell real estate, and not to the other powers, since it immediately follows the power to sell real estate in paragraph 12, appears to be a part of or at least modify -15- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM paragraph 12, and is not a separately designated power, and refers to 'premises.'" The unnumbered paragraph is separated from the twelfth paragraph by double spacing as the numbered second through the twelfth paragraphs are all separated by double spacing. The unnumbered paragraph is also separated by double spacing from the last unnumbered general paragraph which starts with the words "This power of attorney shall continue in force and may be accepted and relied upon by anyone presented... "We disagree with plaintiff that the general language following paragraph 12 simply modifies the authority granted in that paragraph to sell real estate; however, we do agree that the paragraph is not a separately designated power. What the general paragraph does is amplify all of the specific authority granted to the attorney-in-fact in the twelve numbered paragraphs by giving the attorney-in-fact "[f]ull power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises .... "The paragraph also contains the clause "It is expressly understood that no action by me in doing in person any of the acts herein authorized to be done subsequently to the taking of this instrument shall be treated as a revocation of the same." That obviously relates to the entire power of attorney and is not limited only to the specific power to sell real estate in paragraph 12. Accordingly, the word "premises" as it is used in the unnumbered paragraph means the specific authority granted in the twelve numbered paragraphs. Therefore, we must look to the specific language in the first twelve paragraphs as amplified by the general language in the unnumbered paragraph to determine if it was Mary's intent to allow -16- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM Richard Coyne the authority to make a gift of her property to himself and his wife. That is the type of analysis the Supa. rior Court did in Taylor where the attorney-in-fact was granted specific authority to convey land "as she shall think fit," which the court concluded when taken together with the general paragraph which granted her "full power and authority to do and perform every act necessary, requisite, or proper to be done in and about the premises..." sufficiently evidenced the principal's intent to allow the attorney-in-fact to make gifts consisting of property conveyances "[b]ecause the power authorizes her to use her discretion in deciding how to conduct her father's affairs." In the twelve numbered paragraphs of the power of attorney executed by Mary, there is no identical language such as was in (1) Taylor granting the attorney-in-fact the authority to make conveyances as he "sees fit," which the Superior Court concluded authorized the attorney-in-fact to transfer real estate to herself, and (2) Reifsneider where the attorney-in-fact was authorized to do all acts with the principal's property and estate "as in his/her sole discretion, shall be deemed reasonable," which clause the Supreme Court concluded authorized the attorney-in-fact to elect to take against the will of the estate of the principal's deceased spouse, and (3) Brenner where the per curiam order of the Supreme Court resulted in the attorney-in-fact being able to gift money to herself based on the authority to disperse money belonging to the principal "in her sole unrestricted discretion and judgment." However, there is similar broad language in that (1) paragraph one of the power of attorney authorizes Richard Coyne to "[r]eceive all.. -17- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM · annuities.., now due and which may hereinafter become due and payable to me in any manner whatsoever, and upon receipt of same to sign, seal, execute and deliver all necessary acquittances and discharges therefor," and (2) paragraph two authorizes him "[T]o... transfer any.., securities now.., in my name on the books of any and all corporations, national, state, municipal or private," and (3) paragraph nine authorizes him "[T]o take charge of all my property of every nature .... "and (4) the amplification language in the first unnumbered paragraph authorizes him "[f]ull power and authority to do and perform all and every act or thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises .... " Based on the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Superior Court, it would be splitting hairs to conclude that the power of attorney executed by Mary is not broad enough to authorize the attorney-in-fact to make gifts of the principal's property. We conclude as a matter of law, that although the power of attorney uses general language, it sufficiently evidences Mary's intent to allow Richard Coyne, as her attorney-in-fact, to make gifts of her property and therefore it allowed him to change the beneficiary on the Jackson annuity. Despite the language that Richard Coyne was appointed "[m]y true and lawful attorney for me and in my name and use," we are bound by Taylor that an inquiry into whether the power of attorney confers a benefit on the principal is irrelevant. CONCLUSIONS Having found that Richard Coyne was authorized by Mary in her power of -18- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM attorney to change the beneficiary on the Jackson annuity, all of plaintiff's claims against Jackson fail and we will grant the motion of Jackson for summary judgme~.t. Because Jackson acted properly there is no claim against Prudential. Therefore, we will grant the motion of Prudential for summary judgment. Because Jackson and Prudential cannot be found liable to plaintiff, there is no claim against the additional defendants Richard and Rosemary Coyne.4 This resolution makes it unnecessary to "The statutory law applicable to powers of attorney has been amended since Mary signed her power of attorney on May 31, 1990. The Probate Estate and Fiduciaries Code now provides at 20 Pa.C.S. § 5601(a): General rule.--In addition to all other powers that may be delegated to an attorney-in-fact, any or all of the powers referred to in section 5602(a) (relating to form of power of attorney) may lawfully be granted in writing and, unless the power of attorney expressly directs to the contrary, shall be construed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis added.) Section 5602(a), provides: Specification of powers.--A principal may, by inclusion of the language quoted in any of the following paragraphs or by inclusion of other language showing a similar intent on the part of the principal, empower his attorney-in-fact to do any or all of the following, each of which is defined in section 5603 (relating to implementation of power of attorney): (1) Either: (i) 'to make gifts'; or (ii) 'to make limited gifts.' (Emphasis added.) Section 5603(a), provides: (1) A power 'to make gifts' shall mean that the attorney-in-fact may make gifts for and on behalf of the principal to any donees (including the attorney-in-fact) and in such amounts as the attorney-in-fact may decide. (2) A power 'to make limited gifts' shall mean that the attorney-in- fact may make only gifts for or on behalf of the principal which are limited as follows: (i) The class of permissible donees shall consist solely of the principal's spouse and issue (including the attorney-in-fact if he -19- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM discuss the oti~er issues raised by the parties in their motions for summary judgment. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this /¢ ~ day of January, 2000, IT IS ORDERED: (1) The motion of plain,'.iff, Ann M. Harkess, for partial summary judgment against defendant, Jackson National Life Insurance Company, IS DENIED. (2) The motion of defendant, Jackson National Life Insurance Company, for summary judgment against plaintiff, Ann M. Harkess, IS GRANTED. (3) The motion of defendant, Prudential Insurance Company of America, for summary judgment against plaintiff, Ann M. Harkess, IS GRANTED. (4) The motion of additional defendants Richard J. Coyne and Rosemary Coyne, is a member of such class), or any of them. (ii) During each calendar year, the gifts made to each donee, pursuant to such power, shall have an aggregate value not in excess of, and shall be made in such manner as to quality in their entirety for, the principal's annual exclusion from the Federal gift tax permitted under section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, determined without regard to section 2513(a) thereof (or any successor provision to the code). (iii) The attorney-in-fact shall be responsible as equity and justice may require to the extent that any gift made pursuant to a power 'to make limited gifts' exceeds the limitations imposed by subparagraph (i) and (ii). Section (p) now provides that the power to engage in insurance transactions means: (3) In general, exercise all powers with respect to insurance that the principal could if present; however, the attorney-in-fact cannot designate himself beneficiary of a life insurance policy unless the attorney-in-fact is the spouse, child, grandchild, parent, brother or sister of the principal. (Emphasis added.) -20- 97-0015 CIVIL TERM for summary judgment, IS GRANTED. By the Co'rift"-, .~ Edgar B. Bayley, J! R. James Reynolds, Jr., Esquire / For Ann M. Harkess James J. Kutz, Esquire For Jackson National Life Insurance Company John McN.Cramer, Esquire For Prudential Life Insurance Company of America Arthur T. McDermott, Esquire For Richard J. Coyne and Rosemary Coyne :saa -21-