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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-0572 CIVILSTANLEY BETHEA, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. WASHINGTON REDSKINS, DEFENDANT 02-0572 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., November 18, 2002:-- On February 1, 2002, plaintiff, Stanley Bethea, filed a complaint against defendant, Washington Redskins. Defendant filed preliminary objections to the complaint. Plaintiff then filed leave to amend his complaint. An order was entered on March 25, 2002, providing that "the amended complaint shall be deemed filed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(c)(1)." Defendant filed a preliminary objection to the amended complaint in the form of a demurrer. Plaintiff filed a motion to file a second amended complaint. These matters are before us for disposition.~ In his amended complaint, plaintiff avers that he went to the Washington ~ Plaintiff subsequently filed motions to file a third amended complaint and a fourth amended complaint, both of which were denied because there has not yet a resolution of his motion to file a second amended complaint. 02-0572 CIVIL TERM Redskins Training Camp in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on August 1, 2001, to tryout for the position of "half-back for kick off and punt returner." Plaintiff alleges that he was qualified to tryout for the football team as an unrestricted free agent. Plaintiff alleges that the coach of the Washington Redskins, Marty Schottenheimer, "willfully and wantonly refused to let the plaintiff know if he could try out for the Washington Redskins Football Team." Plaintiff alleges that "It was coach Marty Schottenheimer [sic] duty to let the plaintiff know if he could or could not try out for the team." Based on the coach not telling him if he could tryout for the team, plaintiff claims a cause of action against the Washington Redskins for intentional infliction of emotional distress. If this was an action for damages at law for negligence a necessary element to recover would be the violation of a duty or obligation requiring defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct. See Morena v. South Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634 (1983). Plaintiff herein has alleged that there was a duty owed to him by defendant. He has failed to set forth what duty defendant breached. We know of no duty requiring the coach of a professional football team to inform persons whether they will be given a tryout for the team. By not telling plaintiff if he could tryout for the team, defendant was effectively not granted a tryout. A professional football team hardly has to give tryouts to anyone who walks into its training camp. Plaintiff has no cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on a claim of conduct of defendant that did not constitute a wrong. In Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: -2- 02-0572 CIVIL TERM This tort [intentional infliction of emotional distress] is defined as follows: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. ·.. There is very little Pennsylvania or federal case law addressing this cause of action, However, courts have been chary to allow recovery for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Only if conduct which is extreme or clearly outrageous is established will a claim be proven. Indeed our Superior Court has noted, "[t]he conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Buczek v. First National Bank of Mifflintown, 366 Pa. Super. 551,558, 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1987). Described another way, "[i]t has not been enough that the defendant has acted with intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by 'malice,' or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort." Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, comment d; Daughen v. Fox, 372 Pa. Super. 405, 412, 539 A.2d 858, 861 (1988). (Footnote omitted). In Small v. Juanita College, 682 A.2d 350 (Pa. Super· 1996), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated with respect to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, that "a court must make the initial determination of whether a defendant's conduct was so extreme and outrageous that recovery may be justified." The conduct of the coach of the Washington Redskins in not telling plaintiff if he could tryout for the team was not so extreme and clearly outrageous that it could constitute a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff has not set forth any facts which would give him a cause of action against the Washington Redskins. Accordingly, we will grant defendant's demurrer and -3- 02-0572 CIVIL TERM deny plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of November, 2002: (1) The preliminary objection of defendant to plaintiff's amended complaint in the form of a demurrer, IS GRANTED. Plaintiff's amended complaint, IS DISMISSED. (2) The motion of plaintiff to file a second amended complaint, IS DISMISSED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Stanley Bethea, Pro se 533 Curtin Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Charles T. Young, Jr., Esquire 100 Pine Street Harrisburg, PA 17108 For Defendant :sal -4-