HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-5050 CIVILROBERT J. EISENHAUER and IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
HELEN B. EISENHAUER, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
vs. 98-5050 CIVIL
MESSIAH VILLAGE, MESSIAH
HOME, a/k/a/MESSIAH HOME,
INC.; SAMSONITE CORP. a/k/a CIVIL ACTION - LAW
SAMSONITE CORP.; SUNBEAM-
OSTER; SUNBEAM/OSTER
COMPANY, INC.; U.S.
INDUSTRIES, INC.; SAMSONITE
FURNITURE COMPANY;
SAMSONITE FURNITURE
L1NEAL, a/k/a SAMSONITE
FURNITURE L1NEAL GRP.;
SAMSONITE L1NEAL GROUP,
INC.; L1NEAL GROUP, INC.;
MECO CORP.; BEATRICE CO.
a/k/a BEATRICE COMPANY; and
BEATRICE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendants
IN RE: SAMSONITE CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, J.J.
OPINION AND ORDER
Statement of Facts
Before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, Samsonite
Corporation. The plaintiffs, Robert J. Eisenhauer and Helen B. Eisenhauer, filed a complaint
against Samsonite and the other captioned defendants on September 13, 1999. The complaint
alleges that Robert Eisenhauer was injured on September 1, 1996, as a result of the collapse of a
chair in which he was sitting. The incident occurred at the Messiah Village Nursing Home. The
plaintiffs' complaint further alleges that Samsonite Corporation designed, manufactured and sold
98-5050 CIVIL
the chair at issue, thereby presenting claims of strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty.
Samsonite's summary judgment motion asserts that the plaintiffs have failed to present any
evidence that the chair which allegedly collapsed was, in fact, designed, manufactured or sold by
Samsonite.
The defendant, Messiah Village, has presented a chair that is alleged to be the one that
collapsed on September 1, 1996. The chair has the name "Samsonite" embossed on the
underside of the plastic seat. A nurse, Joan Reynolds, testified in her deposition that, subsequent
to the accident, she saw the chair in her supervisor's office but she does not recall who moved
the chair to that office. (Reynolds' dep. p.28-29). Nurse Reynolds stated that there was a note
taped to the chair in the supervisor's office that said that the chair was not to be removed.
(Reynolds' dep. p.48). Nurse Reynolds further testified that the chair was ultimately taken from
the supervisor's office to the office of one John Finley. (Reynolds' dep. p.40).
A witness, Carolyn Schade, stated that, after the alleged accident, she inspected the chair
that Mr. Eisenhauer was sitting in and found that there were loose screws and that the chair
would not stand up properly. (Schade dep. p. 29). She recalls that she took the chair from the
room where it allegedly collapsed to her office. (Schade dep. p.27). She placed the note on the
chair and that the chair remained in her office for a couple months. (Schade dep. p.36 and p. 39).
Mr. John Finley is the chief financial officer at Messiah Village. He received an incident
report concerning the collapsed chair. (Finley dep. p. 5 and p. 24). Mr. Finley testified that the
incident report stated that the chair involved in the alleged accident was missing screws,
however, the chair presented to him as being the one involved in the accident had no missing
screws. (Finley dep. p. 24). Mr. Finley could not say, in fact, whether the chair presented to him
as the chair involved in the accident was the chair Mr. Eisenhauer was sitting in when he fell on
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September 1, 1996. Mr. Finley does not know if there were any repairs made to the chair
subsequent to the accident. (Finley dep. p. 25).
The plaintiff, Robert Eisenhauer, states that the chair that was involved in his fall broke
into two pieces. (Robert Eisenhauer dep. p. 95). Plaintiff Helen Eisenhauer also testified that the
chair was in two pieces after the alleged fall. (Helen Eisenhauer dep. p. 23). Both John Fry, vice
president of campus services, and Greg Witters, director of facility management at Messiah
Village, inspected the chair presented as the chair involved in the accident and determined that
there was nothing wrong with the chair. (Fry dep. p. 22, Witters dep. p. 9-10). The chair
presented in this case as the chair involved in the September 1, 1996, accident has no loose
screws, nor is the chair broken in any way. There is no evidence that anyone from Messiah
Village ever repaired the chair that was involved in the accident.
Discussion
The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is set forth in Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2.
After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within
such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any
party may move for summary judgment in whole
or in part as a matter of law
(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any
material fact as to a necessary element of the cause
of action or defense which could be established by
additional discovery or expert report, or
(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to
the motion, including the production of expert
reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden
of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of
facts essential to the cause of action or defense
which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
submitted to a jury.
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Pa. R. Civ. P. 1035.2. Summary judgment should be granted only in cases that are clear and free
from doubt. DeWeese v. Anchor Hocking Consumer and Industrial Products Group, 427
Pa. Super. 47, 628 A.2d 421 (Pa. Super. 1993). When considering a motion for summary
judgment, the court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
accept as true all well-pleaded facts and give the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. Id. It is well-settled that a party may not defeat a motion for
summary judgment by relying on the allegations of the complaint, but must present depositions,
affidavits or other acceptable documents to show there is a factual issue for a jury's
consideration. Id.
"Summary judgment is proper when the plaintiff has failed to establish that the
defendant's products were the cause of plaintiff' s injuries." DeWeese v. Anchor Hocking
Consumer and Industrial Products Group, 427 Pa. Super. 47, 52, 628 A.2d 421,423, citing
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter, 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975). Similarly, the court in
Eckenrod v. GAF Corporation, 375 Pa. Super. 187, 544 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. 1988), said that
summary judgment is proper when the plaintiff has not established that the defendant's product
was the cause of plaintiff's injuries.
In DeWeese, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant manufacturer because the plaintiff was unable to produce the
product that caused the damage to the defendants for inspection during discovery. DeWeese at
49, 628 A.2d at 422. In that case, the plaintiff was employed as a busboy. While filling a glass
pitcher with hot water, the plaintiff was injured when the pitcher exploded. The plaintiff was
taken to the hospital and the remnants of the pitcher were discarded. The plaintiff then filed a
complaint alleging that the pitcher was defective and the manufacturer was strictly liable. The
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court held that where a plaintiff brings an action claiming that he suffered injury as a result of a
defective product, his failure to produce the product for inspection by the defense will render
summary judgment against him appropriate. DeWeese at 50, 628 A.2d at 423. In order to
establish a successful cause of action in products liability, a plaintiff must prove that a defect in a
product proximately caused injury to him or her. DeWeese at 51,628 A.2d at 423. In DeWeese_,
the plaintiff could not recall the type of pitcher involved in the alleged accident. Id. The
plaintiff in DeWeese testified that there were more than a dozen different pitchers at the club and
he did not know who manufactured the one he used. DeWeese at 52, 628 A.2d at 424.
In the case sub judice, plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that supports the
allegation that the Samsonite chair at issue was in fact the chair involved in the accident on
September 1, 1996. Although Messiah Village may have Samsonite chairs at its facilities, there
has been no testimony or documents that show the chair involved in the accident was in fact a
Samsonite chair.
As an aside, courts have held that a plaintiff can prove identification of a defective
product through circumstantial evidence. In Payton v. Pennsylvania Sling Co., 710 A.2d 1221,
1224 (Pa. Super. 1998), the court stated:
.... [I]n cases in which the allegedly defective
product is not available, a plaintiff may prove
identification through circumstantial evidence.
That is, the failure to produce the product and,
thus, offer direct evidence of the manufacturer's
identity does not automatically bar a plaintiff's
recovery. The determination of whether a plaintiff
has produced sufficient circumstantial
identification evidence is factual and, thus, case-
specific.
Payton v. Pennsylvania Sling Co., 710 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Pa. Super. 1998).
98-5050 CIVIL
In the present case, plaintiffs have not set forth even circumstantial evidence to identify
the actual chair involved as the Samsonite chair at issue. Plaintiffs have no knowledge
concerning the manufacturer of, or the current whereabouts of the chair involved in the accident.
In fact, plaintiffs do not believe the Samsonite chair at issue is the chair that was involved in the
accident because plaintiffs allege that the chair was broken. Although defendant Messiah
Village alleges that the chair involved was preserved, the testimony reveals that the Samsonite
chair produced cannot be the chair involved in the accident. There is testimony that the chair
involved in the accident had loose or missing screws. There was also testimony that the chair
Mr. Eisenhauer was sitting in at the time of the accident was broken in two pieces. There is no
evidence that the chair was ever repaired by anyone subsequent to the accident. The Samsonite
chair, that has been produced in this case, is in good working order with all the screws firmly in
place.
Even assuming that the chair presented by Messiah Village as the chair that was involved
in the accident is in fact the chair that was involved in the accident, the plaintiffs would still fail
in their cause of action. In Schmidt v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Pa. D.&C.3d
647, 649 (Pa. Com. P1. 1986), the court stated:
In order to recover on a strict liability theory the
plaintiff is required not only to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the subject
bottle was defective, whether in manufacture,
design or because it lacked adequate warnings to
make it safe, but that such a defective condition as
existed for whatever reasons was a substantial
factor in causing harm to him.
Schmidt v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 39 Pa. D.&C.3d 647, 649 (Pa. Com. P1. 1986).
98-5050 CIVIL
The Samsonite chair presented as the chair involved is in perfect working condition.
There are no missing screws and it operates as a chair should. The chair stands upright and is
sturdy, and all those that have investigated the chair testified that it is in good working condition.
Further, there is no evidence that the chair has been repaired in any fashion, but is, in fact, in the
same condition as it was at the time of the accident. Therefore, the chair presented by Messiah
Village is not defective.
In light of its condition, it is immaterial whether the chair produced as the alleged
instrumentality of the harm is or is not the chair involved in the accident. Either way, the
defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of November, 2002, the motion for summary judgment
of defendant, Samsonite Corporation, is GRANTED and the plaintiffs' complaint against
defendant is DISMISSED with prejudice.
BY THE COURT,
Kevin A. Hess, J.
Jered L. Hock, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
Jeffrey B. Rettig, Esquire
For Defendant Samsonite Corporation
William J. Peters, Esquire
For Defendant Messiah Village and Messiah Home
:rlm
ROBERT J. EISENHAUER and IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
HELEN B. EISENHAUER, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
vs. 98-5050 CIVIL
MESSIAH VILLAGE, MESSIAH
HOME, a/k/a/MESSIAH HOME,
INC.; SAMSONITE CORP. a/k/a CIVIL ACTION - LAW
SAMSONITE CORP.; SUNBEAM-
OSTER; SUNBEAM/OSTER
COMPANY, INC.; U.S.
INDUSTRIES, INC.; SAMSONITE
FURNITURE COMPANY;
SAMSONITE FURNITURE
LINEAL, a/k/a SAMSONITE
FURNITURE LINEAL GRP.;
SAMSONITE LINEAL GROUP,
INC.; LINEAL GROUP, INC.;
MECO CORP.; BEATRICE CO.
a/k/a BEATRICE COMPANY; and
BEATRICE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendants
IN RE: SAMSONITE CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, J.J.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of November, 2002, the motion for summary judgment
of defendant, Samsonite Corporation, is GRANTED and the plaintiffs' complaint against
defendant is DISMISSED with prejudice.
BY THE COURT,
Kevin A. Hess, J.
Jered L. Hock, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
Jeffrey B. Rettig, Esquire
For Defendam Samsonite Corporation
William J. Peters, Esquire
For Defendant Messiah Village and Messiah Home
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