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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-3512 Civil LOUISE D. SGRIGNOLl, PLAINTIFF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. PERRY P. SGRIGNOLl, DEFENDANT 04-3512 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., March 5, 2007:-- Plaintiff/wife, Louise D. Sgrignoli, and defendant/husband, Perry P. Sgrignoli, entered into a written Agreement on September 15, 1992, the interpretation of which involves an issue submitted on a motion for a declaratory judgment. The Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. Section 7532-7541, at Section 7533 provides that: Any person interested under a . . . contract. . . or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a . . . contract. . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the. . . contract. . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. The parties agree to the following facts. On September 15, 1992, plaintiff and defendant entered into a written Agreement: WHEREAS, Louise D. Sgrignoli, has inherited money from her late uncle, Leroy Ditlow. WHEREAS, Louise D. Sgrignoli, has entered into a contract to purchase a home situate at 1716 Main Street, Lisburn, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055, from Ricky J. Brown and Lynn N. Brown, husband and wife, and James Smith and Carole Smith, husband and wife. WHEREAS, Louise D. Sgrignoli, is using the inheritance she received from her late uncle, Leroy Ditlow, to purchase said premises. WHEREAS, Louise D. Sgrignoli, has agreed to place the title to 04-3512 CIVIL TERM the property to said premises, in her name and the name of her husband, Perry P. Sgrignoli, for and in consideration of the following terms and conditions: A. Should Louise D. Sgrignoli predecease her husband, Perry P. Sgrignoli, then her % of the property shall be owned by her sons, Timothy L. Ditzel and Richard J. Ditzel. B. However, husband, Perry P. Sgrignoli, may use the property as rental property or for whatever purposes he sees fit so long as he maintains the taxes, and insurance and keeps the property in a reasonable state of repairs. C. In the event that the property is sold, then % of the net proceeds shall be divided equally between Louise D. Sgrignoli's sons, Timothy L. Ditzel and Richard J. Ditzel. (Emphasis added.) The property at 1716 Main Street, Lisburn was purchased and deeded to wife and husband. They separated on April 12, 2004. Wife filed for a divorce on July 21, 2004. On November 8, 2005, the property at 1716 Main Street, Lisburn, was sold. The net proceeds of $94,169.94 were placed into escrow. Wife maintains that one-half of the proceeds should be distributed to her two children pursuant to Paragraph C of the Agreement, thus excluding that amount from the marital property subject to equitable distribution in the divorce case. Husband maintains that all of the provisions in the Agreement apply only if wife died; therefore, the entire proceeds are subject to equitable distribution. This court, in interpreting the Agreement, must determine the intent of the parties and give effect to all provisions of the contract. See Tuthill v. Tuthill, 716 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. 2000). If the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be determined only from the express language of the agreement. Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638 (Pa. Super. 1993). If the -2- 04-3512 CIVIL TERM contractual terms are ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, intrinsic evidence should be taken to resolve the ambiguity. Tuthill v. Tuthill, supra. In the case sub judice, both parties maintain that their Agreement is not ambiguous. We agree and conclude that the express language of the Agreement supports the legal position taken by wife. Husband's argument is: (1) that Paragraph A addresses what happens to the property if wife dies, which in that situation one-half continues to be owned by him and the other half is owned by her sons; (2) the use of the word "however" in Paragraph B reflects an extension of Paragraph A which provides that in that event, i.e., of wife's death, he and her two sons each own one-half of the property and he may continue to use it as he sees fit "so long as he maintains the taxes, and insurance and keeps the property in a reasonable state of repairs;" and (3) Paragraph C provides another alternative in the event of wife's death, i.e., if the property is thereafter sold then one- half of the net proceeds go to wife's two sons, and the other half to him. Under this interpretation, Paragraph C is superfluous because under Paragraph A, if wife dies, her two children already own a one-half interest with husband. Therefore, if the property is sold after wife's death, one-half of the net proceeds go to the children and the other half to husband. We agree with wife that Paragraph C, which is separate from Paragraphs A and B, must be given effect. The only reasonable interpretation to give it effect is that the Agreement shows wife's intent to use her inheritance to purchase the property, place it -3- 04-3512 CIVIL TERM into joint names with her husband, and ensure that if she dies or the property is sold, that her two children will get one-half. Now that the property is sold, one-half of the net proceeds go to the children and the other half is marital property subject to equitable distribution. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of March, 2007, the following declaratory judgment is entered. Pursuant to the parties' Agreement dated September 15, 1992, and the contract interpretation set forth in the opinion in support of this order: (a) One-half of the net proceeds from the sale of 1716 Main Street, Lisburn, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, shall be divided equally between Timothy L. Ditzel and Richard J. Ditzel. (b) The other half of the net proceeds is marital property of Louise D. Sgrignoli and Perry P. Sgrignoli subject to equitable distribution. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire For Plaintiff/Wife Sandra L. Meilton, Esquire For Defendant/Husband :sal -4- LOUISE D. SGRIGNOLl, PLAINTIFF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. PERRY P. SGRIGNOLl, DEFENDANT 04-3512 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of March, 2007, the following declaratory judgment is entered. Pursuant to the parties' Agreement dated September 15, 1992, and the contract interpretation set forth in the opinion in support of this order: (a) One-half of the net proceeds from the sale of 1716 Main Street, Lisburn, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, shall be divided equally between Timothy L. Ditzel and Richard J. Ditzel. (b) The other half of the net proceeds is marital property of Louise D. Sgrignoli and Perry P. Sgrignoli subject to equitable distribution. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Diane G. Radcliff, Esquire For Plaintiff/Wife Sandra L. Meilton, Esquire For Defendant/Husband 04-3512 CIVIL TERM :sal -2-