Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout2006-6372 Civil TEAM RAHAL OF MECHANICSBURG, INC., AND FERRIS LAND DEVELOPMENT, L.P., APPELLANTS IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP ZONING: HEARING BOARD, APPELLEE V. TOWNSHIP OF SILVER SPRING, INTERVENOR 06-6372 CIVIL TERM IN RE: APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD BEFORE BAYLEY. J. AND HESS. J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., March 14, 2007:-- Appellants own seventy acres of vacant land on the south side of U.S. Route 11 in the Township of Silver Spring, Cumberland County. They want to access that land from U.S. Route 11 by a proposed public township road to be called Lexus Lane. As authorized by the Township Zoning Ordinance, appellants filed an application seeking conditional use approval for the direct access to Route 11. On December 14, 2005, the Board of Supervisors of Silver Spring Township took the following action on the application: [a]pproved the Team Rahal of Mechanicsburg (Access) conditional use 06-6372 CIVIL TERM application, CU 2005-14, subject to the applicant paying for all improvements associated with traffic signal installation.1 Appellants then filed a Preliminary Subdivision and Land Development Plan which included details of Lexus Lane. The plan did not contain a provision for a traffic signal at the intersection of Lexus Lane and Route 11. On January 27, 2006, the Board of Supervisors approved the plan subject to conditions which include: [t]he conditions of the two (2) conditional use approvals on the plans. All conditions of there [sic] approvals must be addressed. On March 23, 2006, the Zoning Officer of Silver Spring Township, without application or notice, issued the following "interpretation" of the conditional use granted by the Board of Supervisors on December 14, 2005: It is my interpretation of the Board's decision of December 14, 2005 that access to the Carlisle Pike is only permitted conditioned upon the signalization of the intersection of Lexus Lane and the Carlisle Pike (PA Rt. 0011). Therefore, in order to ensure that access to the Carlisle Pike (PA Rt. 0011) is not obtained without this condition being met, the application must provide a copy of an approved Penn D.O.T. Highway Occupancy Permit and a copy of an approved Penn D.O.T. Traffic Signal Installation Permit, prior to any direct vehicular access to the Carlisle Pike (PA Rt. 0011). (Emphasis added.) Appellants filed an "Application for Appeal of Determination from Zoning Hearing Officer" before the Zoning Hearing Board of Silver Spring Township. On October 4, 2006, the Board issued a written decision which included the following: 5. Whether the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation would or would not issue a permit for a traffic light at the proposed new intersection is irrelevant to the Township's conditional use process. 1 No traffic signal was set out in the application for the conditional use. -2- 06-6372 CIVIL TERM 6. The applicant has failed to establish a vested right in the Conditional Use Permit until he has met all conditions thereof. 7. The applicant has not paid for the cost of installing a traffic light at the intersection. 8. Until the applicant pays for the cost of installing the traffic light, it has not met the conditions of the Conditional Use Permit. 9. The applicant's inability to obtain a Warrant to install a traffic light, does not waive the condition imposed by the Board of Supervisors. 10. The interpretation of the Conditional Use Permit and the conditions attached thereto was consistent with the decision of the Board of Supervisors and with the literal language of the decision. DECISION In view of the foregoing, and having considered the testimony and evidence presented to the Board, it is the opinion of the Board that it was within the discretion of the Zoning Hearing Officer to interpret the Conditional Use Permit, and it is further the opinion of the Board, that he correctly did so. Accordingly, the appeal of Team Rahal should be and is hereby denied. (Emphasis added.) This land use appeal followed. The issues were briefed and argued on February 28, 2007. Initially, appellants maintain that the Zoning Hearing Officer had no authority to interpret the decision granting the conditional use decision by the Board of Supervisors. The intervenor, Township of Silver Spring, responds in its brief as follows: Under Section 614 of the Municipalities Planning Code ("MPC"), 53 P.S. S1 0614, the zoning officer is required to administer the zoning ordinance in accordance with its literal terms, and shall not have the power to permit any construction or any use or change of use which does not conform to the zoning ordinance. The Township Zoning Ordinance states, in Section 700.1.2A, that one of the duties of the zoning officer is "to issue zoning permits for special exception and conditional uses, or for variances after the same have been approved." In addition, Section 701.1.4.B of the township Zoning Ordinance states that "no zoning permit shall be issued except in conformity with: B. any conditions imposed upon the site by the -3- 06-6372 CIVIL TERM Zoning Hearing Board or the Board of Supervisors." It is clear from the above-referenced sections of the Zoning Ordinance that not only does the Zoning Officer have the authority to interpret conditional use decisions, he has the duty to do so in order to determine whether a zoning permit for a conditional use may be issued. Team Rahal argues that only the Board of Supervisors, not the Zoning Officer, has the power to interpret its decisions. Team Rahal's claim is misplaced. We recently addressed this type of issue in Board of Supervisors of Dickinson Township v. Zoning Hearing Board of Dickinson Township, 55 Cumberland L.J. 135 (2006), aff'd _ Commw. Ct. _ (No. 415 C.D. 2006, November 15,2006). In that case, the Dickinson Township zoning officer issued an interpretation of whether a specific use was permitted in a Medium Density Residential Office District under the Dickinson Township zoning ordinance. On an appeal from that interpretation to the Zoning Hearing Board, the Board granted a special exception. Relying on Hopkins v. North Hopewell Township Zoning Hearing Board, 154 Pa. Commw. 376 (1993), we held that the interpretation by the zoning hearing officer was a nullity, and we vacated the order of the Zoning Hearing Board for erroneously granting a special exception which was not properly before it. In Hopkins, an owner submitted an application to a Zoning Hearing Board titled "Request for Interpretation," asking the Board to interpret a section of a zoning ordinance as to whether a tract could be subdivided into six residential lots, and in addition contain a seventh dwelling for use as a "prime farmstead" as that term was defined in the zoning ordinance. The Zoning Hearing Board issued a decision -4- 06-6372 CIVIL TERM interpreting the ordinance as allowing only six single-family detached dwellings and no prime farmstead. The owner filed an appeal. The lower court declined to address the merits and vacated the determination by the Zoning Hearing Board. It concluded that the Board lacked jurisdiction to grant the interpretation. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, stating that the Municipalities Planning Code at 53 P.S. S 10909.1, only provides jurisdiction to a Zoning Hearing Board "to hear and render final adjudications" as set forth in that Section. The Court concluded that the Code does not empower a zoning hearing board to issue an interpretation of a zoning ordinance. In the case sub judice, Section 700.1.2 of the Silver Spring Township Zoning Ordinance sets forth ten duties of the zoning officer. Like the Dickinson Township Zoning Ordinance, it does not authorize the Zoning Officer to issue an interpretation of anythinq. No application for a permit of any kind was pending when the Zoning Hearing Officer, without notice, issued the interpretation dated March 23, 2006. Accordingly, that interpretation is a nullity. There being no authority in the Municipalities Planning Code for a zoning hearing board to issue an interpretation, the decision of the Board dated October 4, 2006, "that it was within the discretion of the Zoning Hearing Officer to interpret the Conditional Use Permit, and it is further the opinion of the Board, that he correctly did so," must be vacated.2 ORDER OF COURT 2 This resolution makes it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by appellants. -5- 06-6372 CIVIL TERM AND NOW, this day of March, 2007, the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Silver Spring Township dated October 4,2006, IS VACATED. -6- 06-6372 CIVIL TERM Richard C. Snelbaker, Esquire For Appellants Silver Spring Township Zoning Hearing Board Steven A. Stine, Esquire For Intervenors :sal By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. -7- TEAM RAHAL OF MECHANICSBURG, INC., AND FERRIS LAND DEVELOPMENT, L.P., APPELLANTS IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP ZONING: HEARING BOARD, APPELLEE V. TOWNSHIP OF SILVER SPRING, INTERVENOR 06-6372 CIVIL TERM IN RE: APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD BEFORE BAYLEY. J. AND HESS. J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of March, 2007, the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Silver Spring Township dated October 4,2006, IS VACATED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Richard C. Snelbaker, Esquire For Appellants Silver Spring Township Zoning Hearing Board Steven A. Stine, Esquire 06-6372 CIVIL TERM For Intervenors :sal -2-