HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0000390-2018
COMMONWEALTH
v.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
JAMES DUANE RUGG CP-21-CR-0390-2018
IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
PLACEY, C.P.J. 10 SEPTEMBER 2018
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action began with a Driving Under the Influence arrest of Defendant
following a traffic stop on December 4, 2017. The traffic stop was performed by a
trooper (Trooper) with the Pennsylvania State Police on York Road, in South Middleton
Township, Cumberland County. The charges were waived to court at the Preliminary
Hearing on February 9, 2018; a seven-count Information was filed on April 4, 2018; and
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on June 4, 2018, alleging that Trooper lacked
both reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop Defendant’s vehicle. A
suppression hearing was held on August 7, 2018, and this Opinion is in support of the
simultaneously filed order.
FACTS FROM HEARING
1. Trooper, a three (3) plus year veteran officer with the Pennsylvania State
Police, was working a midnight shift with his patrol partner on December
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4, 2017, and was traveling northbound in South Middleton Township on
State Route 74, York Road, towards Carlisle Borough.
2. Trooper came upon a Chevrolet Cavalier traveling in that same direction,
at a speed of approximately 26 mph in a 35 mph speed zone.
3. Trooper observed the vehicle’s tires cross the double yellow lines three or
four times.
4. Trooper also observed the vehicle weaving within its own lane and
swerving.
5. A traffic stop of the vehicle was made at approximately 1:44 a.m.
6. Trooper opined that the vehicle was stopped based on his reasonable
suspicion of an impaired driver as evidenced by the vehicle crossing over
the yellow lines multiple times and lack of speed.
7. A mobile video recorder (MVR) recording of the incident was introduced
by the Commonwealth and reviewed in court.
8. The video shows two minutes and seven seconds of Troopers following
the vehicle prior to the activation of the police emergency lights.
9. The MVR reveals the vehicle in question touching the inner line of the
double yellow lines but never crossing over the inner line, never touching
the outer line, nor crossing over both double yellow lines into the
oncoming lane of travel.
10. Trooper’s observation of swerving within the lane of travel and any speed
related issues were not observable in the two-dimensional MVR.
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11. Defendant is charged with the summary traffic offenses of Driving on the
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Right Side of Roadway, Driving on Roadways Laned for Traffic, and
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Careless Driving, in addition to alcohol related offenses and a seat belt
violation.
DISCUSSION
Statement of Law – Cause to stop: The law is clear that “before the government
may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this
intrusion. To hold otherwise would be to give the police absolute, unreviewable
discretion and authority to intrude into an individual's life for no cause whatsoever.”
Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. 1973). The stop justification
standard in an impaired driver situation is found in Section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code
provides that:
\[w\]henever a police officer ... has reasonable suspicion that
a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may
stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of
checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial
responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
number or driver's license, or to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).
“In order to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts
in light of the officer’s experience.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a).
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1).
3
75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(a).
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1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa. 1997)). See also
Commonwealth v. Anthony, 1 A.3d 914, 919 (Pa. Super. 2010), and Commonwealth
v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1203 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Cook for the reasonable
suspicion standard). “Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court must be
an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
stop warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate.” Anthony, 1 A.3d at 919–20 (internal citations, brackets, and quotation
marks omitted).
Section 3301(a) of Title 75, the Vehicle Code (Code), provides for driving on the
right side of the roadway; specifically on “all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall
be driven upon the right half of the roadway” with exceptions for hazards and traffic
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flow. Section 3309(1) of the Code provides for driving within a single lane, in relevant
part, “\[a\] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and
shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement
can be made safely.” As a general rule, the Code requires that any “person who drives
a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless
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driving, a summary offense.” The Code further establishes a violation for driving under
the influence of alcohol or controlled substance that provides, in everyday common
terms, a person may not drive a vehicle after drinking enough alcohol or while actively
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under the influence of drugs such that the person is no longer able to safely drive.
4
75 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a).
5
75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(a).
6
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802.
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A vehicle stop based solely on offenses not “investigable” cannot be justified by
an officer’s mere reasonable suspicion, because the purposes of a Terry stop do not
exist – maintaining the status quo while investigating is inapplicable where there is
nothing further to investigate. An officer must have probable cause to make a
constitutional vehicle stop for such offenses. Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108,
116 (Pa. 2008).
The summary traffic stop case law articulates that probable cause does not
develop where a vehicle crossed the berm line by six to eight inches on two occasions
for a period of a second or two over a distance of approximately one quarter of a mile.
Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983 (Pa. 2001). Indeed, “where a vehicle is
driven outside the lane of traffic for just a momentary period of time and in a minor
manner, a traffic stop is unwarranted.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 859 A.2d 820, 823
(Pa. Super. 2004).
Cause to arrest: Our Superior Court summarized the assessment standard of
probable cause for an arrest in the following principles:
Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and
circumstances within the police officer's knowledge and of
which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by
the person to be arrested. Probable cause justifying a
warrantless arrest is determined by the totality of the
circumstances.
\[…\] It is the facts and circumstances within the personal
knowledge of the police officer that frames the determination
of the existence of probable cause. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 309 A.2d 391, 394 (Pa.1973)
(Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known
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to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that an
offense has been committed.).
Commonwealth v. Weaver, 76 A.3d 562, 565 (Pa. Super. 2013), aff'd, 105 A.3d 656
(Pa. 2014) (most internal citations and all quotation marks omitted).
Application of Law to Facts – Cause to stop: Trooper’s stop of the vehicle for the
reported crossing over the center line is not supported by probable cause because the
evidence does not establish that Defendant’s driving “created a safety hazard.”
Gleason, 785 A.2d at 989. Applying the “momentary and minor” standard of Gleason
to the facts of this case, it is found that probable cause is lacking. See also Garcia, 859
A.2d at 823. The driving within single lane section of the Code requires motorists to
maintain a single lane “as nearly as practicable.” The statutory language does not
foreclose minor deviations from the single lane. Application of the driving on right side
of roadway section provides for exceptions that are not in evidence; additionally, it is
unseen in the video that the vehicle crossed over the double yellow lines; so, these
facts too do not rise to the prerequisite level of probable cause. Commonwealth v.
Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 847-48 (Pa. Super. 2013). No evidence was presented to show
how the vehicle’s lack of being driven at or above the speed limit was in careless
disregard for the safety of persons or property. The facts and circumstances as known
to Trooper and as articulated and shown at the suppression hearing do not warrant
belief that any summary traffic offenses had been committed.
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW, this 10 day of September 2018, upon consideration of the
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, the Commonwealth response thereto, and
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the evidence from the suppression hearing, the Motion is GRANTED. All evidence
obtained subsequent to the vehicle stop is SUPPRESSED.
By the Court,
________________________
Thomas A. Placey C.P.J.
Distribution:
Scott Jocken, Esq.
Joshua Yohe, Esq.
Court Administration
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