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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0003595-2017 COMMONWEALTH v. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT SHAWN DWAYNE NELLONS CP-21-CR-3595-2017 IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT PLACEY, C.P.J. 14 SEPTEMBER 2018 FACTS FROM HEARING This case arises from the execution of a bench warrant on October 5, 2017, for Defendant at the Roadway Inn, located on Hershey Road in Southampton Township, Cumberland County. A Pennsylvania State Police trooper on patrol advised fellow troopers that Defendant had been identified as a person staying at the hotel, which upon check by that trooper found an active bench warrant. Four troopers were dispatched to the hotel for the service of the active warrant. In advance of the execution of the bench warrant, a check of Defendant’s PennDOT photo was made. The troopers then knocked at the hotel room door; Defendant answered and stepped back; the troopers entered; one trooper asked if Defendant was “Shawn” to which troopers received a positive response; a trooper told Defendant he was under arrest for the active bench warrant, and had Defendant turn around and handcuffed him. CR-3595-2017 Simultaneously, upon entering the room trooper observed a dresser next to the door that had a plate containing a white powdery substance and three (3) razor blades; a night stand between the two beds had a drawer open and multiple small zip lock baggies were seen that contained a white powdery substance and a smoking device; there was also a back pack with the contents spread across the bed that included cash, a scale, smoking device and more zip lock baggies. Defendant was searched incident to arrest, which uncovered no additional contraband items; however, in a dresser located within two feet of Defendant was a loaded twenty-two (.22) revolver. All the above items of were seized and removed with the arrest of Defendant. Defense’s Motion asserts that the law enforcement officers did not have a valid search warrant, nor did they attempt to secure one. Further, it is posited that a valid search incident to arrest would not allow the law enforcement officers to search inside the contents of the room, and that there were no exigent circumstances justifying a search without a warrant. This Opinion is in support of the Order denying relief on the Motion to Suppress. DISCUSSION Statement of Law: “In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). “In 1914, th\[e United States Supreme\] Court first acknowledged in dictum “the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 2 CR-3595-2017 The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine has an ancient pedigree. Well before the Nation's founding, it was recognized that officers carrying out a lawful arrest had the authority to make a warrantless search of the arrestee's person. An 18th-century manual for justices of the peace provides a representative picture of usual practice shortly before the Fourth Amendment's adoption: “\[A\] thorough search of the felon is of the utmost consequence to your own safety, and the benefit of the public, as by this means he will be deprived of instruments of mischief, and evidence may probably be found on him sufficient to convict him, of which, if he has either time or opportunity allowed him, he will besure \[sic\] to find some means to get rid of.” The Conductor Generalis 117 (J. Parker ed. 1788) (reprinting S. Welch, Observations on the Office of Constable 19 (1754)). One Fourth Amendment historian has observed that, prior to American independence, “\[a\]nyone arrested could expect that not only his surface clothing but his body, luggage, and saddlebags would be searched and, perhaps, his shoes, socks, and mouth as well.” W. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning: 602–1791, p. 420 (2009). No historical evidence suggests that the Fourth Amendment altered the permissible bounds of arrestee searches. On the contrary, legal scholars agree that “the legitimacy of body searches as an adjunct to the arrest process had been thoroughly established in colonial times, so much so that their constitutionality in 1789 cannot be doubted.” Id. at 752. Birchfield v. North Dakota, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2174–2175(2016) (some internal quotations and citations omitted). If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339, (2009). Merely arresting someone does not give police carte blanche to search any property belonging to the arrestee. Certainly, a police officer may search the arrestee's person and the area in which the person is detained in order to prevent the arrestee from obtaining weapons or destroying evidence, but otherwise, absent an exigency, the arrestee's privacy interests remain intact as against a warrantless search. In short, there is 3 CR-3595-2017 no justifiable search incident to arrest under the Pennsylvania Constitution save for the search of the person and the immediate area which the person occupies during his custody, as stated above. Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995). Application of Law to Facts: The facts show that immediately upon the troopers entry, in unobstructed view and readily perceptible, were illegal substances and drug paraphernalia. Within feet of Defendant, in a drawer, was a loaded firearm that was located quickly upon perfunctory inspection of the immediate area. All of this was done in a motel room; the space by its very nature is compact and utilitarian. There is no indication that the troopers loitered about to extend their arrest and protective sweep purpose. The troopers went to the motel and into the room; they demonstrated control by their mere presence and maintained that control over the room only long enough to safely effectuate the arrest. The unfruitful search of the person is obviously lawful. So is the seizure of the readily recognizable contraband items left out in the open, as turning a blind eye to criminal activity when conducting an arrest has never been a legal requirement. The search of the drawer within two-feet of the Defendant is also lawful as it is part of the area occupied by and accessible to the Defendant. The fact that Defendant was handcuffed is of no moment as the relevant inquiry requires no possibility of access; handcuffs only impair opportunity to access. As a practical matter, incident to an arrest an officer could and should, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look briefly in any bathroom, closet, and more unequivocally to other spaces in the immediate area the arrest location from where a 4 CR-3595-2017 weapon could be retrieved, as was done here, or from which an attack could be immediately launched. ORDER OF COURT th And now, this 14 day of September 2018, upon review of the Motion to Suppress, the Answer thereto, and consideration of the hearing testimony, the Motion is DENIED. By the Court, ________________________ Thomas A. Placey C.P.J. Distribution: Jennifer Robinson, Esq. Stacy B. Wolf, Esq. Court Administrator 5