HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0000095-2018
IN RE: : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
COMMONWEALTH :
: CRIMINAL DIVISION
v. :
: TRIAL COURT NO. CP-21-CR-95-2018
CANDY T. MARTIN : SUPERIOR COURT NO. 1420 MDA 2018
OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925
Peck, J., November 6, 2018 –
FINDINGS OF FACT & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 11, 2018, a jury found Appellant guilty of one count of Simple Assault,
and this Court found Appellant guilty of two summary offenses—one count of
1
Harassment and one count of Criminal Mischief. The incident underlying Appellant’s
offenses occurred on June 24, 2017 in Carlisle Borough, Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth’s evidence to support the charges was as follows:
Deborah Baker (“Victim”) testified that she shares an apartment with Kim Taylor,
2
Appellant’s former husband (“Mr. Taylor”). On June 24, 2017, Victim was “sitting on
\[the\] couch watching a movie” while Mr. Taylor went downstairs with his daughter to
3
retrieve a bicycle Mr. Taylor was storing for her. Victim testified, “the next thing I
4
know, \[Appellant\] entered my home without my permission.” Victim then repeatedly
told Appellant to “get out,” testifying that she did not wish to speak to Appellant because
5
she “knew things would start.” When Appellant did not leave, Victim “took her by the
6
arm and gently guided her to \[the\] door, showed her the exit,” and said “get out.”
1
The trial concluded on May 10, 2018. The jury deliberated and returned a verdict on May 11, 2018. See
Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Jury Trial, May 10, 2018, at 31 (Peck, J.) (hereinafter “N.T. at ___”);
Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Jury Trial, May 11, 2018 (Peck, J.).
2
N.T. at 31.
3
N.T. at 33.
4
Id.
5
Id. Victim explained, “that’s how \[Appellant\] and her daughters are, they would provoke, say
derogatory things, use profanity, and want to start fights every time.” Id.
6
Id.
7
Victim testified that at that point, “the attack started.” When she began guiding
Appellant to the door, Appellant began attacking her, and eventually “grabbed \[her\]
glasses, scratched \[her\] face,” and “\[g\]ot \[her\] against the window where the AC was”
8
located. Victim explained that she began “squeezing” Appellant to free herself, but
Appellant “kept hitting, punching, \[and\] shoving,” eventually pulling the blinds off the
9
window. Finally, while Victim was still telling Appellant to leave the apartment and let
her go, the air conditioning unit fell out of the second-story window and onto the
10
sidewalk. Victim testified that she believed Appellant was going to push her out of the
11
window. Eventually, Mr. Taylor evidently heard the yelling, returned to the apartment,
12
broke apart the fight, and successfully asked Appellant to leave. Victim suffered
13
scratches and a black eye after her “glasses were punched off \[her\] face.”
Mr. Taylor testified that when Appellant walked up the sidewalk to enter the
14
apartment, he was outside playing with his granddaughter and daughter. Both Mr.
15
Taylor and his daughter urged Appellant not to go into the apartment, because, “right
16
away,” he thought, “oh here it comes, here it goes.” Appellant went into the apartment
anyway, and Mr. Taylor testified, “the next thing you know, I hear \[Victim\] hollering,
17
\[‘\]get out,\[’\] and the air conditioner came out the window.” When Mr. Taylor went into
the apartment, Appellant had Victim “against the window and the wall,” Victim was
18
holding onto Appellant’s shirt, and Mr. Taylor “split them up.”
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
N.T. at 34.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
N.T. at 42.
14
N.T. at 65.
15
Mr. Taylor’s daughter is also Appellant’s daughter. N.T. at 65, 88.
16
N.T. at 66.
17
N.T. at 65.
18
N.T. at 66. Victim testified that she was holding onto Appellant when Mr. Taylor arrived because
Appellant said she was going to push Victim out of the window, and Victim felt that if Appellant was
going to push her out of the window, then Appellant would be “going right along with \[her\].” N.T. at 59.
2
Patrolman Christopher Miller of the Carlisle Police Department investigated after
19
Victim called 911. The Commonwealth showed the jury Patrolman Miller’s photos,
evidencing Victim’s arm and facial injuries, her broken glasses, blinds, and air
20
conditioning unit, as well as Appellant’s scratched hand.
The defense produced one witness—Appellant. She testified that she entered the
apartment to speak with Victim despite Mr. Taylor’s and her daughter’s urging that she
21
not do so, because she “had no reason to think that there would be a fight.” She testified
that when she dropped off her daughter to retrieve the bicycle, she believed it would be
the “perfect opportunity to ask \[Victim\] what she wanted” because Victim had called her
22
on the phone some days prior. According to Appellant, Victim had called her on two
prior occasions while intoxicated, and therefore Appellant hoped to speak with Victim
23
while Victim was sober. Cross-examination created some question as to Appellant’s
actual reason for entering Victim’s apartment; at that time, Appellant testified she wanted
24
information about her children that Victim could offer.
Appellant testified that she “calmly went up the steps,” walked into the apartment,
25
and asked why Victim had called her. Appellant stated that immediately upon arrival,
before she could finish her sentence, Victim “jumped up off the couch, came toward \[her\]
26
screaming” to get out of the apartment, and “grabbed ahold” of Appellant. Appellant’s
version of events from this moment forward varies dramatically from Victim’s version.
Appellant explained that she tried pushing Victim off of her, but Victim “still had ahold
27
of \[her\] like she was going to strike \[her\],” and the pair ended up at the window.
Appellant testified that she did not know if Victim ever actually struck her, because “it
19
N.T. at 34, 76.
20
See Commonwealth’s Exhibit Nos. 2-13. With respect to Appellant’s scratched hand, Appellant
testified she did not know if she obtained the scratch from the window blinds or from picking blackberries
earlier in the day with her granddaughter. N.T. at 93.
21
N.T. at 88.
22
Id.
23
N.T. at 87.
24
N.T. at 101-03.
25
N.T. at 88-89.
26
N.T. at 89.
27
Id.
3
28
happened so fast.” Appellant said that she never struck Victim, and only pushed Victim
off of her, explaining that she “would never break \[their\] bond” and thereby be out of the
29
loop of information about her children.
In summary, Victim’s and Appellant’s testimony both described Appellant
entering Victim’s apartment evidently against Victim’s wishes, Victim immediately
30
shouting at Appellant to leave, and Victim escorting Appellant to the door. Victim
31
testified that Appellant then began attacking her; Appellant testified that Victim
32
appeared to attempt striking her or perhaps did strike her.
Based on the foregoing evidence, on May 11, 2018, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty on Count 1, Simple Assault, a second-degree misdemeanor, and this Court entered
a verdict of guilty on the two summary offenses—Count II, Harassment, and Count III,
33
Criminal Mischief. On July 3, 2018, following receipt of a presentence investigation
report, this Court sentenced Appellant as follows: on Count I, Appellant was ordered to
pay a fine of $300, pay restitution in the amount of $244 to Victim, undergo two years of
supervised probation, and have no contact with Victim; Appellant was further ordered to
34
pay the costs of prosecution on all counts for which she was convicted.
On July 13, 2018, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion to vacate her
convictions or grant a new trial, alleging that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence on the ground that “the evidence proved that \[Appellant\] was not the initial
aggressor in the incident and that any injuries to \[Victim\] or damage to her property that
35
resulted from the altercation were the result of \[Appellant\] acting in self-defense.” This
36
Court denied the Motion on August 3, 2018. On August 28, 2018, Appellant filed a
28
N.T. at 91.
29
N.T. at 94.
30
N.T. at 33, 89.
31
N.T. at 33-34.
32
N.T. at 89.
33
See Order of Court, In Re: Verdict/Defendant Found Guilty/Appear for Sentence, May 14, 2018 (Peck,
J.).
34
Order of Court, In Re: Sentence, July 3, 2018 (Peck, J.).
35
See Def.’s Post-Sentence Motion, July 13, 2018.
36
Order of Court, In Re: Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motion, August 3, 2018 (Peck, J.).
4
37
Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court. On August 28, 2018, this Court directed
38
Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal. In her
Concise Statement of Errors, Appellant complains:
1. The jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence and
shocked one’s sense of justice because the evidence proved
that \[Appellant\] was not the initial aggressor in the incident
and that any injuries to \[Victim\] or damage to her property
that resulted from the altercation were the result of
\[Appellant\] acting in self-defense.
2. The trial court abused its discretion when it provided the self-
defense instruction to the jury by including instructions found
under subsection 1(b) dealing with “Rules Regarding Use of
Force in Specific Situations” found in section 9.501 of the
Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury
39
Instructions.
This Court offers this Opinion, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), in support of its
judgment.
DISCUSSION
a. Weight of the Evidence
Appellant first argues that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence
with respect to the only Count for which the jury was responsible for delivering a
verdict—Simple Assault. When reviewing weight of the evidence claims, the standard of
review is as follows:
A challenge to the weight of the evidence is directed to the
discretion of the trial judge, who heard the same evidence and
who possesses only narrow authority to upset a jury verdict. The
trial judge may not grant relief based merely on some conflict in
testimony or because the judge would reach a different
conclusion on the same facts. Relief on a weight of the evidence
claim is reserved for extraordinary circumstances, when the
jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s
sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that
right may be given another opportunity to prevail.
37
Def.’s Notice of Appeal, August 28, 2018.
38
Order of Court, August 28, 2018 (Peck, J.).
39
Def.’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, September 17, 2018.
5
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 39 (Pa. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has noted, “the jury . . . may choose
to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Id.
Title 18, Section 2701 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides, in relevant part:
“\[a\] person is guilty of assault if he . . . attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a). The jury received oral
and written jury instructions defining the elements of simple assault, in accord with the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code’s statutory definitions and the Pennsylvania Suggested
40
Standard Criminal Jury Instructions. The jury received oral and written instructions on
41
justification as a defense. The jury further received extensive instructions with respect
42
to judging the credibility of witnesses. Accordingly, the jury was equipped to make
credibility determinations, judge the evidence on its own, and was free to “choose to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Sanchez, 36 A.3d at 39. The Commonwealth
presented evidence of all elements of Simple Assault that the jury obviously weighed in
favor of the Commonwealth.
Appellant contends that “any injuries to \[Victim\] or damage to her property that
43
resulted from the altercation were the result of \[Appellant\] acting in self-defense.” As
detailed supra, the Commonwealth’s evidence detailed the altercation contrary to
Appellant’s version of the events. Victim testified that when Appellant appeared at
44
Victim’s apartment, Victim immediately told her to leave and led Appellant to the door.
45
At that point, Appellant began attacking her. Victim further testified that from that
moment until Mr. Taylor came back into the apartment to break up the altercation,
Appellant scratched Victim’s face, pushed her up against the window, damaged her
40
N.T. at 113-16; Court’s Exhibit No. 1, Written Jury Instructions. The jury was instructed according to
the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, sections 15.2701B (simple assault) and
15.2701A (criminal attempt), which track 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (bodily injury), 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a)
(attempt), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(1)-(3) (levels of mens rea).
41
N.T. 116-19, 135-49; Court’s Exhibit No. 1, Written Jury Instructions.
42
N.T. at 110-12.
43
Def.’s Concise Statement of the Errors Complained of on Appeal, September 17, 2018.
44
N.T. at 33.
45
Id.
6
blinds, pushed her air conditioning unit out of the window, and punched her glasses off of
46
her face. Victim additionally testified that she continued to shout at Appellant to leave
the apartment while she was being attacked, and was nearly pushed out of the window
4748
until Mr. Taylor appeared. Photos of her injuries were shown to the jury.
This Court instructed the jury extensively regarding legal justification and how to
apply that doctrine to the facts such that Appellant might be found not guilty by reason of
49
acting in self-defense. This Court gave the jury both written and oral instructions
according to the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, which
informed the jury that, after Appellant raised the issue at trial, “it is the Commonwealth’s
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in justifiable
50
self-defense.” The jury instructions regarding self-defense included, in relevant part:
1. If the defendant only used non-deadly force during the
incident in question, the Commonwealth may prove that this use
of force was not justified if it can show, beyond a reasonable
doubt, any of the following elements:
a. That the defendant did not reasonably believe that it
was immediately necessary for her to use force to
protect herself against the unlawful use of force by
DEBORAH BAKER. . . .
b. That, (i) in the same encounter with DEBORAH
BAKER, the defendant engaged in conduct that
demonstrated her intent to use unlawful force
against the alleged victim, and, (ii) by that conduct,
she provoked the use of force against herself. . . .
c. That the defendant used force to resist force used by
the occupier of property, where the defendant knew
that the person they were resisting was acting under
a claim of right to the property, and that her
resistance was not authorized by law. A defendant is
authorized to use force in such a circumstance if:
46
Id.
47
N.T. at 34.
48
See Commonwealth’s Exhibit Nos. 2-13.
49
N.T. at 116-19, 135-49; Court’s Exhibit No. 1, Written Jury Instructions.
50
See, e.g., N.T. at 108-10.
7
(i) she is a public officer or a person assisting a
public officer . . . or a person making or
assisting in a lawful arrest;
(ii) she has been unlawfully dispossessed of the
property and is making a justified re-entry of
it under the law; or
(iii) she reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to protect herself from deadly
51
force by another.
The jury’s verdict was not “so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice.” See Sanchez, 36 A.3d at 39. With respect to whether Appellant acted in self-
defense during the altercation, the Commonwealth presented evidence that it was
52
Appellant who attacked Victim when Victim attempted to escort Appellant to the door.
Furthermore, even if the jury credited Appellant’s testimony that she believed Victim was
going to hit her when Victim approached, the jury was free to find, in accord with Part
1(a) of the jury instructions, that “the defendant did not reasonably believe that it was
immediately necessary for her to use force to protect herself” before attacking Victim.
The jury was additionally free to find, in accord with Part 1(b) of the jury instructions,
that even if Victim did use force at some point, that Appellant “provoked the use of force
against herself” through the use of unlawful force, as supported by the Commonwealth’s
evidence that Appellant first attacked Victim by hitting, punching, and shoving once
53
Victim attempted to escort Appellant from the home. Finally, the jury was free to find,
in accord with Part 1(c) of the jury instructions, that Appellant used force unlawfully via
resisting force used by the occupier of property (in this case, the altercation occurred
inside Victim’s apartment) without, for example, reasonable belief that force was
necessary. All of these conclusions were supported by the Commonwealth’s evidence.
Appellant contends that the guilty verdict was against the weight of the evidence
on grounds that the evidence showed that Victim was the initial aggressor and Appellant
51
N.T. at 135-39; Court’s Exhibit No. 1, Written Jury Instructions.
52
N.T. at 33-34.
53
N.T. at 34.
8
54
acted in self-defense. Appellant did, in fact, testify that she believed Victim was about
55
to hit her, which prompted her to grab Victim and attempt to push Victim off of her.
However, the Commonwealth presented contrary evidence that Appellant was the first
aggressor when she attacked Victim upon her entrance, punched, scratched, and bruised
56
Victim, and caused damage to various items of the Victim’s property.
It was not within this Court’s power to take a different view of the evidence than
the jury, based merely on “some conflict in testimony.” Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946
A.2d 645, 653 (Pa. 2008). It is the jury’s sole province to weigh the evidence and assess
credibility for itself. Id. In Commonwealth v. Reynolds, Appellant challenged numerous
convictions, including Simple Assault, arising out of an altercation outside of a bar.
Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 725 (Pa. Super. 2003). Appellant claimed,
inter alia, that his verdicts were against the weight of the evidence given his justification
defense. Id. at 731. The Commonwealth’s evidence “painted a picture of Appellant
pulling a gun on the victims, holding the gun to the victims’ faces, and threatening their
lives,” while Appellant’s evidence “painted a picture of aggression by the two victims.”
Id. The Superior Court disposed of Appellant’s claim as follows: “Appellant essentially
argues that the jury should have believed his testimony and the testimony of his wife,
rather than the testimony of the Commonwealth witnesses.” Id. at 732. The court
reasoned, as this Court has herein, that “the jury is free to disbelieve all of the defense’s
testimony, and is free to believe all of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses . .
. \[and thereby\] resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” Id.
As in Reynolds, here Appellant’s jury was tasked with crediting either Appellant’s
57
or Victim’s version of events as to whether Appellant attacked Victim or if Appellant
58
was acting in self-defense. In this case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Victim’s
version, and such a conclusion was not against the weight of the evidence.
54
Def.’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, September 17, 2018.
55
N.T. at 89.
56
N.T. at 33-34.
57
See, e.g., N.T. at 33.
58
See, e.g., N.T. at 89-90.
9
b. Self-defense Jury Instruction
Appellant additionally contends that this Court abused its discretion by giving the
jury an instruction provided by the “Rules Regarding Use of Force in Specific Situations”
portion of Section 9.501 of the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury
59
Instructions. The jury instructions regarding self-defense, excerpted and reproduced in
this Opinion supra, provided the jury with three theories by which the Commonwealth
could prove that Appellant lacked justification in her conduct. The first two theories, with
60
which Appellant takes no issue, are lack of reasonable belief of immediate danger and
61
provocation. The theory of culpability that Appellant argues was erroneously given to
the jury provided that “the Commonwealth may prove that . . . force was not justified if it
can show, beyond a reasonable doubt:
c. That the defendant used force to resist force used by the
occupier of property, where the defendant knew that the
person they were resisting was acting under a claim of right to
the property, and that her resistance was not authorized by
law. A defendant is authorized to use force in such a
circumstance if:
(i) she is a public officer or a person assisting a
public officer . . . or a person making or
assisting in a lawful arrest;
(ii) she has been unlawfully dispossessed of the
property and is making a justified re-entry of it
under the law; or
(iii) she reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to protect herself from deadly force
62
by another.”
59
Def.’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, September 17, 2018 (“The trial court
abused its discretion when it provided the self-defense instruction to the jury by including instructions
found under subsection 1(b) dealing with ‘Rules Regarding Use of Force in Specific Situations’ found in
section 9.501 of the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions.”); Court’s Exhibit No.
1, Part 1(c); Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions § 9.501, Rules Regarding Use
of Force in Specific Situations, 1.b.
60
N.T. 116-19; Court’s Exhibit No. 1, 9.501, Part 1(a).
61
N.T. 116-19; Court’s Exhibit No. 1, 9.501, Part 1(b).
62
N.T. 135-39, Court’s Exhibit No. 1, 9.501, Part 1(c). After the jury received all oral instructions and
was about to be sent for deliberations, the Commonwealth requested that an additional, third theory be
added to the instructions to prove Appellant lacked justification. N.T. at 122. At sidebar, the
10
The standard of review for jury instructions provides:
\[T\]he court must review the jury charge as a whole to determine
if it is fair and complete. A trial court has broad discretion in
phrasing its charge and can choose its own wording so long as
the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the
jury for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of
discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible
error.
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 511 (Pa. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
The provision at issue tracks the language, almost verbatim, of 18 Pa.C.S. §
505(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(C)—the statutory authority for use of force in self-protection. See 18
Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(C). The instruction provides that force is unjustifiable “to
resist force used by the occupier of property, where the defendant knew that the person
they were resisting was acting under a claim of right to the property,” unless one of the
63
enumerated exceptions applies. Both the Commonwealth and Appellant presented
evidence to support the instruction. See Commonwealth v. McClain, 587 A.2d 798, 804
(Pa. Super. 1991) (noting that “the primary duty of a trial judge in charging a jury is to
clearly and adequately explain the principles of law that are supported by the evidence
introduced at trial”).
64
Appellant and Victim testified that Appellant entered Victim’s home, with
Victim being an occupier and possessor of her property at the time of the altercation.
Whether Appellant knew that Victim was using force under a claim of right to the
property was borne out by testimony from Appellant and Victim that Victim attempted to
physically remove Appellant from the home, though each described wildly varying
Commonwealth requested that the self-defense instruction reproduced above be included. N.T. at 122-24.
Defense counsel objected to its inclusion, arguing that this third theory is applicable only where the
defendant and victim are in a dispute over the land itself. N.T. at 125. This Court determined that the
instruction was applicable, and read all justification instructions to the jury a second time—this time
including the third theory, as included in the Court’s Exhibit No. 1. N.T. 122-39.
63
See Court’s Exhibit No. 1, 9.501, Part 1(c); Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury
Instructions § 9.501, Rules Regarding Use of Force in Specific Situations, 1(b). See also 18 Pa.C.S. §
505(b)(1)(ii)(A)-(C).
64
N.T. at 33, 89.
11
65
degrees of force and points of contact. Additionally, Appellant, Victim, and Mr. Taylor
66
each testified that Victim repeatedly shouted at Appellant to get out of the apartment.
The evidence showed that Victim did not invite, welcome, or want Appellant in her
6768
home, and that Victim sought to expel Appellant from her home. Victim, particularly,
testified at length that she was attempting to guide Appellant to the door to remove her
69
from the apartment. The instruction at issue, therefore, applied.
Appellant then had to prove one of the exceptions to the rule applied, here, most
appropriately, that “she believe\[d\] that such force \[was\] necessary to protect \[herself\]
70
from deadly force by another.” Appellant did evidently attempt to defend the charge on
this basis, testifying that any physical contact she had with Victim was limited to pushing
71
Victim in order to protect herself from what she believed was going to be an attack.
However, as discussed supra, the jury appears to have credited Victim’s testimony
72
instead of Appellant’s on this point.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the weight of the evidence
supported the jury’s guilty verdict for Simple Assault, and that this Court did not err in
instructing the jury on justification regarding the occupier or possessor of property from
the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions.
BY THE COURT,
Christylee L. Peck, J.
65
See N.T. at 33 (“I took her by her arm and gently guided her to my door.”); cf. 89 (“\[She\] came toward
me screaming, get out of my house . . . \[and\] grabbed ahold of me and she started what I thought might
have been striking me.”).
66
N.T. at 33, 66, 96.
67
N.T. at 33, 66, 96.
68
N.T. at 33, 66, 96.
69
N.T. at 33.
70
N.T. at 135-39; Court’s Exhibit No. 1, 9.501, Part 1(c)(iii).
71
N.T. at 89, 91, 94.
72
See, e.g., N.T. at 33 (“She started pushing. She started shoving. She started grabbing.”).
12
Courtney Hair LaRue, Esq.
Assistant District Attorney
Christopher McCabe, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
13