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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2017-7688 MARY STRANGE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA V. : : FORD MOTOR COMPANY, : DEFENDANT : 17-07688 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE MASLAND, J., PECK, J., AND BREWBAKER, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Masland, J., March 15, 2019:-- Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant, Ford Motor Company. Following briefing by the parties and argument before a panel of judges, that Motion will be granted in part and denied in part. This dispute arises from the purchase by Plaintiff, Mary Strange, of a new vehicle from Defendant. Plaintiff claims that, shortly after the purchase, the vehicle began to exhibit manufacturing defects relating to the transmission. She returned to the dealership to repair this no less than three times within the first year and a half of her ownership of the vehicle. The dealership was never able to fully rectify Plaintiff’s concerns about the vehicle. Plaintiff subsequently sold the vehicle and now brings claims based on a breach of warranty and the Pennsylvania Lemon Law. Additionally, she seeks damages under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). 17-07688 CIVIL TERM I. Discussion Summary judgment is appropriate when, after the pleadings are closed, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action which could not be established by additional discovery. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035.2. In summary judgment cases, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party. See Kemp v. Oldham Saw Co., No. 3620, LEXIS 489 (Pa. C.P. 2006) citing Al's Cafe v. Sanders Ins. Agency, 820 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2003). However, to avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party must not rely on “mere allegations or denials of the pleadings” but must instead identify “one or more issues of fact arising from evidence in the record.” Swords v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 883 A.2d 562, 566-67 (Pa. 2005). “Where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment may be entered.” Babb v. Ctr. Cmty. Hosp., 47 A.3d 1214 (Pa. Super. 2012). The failure of the responding party to identify specific facts in the record can establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A. Lemon Law Claim We briefly note that the remedy available to Plaintiff under the Lemon Law is the repurchase or replacement of the defective vehicle. Here, Plaintiff concedes that she cannot recover under the Lemon Law as she has already traded in the alleged vehicle -2- 17-07688 CIVIL TERM for $11,000. Accordingly, we will grant summary judgment as to Count I of the Complaint. B. Breach of Warranty Defendant argues Plaintiff’s Breach of Warranty claim must fail as there is no evidence of an unrepaired factory defect or evidence of damages. Plaintiff responds that she has raised a triable issue of fact regarding the reasonableness of Defendant’s attempts to fix the defect in her vehicle. In support of her position she relies on the pleadings and an expert report prepared by Jason E. Jones of Northeast Auto Inspection Services. She also notes Defendant voluntarily extended the warranty for her vehicle’s transmission control module, stating “\[y\]our vehicle may exhibit symptoms of intermittent loss of transmission engagement while driving, no-start, or lack of power, usually accompanied by an illuminated Service Engine Soon indicator on the instrument cluster.” Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A. As such, she alleges Defendant was aware of the manufacturing defect in her vehicle. The Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act provides that if a consumer purchases a good with a warranty, and during that warranty period a warrantable defect arises that cannot be fixed in a reasonable amount of time, the consumer is entitled to damages. Chatlos System v. NCR Corp., Inc., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). A plaintiff must show that the good did not conform to the warranty and that the manufacturer was unable to fix the defect within a reasonable time. Notably, the Act does not define what constitutes a reasonable amount of time. -3- 17-07688 CIVIL TERM Here, Plaintiff alleges she brought her vehicle in for repair at least three times within fourteen months and Defendant was never able to remedy the problem with her vehicle. Based on the information in the record we cannot determine whether this was unreasonable as a matter of law. Instead, this presents a question of fact to be determined at trial. Accordingly, we will deny the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II. C. Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Claim Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim for treble damages pursuant to the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) must fail because Plaintiff has produced no evidence of fraud or deception or that Defendant did not comply with the terms of the warranty. Plaintiff maintains the claim should survive summary judgment because Defendant continued to market and sell a vehicle with a known defect. To state a claim under the UTPCPL, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Relevant here, “\[f\]ailing to comply with the terms of any written guarantee or warranty given to the buyer at, prior to or after a contract for the purchase of goods or services is made” constitutes such a practice. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xiv). The Law also has a catch- all provision wherein “\[e\]ngaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding” also constitutes such a practice. 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi). -4- 17-07688 CIVIL TERM Plaintiff argues that by failing to repair her vehicle within a reasonable amount of time, Defendant did not comply with the terms of the warranty. She also argues that by continuing to market a vehicle with a known defect, Defendant engaged in fraudulent or deceptive conduct. We disagree. Plaintiff has adduced no evidence to establish that Defendant’s attempts to repair her vehicle were not good faith attempts to comply with the warranty. Further, there is no evidence of fraud or deception. Instead, the record suggests that upon discovery of a known defect in the transmission of its vehicle, Defendant extended warranty protections in an attempt to ameliorate the problem. The conduct Plaintiff alleges simply does not give rise to a claim under the UTPCPL and does not justify the award of treble damages. Defendant’s Motion Summary Judgment as to Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint will be granted. II. Conclusion In sum, Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to the viability of her claim for Breach of Warranty. However, she has failed to do so as to the UTPCPL claim and she has conceded her Lemon Law Claim. For these reasons, we will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts I and IV and deny the Motion in all other respects. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of March, 2019, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Response thereto, and after -5- 17-07688 CIVIL TERM briefing and argument before a panel of judges, the Motion is GRANTED as to Counts I and IV of the Complaint. It is DENIED in all other respects. By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. David J. Gorberg, Esquire For Plaintiff Megan C. Pear, Esquire For Defendant -6- MARY STRANGE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PLAINTIFF : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA V. : : FORD MOTOR COMPANY, : DEFENDANT : 17-07688 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE MASLAND, J., PECK, J., AND BREWBAKER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of March, 2019, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Response thereto, and after briefing and argument before a panel of judges, the Motion is GRANTED as to Counts I and IV of the Complaint. It is DENIED in all other respects. By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. David J. Gorberg, Esquire 103 Sibley Avenue Ardmore, PA 19003 For Plaintiff Megan C. Pear, Esquire 213 Yates Avenue Woodlyn, PA 19094 For Defendant