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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-1897 criminalCOMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Ve DANIEL E. BELL IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-1897 CRIMINAL TERM CHARGE: (1) DUI (2) DRIVING WHILE OPERATING PRIVILEGE IS SUSPENDED OR REVOKED (SUM.) (DUI-related) (3) ALTERED, FORGED, OR COUNTERFEIT DOCUMENTS & PLATES IN RE: DEFENDANT'S POST SENTENCE MOTIONS FOR ACQUITTAL AND IN ARREST OF JUDGMV. NT BEFORE GUIDO, J. AND NOW, ORDER day of JULY, 1998, Defendant's Post Sentence Motions For Acquittal and in Arrest of Judgment are DENIED. By the C Edward E. Guido, J. Mary Jo Mullen, Esquire District Attorney's Office Austin F. Grogan, Esquire For the Defendant :sld COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Ve DANIEL E. BELL IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-1897 CRIMINAL TERM CHARGE: (1) DUI (2) DRIVING WHILE OPERATING PRIVILEGE IS SUSPENDED OR REVOKED (SUM.) (DUI-related) (3) ALTERED, FORGED, OR COUNTERFEIT DOCUMENTS & PLATES IN RE: DEFENDANT'S POST SENTENCE MOTIONS FOR ACQUITTAL AND IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT BEFORE GUI DO, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT On August 14, 1997, Defendant was arrested and charged with the above listed offenses. After a non-jury trial held before this Court on February 23, 1998, Defendant was found guilty of violating Sections 3731 and 7122 of the Vehicle Code. (75 Pa. C.S.A. §3731 and §7122). Sentence was imposed on March 24, 1998. Defendant filed timely post trial motions. The only issue raised by Defendant is whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth is sufficient to sustain his conviction under Section 7122 of the Vehicle Code~ For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the motions are denied. ~Section 7122 reads in relevant part: A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree if the person, with fraudulent intent: (3) has possession of, sells or attempts to sell, uses or dispJ, ays a certificate of title, registration card or plate, driver's license, inspection certificate, proof of insurance or any othor documont issuod by the dopartment, knowing it to have been al%ered, forged or counterfeited. (emphasis added) NO. 97-1897 CRIMINAL TERM FACTUAL BACKGROUND At trial, the Commonwealth's only witness was Sergeant Hope of the Camp Hill Police Department. The Sergeant testified that he stopped the Defendant as a result of erratic driving. (N.T. 7). The Officer asked Defendant for "his registration." (N.T.7) The Officer immediately noticed that the inspection sticker on the windshield of Defendant's vehicle had been altered. (N.T. 8). The numeral 1 had been changed to a 12, in an obvious attempt to extend the validity of the sticker from January of 1997, to December of 1997. (N.T.7-8). DISCUSSION In determining whether the evidence is sufficient, we must view it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Com. v. Green, 464 Pa. 557, 347 A.2d 682 (1975). We must then determine whether such evidence and all reasonable inferences deductible therefrom are sufficient to establish the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Com. v. Williams, 468 Pa. 357, 362 a.2d 244 (1976). In the instant case, the Commonwealth introduced the inspection sticker into evidence as its Exhibit 1. The fact that it had been tampered with was obvious. Anyone occupying the driver's seat of the vehicle, (even someone in Defendant's inebriated condition) could not help but notice that the sticker had been altered. Furthermore, there is no logica~ reason to display the altered sticker on the windshield other than to NO. 97-1897 CRIMINAL TERM mislead the law enforcement authorities into believing that it was still valid. Therefore, we have no hesitation in concluding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant by operating a vehicle with an obviously altered inspection sticker, knowingly displayed the sticker with fraudulent intent. The Defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to offer any evidence that he was the owner of the vehicle. Therefore, he concludes, it has failed to prove that he knew the sticker was altered or that he displayed it with fraudulent intent. For the reasons set forth above, we do not believe that proof of Defendant's ownership of the vehicle is necessary to sustain the conviction. However, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to establish the fact that Defendant did, in fact, own the vehicle upon which the altered sticker was displayed. The record indicates that the Sergeant asked Defendant for "his registration," which he produced. (N.T.7). In addition, both the District Attorney in her questioning, and the officer in his responses, referred to the car as "Defendant's vehicle," without objection by Defense Counsel. (N.T.8). These facts simply bolster our conclusion that there is ample evidence to sustain the conviction. Therefore, Defendant's Post Trial Motions are DENIED. NO. 97-1897 CRIMINAL TERM AND NOW, this ORDER day of JULY, 1998, Defendant's Post Sentence Motions For Acquittal and in Arrest of Judgment are DENIED. By the Court, Mary Jo Mullen, Esquire District Attorney's Office Austin F. Grogan, Esquire For the Defendant :sld /s/ Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J.