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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-6727 civilKAREN FLICKINGER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KRISTINA R. FEHRENBACH, DECEASED, & CLIFFORD C. FEHRENBACH, Plaintiffs Ve : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA SARAH R. CHAPMAN, ROCK CHAPMAN, DENNIS JAMES WONDER : AND WONDER'S AUTO REPAIR : CIVIL ACTION - LAW Defendants : V. PAUL FLICKINGER, : Additional : Defendant : IN RE: DEFENDANT WONDER'S MOTION FOR suMMARy JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER, J., GUIDO, J. AND NOW, this ORDER day of JULY, 1998, Defendant Wonder's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED as it relates to the cause of action alleging civil conspiracy and as it relates to Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. The remainder of said motion is DENIED. David W. Knauer, Esquire For the Plaintiff Edward E. Guido, J. Dennis E. Reinaker, Esquire For the Defendants (Chapman) Thomas E. Brenner, Esquire For the Defendants (Wonder & Wonder's Auto Repair) Richard H. Wix, Esquire For Additional Defendant KAREN FLICKINGER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KRISTINA R. FEHRENBACH, DECEASED, & CLIFFORD C. FEHRENBACH, Plaintiffs Vo SARAH R. CHAPMAN, ROCK IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-6727 CIVIL TERM CHAPMAN, DENNIS JAMES WONDER : AND WONDER'S AUTO REPAIR Defendants Ve PAUL FLICKINGER, Additional Defendant CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: DEFENDANT WONDER ' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER, J., GUIDO, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT On February 27, 1998, Plaintiffs' daughter Kristina was struck and killed by an automobile being operated by Defendant Sarah Chapman. On December 5, 1997, Plaintiffs initiated this action against the Defendants.~ The cause of action against Defendant Wonder is based upon his alleged negligent inspection of the Chapman vehicle. Plaintiffs have also alleged that Defendant Wonder conspired with the Chapmans to improperly issue an inspection sticker for a vehicle which should not have passed inspection. The action seeks both compensatory and punitive ~The parties have related to the Court that this action will be dismissed by stipulation as to Wonder'$ Auto Repair since it is not a legal entity. Defendant Wonder conducts his business as a sole proprietor. NO. 97-6727 CIVIL ACTION - LAW damages. On May 6, 1998, Defendant Wonder filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion was subsequently briefed by the parties and argued before this Court. It is now ready for disposition. DISCUSSION Defendant Wonder's Motion for Summary Judgment is based upon Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2(2) which provides as follows: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law (2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. It is Defendant Wonder's position that Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with any evidence of his negligence. He further argues that they have offered no proof that his negligence was a substantial factor in causing of the accident. Therefore, he has asked us to grant his Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss this action against him. In the alternative, he argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence upon which to base their cause of action for civil conspiracy or their claim for punitive damages. He has requested partial summary judgment in connection with those claims. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we are constrained to deny his Motion for Summary Judgment. However, we agree that he is 2 NO. 97-6727 CIVIL ACTION - LAW entitled to partial summary judgment in connection with the civil conspiracy cause of action and the punitive damages claim. In determining whether to grant a Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. City of York v. Schaefer Temporary Serv., Inc., 667 A.2d 495 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 674 A.2d 1038 (1996). Summary judgment may only be granted in cases that are clear and free from doubt. Hoffman v. Brandywine Hosp~, 443 Pa. Super. 245, 661 A.2d 397 (1995). Viewing the instant record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she is able to produce the following evidence:2 1) On February 27, 1998, Sarah Chapman was operating a motor vehicle on Locust Point Road in Silver Spring Township. 2) Immediately after the accident Mrs. Chapman was interviewed by the investigating officer. She stated, inter alia, that she was travelling approximately twenty (20) miles per hour when the Plaintiffs' decedent ran directly into her path. She attempted to stop, but was unable to avoid hitting the child. 3) Mrs. Chapman also told the officer that her brakes were normally spongy and that she always pumped them prior to 2The record submitted to us for review by Defendant Wonder consists of the depositions of Defendants Sarah and Rick Chapman as well as the deposition of Defendant Wonder. We have also reviewed the discovery responses filed by Plaintiff to Defendant Wonder's various discovery requests. NO. 97-6727 CIVIL ACTION - LAW stopping.3 4) The police inspected the vehicle immediately after the accident and determined that the rear brakes were deficient. The deficiencies were such that they would not have passed a vehicle inspection. 5) Defendant Wonder had inspected the Chapman vehicle on December 14, 1996, just two months before the accident. 6) Mr. Chapman told the investigating officer that the vehicle had been driven only about eight times since it had been inspected. 7) The vehicle had been driven only 439 miles from the time of the inspection until the accident. 8) When he inspected the vehicle, Defendant Wonder replaced the front brakes. He advised the Chapmans that the rear brakes were sufficient to pass inspection this time, but would need to be replaced to pass the next inspection. Based upon the above facts, we cannot say that it is free and clear from doubt that Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on their negligence claim against Defendant Wonder. Therefore, we must deny his Motion for Summary Judgment. However, our review of the record satisfies us that Plaintiffs are clearly not entitled to relief in connection with 3In her deposition, Mrs. Chapman had a different version of what she told the police officer. However, this is clearly a question for the jury, since it may very well accept the version given to the officer. NO. 97-6727 CIVIL ACTION - LAW their allegations of a civil conspiracy. As Defendant Wonder 4 pointed out in his brief, our Supreme Court has recently stated that a cause of action for civil conspiracy must fail unless Plaintiffs can show "that two or more persons combined or agreed with intent to do an unlawful act .... Proof of malice, i.e. an intent to injure, is essential in proof of a conspiracy." Skipworth v. Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc., 547 Pa. 224, 235, 690 A.2d 169, 174 (1997). There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to indicate that the Chapmans and Mr. Wonder conspired to breach the law, let alone to do so with an intent to injure someone. Likewise, Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages cannot be sustained. Punitive damages may be awarded only if the conduct of the Defendant is wanton, malicious, reckless, willful or oppressive. Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989). Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, there is nothing to suggest that Defendant Wonder's conduct amounted to anything worse then ordinary negligence. For the reasons stated above, we will enter the following order. 4Plaintiffs' counsel did not address the issues of civil conspiracy or punitive damages in his brief in opposition to Defendant Wonder's Motion for Summary Judgment. NO. 97-6727 CIVIL ACTION - LAW ORDER AND NOW, this ~~~ ~ day of JULY, 1998, Defendant Wonder's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED as it relates to the cause of action alleging civil conspiracy and as it relates to Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. The remainder of said motion is DENIED. By the Court, /s/ Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. David W. Knauer, Esquire For the Plaintiff Dennis E. Reinaker, Esquire For the Defendants (Chapman) Thomas E. Brenner, Esquire For the Defendants (Wonder & Wonder's Auto Repair) Richard H. Wix, Esquire For Additional Defendant :sld