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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-3377 civilSUSAN EDWARDS, Plaintiff Ve COMMERCE BANK, HARRISBURG, N.A., Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-3377 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE NATURE OF A DEMURRER BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER, GUIDO, J.J. AND NOW, this ORDER OF COURT day of NOVEMBER, 1998, Defendant's Preliminary Objection in the nature of a demurrer is SUSTAINED and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. By Edward E. Guido, Je Douglas B. Marcello, Esquire For the Plaintiff David A. Fitzsimons, Esquire For the Defendant :sld SUSAN EDWARDS, Plaintiff Ve COMMERCE BANK, HARRISBURG, N.A., Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 97-3377 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IN THE NATURE OF A DEMURRER BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER, GUIDO, J.J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT On June 24, 1997, the Plaintiff filed a nine (9) count, one hundred twenty three (123) paragraph complaint to commence this action against Defendant. Defendant filed Preliminary Objections. Over the course of the next nine months two amended complaints were filed by Plaintiff along with corresponding Preliminary Objections by Defendant. Currently before us is Defendant's Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Demurrer to Plaintiff's second amended complaint. The issues have been briefed and argued by the parties. This matter is now ready for disposition. FINDINGS OF FACT The Second Amended Complaint avers the following relevant facts: 1) On August 1, 1996, Plaintiff applied for a mortgage with Defendant to finance the purchase of a residence. She was orally advised that the interest rate would be 8.25%. (para. 6, 9.) NO. 97-3377 CIVIL TERM 2) On August 12, 1996, Plaintiff received a Good Faith Estimate and Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement reflecting the 8.25% rate. (para. 13-14.) 3) On August 22, 1996, the Plaintiff was orally advised that the loan was approved at 8.25%. (para. 16.) 4) The closing was scheduled for August 29, 1996. (para. 17.) 5) On August 23, 1996, Plaintiff was advised by Defendant that she would be required to maintain all of her accounts with Defendant in order to obtain the 8.25% rate. Otherwise, the rate would have to be 9.25%. (para. 19-20.) 6) On August 28, 1996, Plaintiff was orally advised that the rate would be 9.25% because she had not agreed to keep her accounts with Defendant. (para. 27-29. ) 7) Defendant prepared a commitment letter with the proposed 9.25% rate on August 28, 1996. Plaintiff never saw this commitment letter. (para. 30. ) 8) On August 28, 1996, Plaintiff had someone contact Defendant's chairman on her behalf. After several phone calls, Plaintiff was advised that the rate would be 8.25% and that she would not be required to transfer her accounts. (para. 31-34.) 9) On August 29, 1996, Plaintiff was advised by the unnamed person who had contacted Defendant's chairman on her behalf that the bank had agreed to the 8.25% rate because its chairman did a great deal of business with Plaintiff's employer. (para. 35.) 10) Plaintiff was troubled by the notion that the 8.25% rate was NO. 97-3377 CIVIL TERM being offered because her employer did business with Defendant's chairman rather than because it had been agreed upon. (para. 36.) 11) Plaintiff proceeded with the closing process to determine the true reason she was being offered the loan at the 8.25% rate. (para. 37.) 12) Plaintiff refused to close on the loan until she was given the true reason. (para. 38.) 13) Defendant refused to give Plaintiff the reason behind its decision to offer the 8.25% rate. It also failed to give her adequate information as to how it determined interest rates in general. (para. 39-47.) 14) Plaintiff elected to adjourn the closing because of the inability to resolve the aforementioned issues. (para. 49. ) 15) As the closing "was being adjourned" Defendant provided Plaintiff with a commitment letter for a mortgage at the rate of 8.25%. (para. 50.) 16) Since Plaintiff perceived that the loan was being provided at the 8.25% rate as a result of who her employer was and not because it was originally agreed upon, Plaintiff "was unable to accept the loan." (para. 51.) 17) Since Plaintiff "was unable to accept the loan," she could not purchase the home and was, therefore, forced to live with NO. 97-3377 CIVIL TERM friends. (para. 56.) ~ DISCUSSION At the outset, we note that the standard to be applied to preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer was succinctly stated by our Supreme Court in Allegheny County v. Com., 507 Pa. 360, 490 A.2d 402 (1985) as follows: A demurrer can only be sustained where the complaint is clearly insufficient to establish the pleader's right to relief. For the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading a preliminary objection in the nature of a ~demurrer admits as true all well-pleaded, material, relevant facts, and every inference fairly deducible from those facts. The pleader's conclusions or averments of law are not considered to be admitted as true by a demurrer. Since the sustaining of a demurrer results in a denial of the pleader's claim or a dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. If the facts as pleaded state a claim for which relief may be granted under any theory of law then there is sufficient doubt to require the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to be rejected. (citations omitted). 507 Pa. 360, 372. We will attempt to summarize the essential facts of this case in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. She and Defendant made a deal. Defendant tried to alter the terms of the deal. Plaintiff objected. Defendant agreed to go along with the ~Plaintiff alleges that the seller of the home wanted to charge an outrageous amount of rent to allow her to live in the home. She further alleges that this was an attempt to coerce her to accept the terms of the bank. However, there is no allegation that the seller was in any way connected with the Defendant or working on its behalf. The reasonable inference is that he wanted merely to sell his home then and there, not to rent it. NO. 97-3377 CIVIL TERM original deal. For her own personal reasons, Plaintiff could no longer go along with the original deal. As a result of her inability to accept the original deal, Plaintiff sustained damages. Based upon the foregoing factual scenario, we cannot imagine any cause of action that could be maintained. No matter how you cut it, the Defendant stood ready, willing and able to loan the money to Plaintiff at the agreed upon rate and at the agreed upon time. Any damages she sustained were the result of her choice not to accept the money for personal reasons. While her sensibilities may have been offended by the realities of the business world, that does not give rise to a cause of action. For the reasons set forth above, we must grant Defendant's Preliminary Objection in the nature of a demurrer and dismiss this cause of actiOn. ORDER AND NOW, this 9TH day of NOVEMBER, 1998, Defendant's Preliminary Objection in the nature of a demurrer is SUSTAINED and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. By the Court, /s/ Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. Douglas B. Marcello, Esquire For the Plaintiff David A. Fitzsimons, Esquire For the Defendant