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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-3758 civilMARIE H. SUNKEL Ve CONNIE L. SUNKEL : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : · · : : : NO. 98-3758 CIVIL TERM : : IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDG~_?.NT ON T~E P?.R_ADING$ BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER, GUIDO, J.J. AND NOW, this ORDER OF COURT day of DECEMBER, 1998, Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. Douglas K. Marsico, Esquire For the Plaintiff William C. Kollas, Esquire For the Defendant By t Edward E. Guido, J. :sld MARIE H. SUNKEL Ve CONNIE L. SUNKEL IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 98-3758 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER, GUIDO, J.J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT On July 6, 1998, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint. On July 13, 1998 Defendant filed an Answer. Shortly thereafter Plaintiff filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings which was responded to by the Defendant. The matter was listed for argument and briefs were filed. The parties elected not to proceed to argument and requested that we decide the issue on briefs. The matter is now ready for disposition. FACTS The following facts are established by the pleadings: 1) On October 14, 1992, the Defendant executed a "Demand Note" in favor of Plaintiff. (Paragraph 4 of the Complaint and Answer). 2) A true and correct copy of the "Demand Note" is attached as Exhibit A to the complaint (Paragraph 3 of the Complaint and Answer). 3) The "Demand Note" attached as Exhibit A by its terms provides in relevant part as follows: NO. 98-3758 CIVIL TERM $10,000. Date ........ Oct. 14, 1997 ON D~D the undersized ... promise to pay to the order of Marie H. Sunkel of Harrisburg Pennsylvania ten thousand and 00/100 dollars without defalcation, and without interest. It is understood that any unpaid balance is to be deducted from any share in Mrs. Sunkel's Estate that I may be entitled to. 4) Despite several written demands, Defendant has refused to pay as required under the terms of the "Demand Note". (Paragraph 6 of the Complaint and Answer). 5) While she admits that she executed the "Demand Note", the Defendant denies that it was a Demand Note and that she owes Plaintiff $10,000. Rather, she alleges that "the purpose of the note was that the $10,000 was to be deducted from any money Connie Sunkel or her children were to inherit from Marie N. Sunkel." (Answer Plaintiff 5). DISCUSSION Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1034(a) provides as follows: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay the trial, any party may move for judgment in pleadings. We may grant such a motion only where the pleadings demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Swartz v. Swarth, 689 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super 1997). The motion should not be granted unless "the moving party's case is clear and free from doubt such that a trial would prove fruitless...... _American Motorists Insurance Com a_~. Farmers Bank and Trust Co. of Hanover, 435 Pa. Super. 54, 58, 644 A.2d 1232, (1994). We must accept as true NO. 98-3758 CIVIL TERM all well pleaded facts of the party against whom the motion is made, and consider against her only the facts which are specifically admitted. Swartz v. Swartz, supra. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we feel that it would be inappropriate to grant judgment on the pleadings in the instant case. It is clear from the pleadings that the Defendant received $10,000 from Plaintiff. It is also clear that Defendant executed the "Demand Note" and delivered it to Plaintiff. However, Defendant has raised a genuine issue of fact in her answer. She alleges that the parties never intended for the money to be repaid during Plaintiff's lifetime. Rather, the purpose of the note was to ensure that the $10,000 was deducted from any portion of the Plaintiff's estate to which Defendant or her children would be entitled. If believed by the fact finder, this allegation would entitle Defendant to prevail at trial. Plaintiff argues that the note is clear and unambiguous on its face. Therefore, any extrinsic evidence as to the intention of the parties would be barred by the parole evidence rule. Harl~avidson v. Morris, 19 F.3d 142 (3d Circ. 1994) and Nimich ¥. Shut~, 440 Pa. Su~er 87, 655 A.2d 132 (1995). While that is a correct statement of the law, we cannot conclude from the pleadings that the Defendant would be precluded from testifying as to the intention of the parties. As our Commonwealth Court has stated: The intention of the parties is the paramount consideration in contract interpretation. This intention may be NO. 98-3758 CIVIL TERM ascertained from the document itself when the terms are clear and unambiguous. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp~ 513 Pa. 192, 519 A.2d 385 (1986). A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense. Commonwealth State Albrecht C---~. 59 Pa. Cmwlth. . E.J. 246, 430 A.2d 328 (1981). Where an ambiguity exists, parole evidence is admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, irrespective of whether the ambiguity is created by the language of the instrument or by extrinsic or collateral circumstances. In re: Estate of Heir, 400 Pa. 90, 94, .161A.2d 32, 34 (1960~. A.2d 32, 24 (1960). Thus, if a contract is not patently ambiguous, an ambiguity may be revealed by extrinsic evidence, if that extrinsic evidence is not barred by the parole evidence rule, and once this ambiguity is revealed, parole evidence regarding the intent of the parties is admissible. La_~er v. Mo___narch Life Insu_____rance Co_~ 879 F.2d 75 (3rd Cir. 1989) (construing Pennsylvania contract law). Preston v. Saucon Valle/_~chool Di___stric~, 666 A.2d 1120, 1126-1127, (Pa. Cmwlth.1995).(emphasis added). In view of the above, even if we were to agree that the note is unambiguous on its face, there may be "extrinsic or collateral circumstances" which would reveal an ambiguity, thereby allowing parole evidence as to the intent of the parties. Under these circumstances, we do not feel that it would be appropriate to grant Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the pleadings. ORDER ! day of DECEMBER, 1998, Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. Douglas K. Marsico, Esquire By the Court, For the Plaintiff William C. Kollas, Esquire For the Defendant s Edward E. Guido j. Edward E. Guido, j.