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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-1626 criminalCOMMONWEALTH. OF PENNSYLVANIA Ve JOHN M. SALAPA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 98-1626 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE- DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE GUIDO, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this /~ ~ day of JANUARY, 1999, after hearing on Defendant ' s Omnibus evidence is DENIED. Pretrial Motion, his request to suppress By the Edward E. Guido, J. District Attorney Patrick F. Lauer, For the Defendant :sld Jro~ Esquire COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERED COUNTY, PENNSYLV/~IA Vo : JOHN M. SALAPA : NO. 98-1626 CRIMINAL TERM : IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE GUIDO, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence. A hearing on said motion was held before this Court on January 5, 1999. During the hearing, Defendant's counsel made it clear that this Court need only address the following issues: a) Was the initial stop of Defendant's vehicle appropriate? b) Did the officer have sufficient probable cause to arrest the Defendant for driving under the influence? Pursuant to Pa. Rule of Criminal Procedure 323(i) the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Officer Ressler of the West Shore Regional Police Department was on routine patrol in a police cruiser in the Borough of Lemoyne at approximately 1:25 a.m. on July 19, 1998. 2. While stopped at a stop sign on Bosler Avenue, he noticed a green Saturn being driven by the Defendant traveling south on Third Street at a high rate of speed. The Officer estimated the vehicle's speed to be between 50 and 60 miles per hour. 3. The posted speed limit in that area is 25 miles per hour. NO. 98-1626 CRIMINAL TERM 4. The officer made a left hand turn onto Third Street to follow the Defendant's vehicle. He had to gun his engine and accelerate very quickly to catch up to the Defendant. 5. The Defendant's vehicle entered a "left hand turn only" lane at the intersection of Third Street and Lowther. Instead of turning left onto Lowther he continued to travel straight on Third Street. 6. Shortly thereafter the Defendant made a left hand turn onto Walton. This turn was made very wide, with the Defendant almost striking the curb. 7. The officer turned left onto Walton and immediately activated his emergency lights signalling Defendant to pull over. 8. The Defendant did not pull over, but continued to travel on Walton. 9. During the course of the pursuit, the Defendant nearly hit parked vehicles on two separate occasions. 10. The Defendant eventually turned into a driveway off Walton Avenue and parked the vehicle. He shut off the engine but did not turn off his headlights. 11. The officer approached the vehicle and asked the Defendant for his driver's license and registration. 12. The Defendant produced his license but indicated that he could not find the registration. The officer pointed to the registration card that Defendant was holding in his hand. 13. The Defendant's speech was slurred and there was an odor of NO. 98-1626 CRIMINAL TERM alcohol emanating from his breath. In addition, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. 14. The officer asked the Defendant to turn off his lights. Instead of turning off the lights, he turned on his wipers spraying both the windshield and the officer. 16. At the officer's request the Defendant exited the vehicle. · When he did so, he staggered and was very slow in his movements. While standing there, he swayed. 17. At this point the officer placed him under arrest for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1) The officer had grounds to effectuate an investigative stop of Defendant's vehicle. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, 662 A.2d 1043 (1995), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.E.D. 889 (1968). 75 Pa. C.S.A. ~ 6308. 2) Under all the circumstances present in this case, the Officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for Driving Under the Influence. Pearson v. Commonwealth, 551 A.2d 394, 122 Pa. Comwlth. 91, (1998) and Com. v. Romero, 449 Pa. Super 194, 673 A.2d 374 (1996). DISCUSSION At the time that the officer activated his emergency lights he clearly had grounds to effectuate an investigative stop. The Defendant was travelling at a high rate of speed in a 25 mph posted speed zone. He proceeded to travel straight from a left NO. 98-1626 CRIMINAL TERM hand turn only lane. When he did turn left, he took the turn so wide that he nearly hit the curb. Clearly, the officer had articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that the Defendant had violated various sections of the Vehicle Code.~ Therefore, the stop was appropriate under Section 6308. (75 Pa. C.S.A. 6308). Probable cause to effectuate an arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police officer are sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that the arrestee has committed an offense. Com. v. Romero, supra. In the instant case, the facts and circumstances known to Officer Ressler were more than sufficient to justify the arrest. In addition to the erratic driving which he observed prior to activating his emergency lights, the officer observed the · following: The Defendant nearly hit parked vehicles on two separate occasions. When attempting to turn off his lights, he turned on the windshield wipers. Defendant could not locate the vehicle registration which he was holding in his hand. His speech was slurred and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. The odor of alcohol was noticeable on his breath. ~Some of the Sections that immediately come to mind include Section 3361 (Driving vehicle at safe speed), Section 3311 (Obedience to traffic control devices), and Section 3731 (Driving under the influence) . NO. 98-1626 CRIMINAL TERM When exiting the vehicle he staggered and was very slow in his movements. He was not able to stand without swaying. Under the circumstances, the officer acted appropriately in arresting the Defendant for driving under the influence. For the reasons set forth above, we are compelled to deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress. ORDER AND NOW, this /~ day of JANUARY, 1999, after hearing on Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion, his request to suppress evidence is DENIED. By the Court, /s/ Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. District Attorney Patrick F. Lauer, Jr., Esquire For the Defendant :sld