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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-1714 criminalCOMMONWEALTH Ve LISA YVETTE WARREN IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 98-1714 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE GUIDO, J. AND NOW, this ORDER day of JANUARY, 1999, Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the Nature of a Motion to Suppress Evidence is GRANTED. The Commonwealth is precluded from introducing at trial any evidence obtained after the officer requested the driver to exit the vehicle. By Edward E. Guido, J. District Attorney Timothy Clawges, Esquire For the Defendant :sld COMMONWEALTH Ve LISA YVETTE WARREN IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 98-1714 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE GUIDO, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT The Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion alleging inter alia, that her initial detention was unlawful, that she made incriminating statements without the benefit of Miranda Warnings, and that her arrest was illegal. Therefore, she has requested that certain evidence be suppressed. A hearing~ on said motion was held before this Court on December 15, 1998. The parties were given the opportunity to file briefs, which they have done. This matter is now ready for disposition. FINDINGS OF FACT ,, 1) North Middleton Township Police Officer Thomas Kibler was on routine patrol in full uniform in a marked patrol vehicle in North Middleton Township on June 14, 1998. At about 8:12 p.m. he saw a vehicle parked on the emergency access road to the " Pennsylvania Turnpike. 2) The vehicle was improperly parked in that it blocked the emergency access to the Turnpike. 3) The officer approached the vehicle and noticed two occupants therein. The driver was a male in his seventies and the passenger was the Defendant, a female in her twenties. NO. 98-1714 CRIMINAL TERM 4) The officer asked the driver to move the vehicle onto a gravel area so that it was not blocking access to the Turnpike. 5) The driver complied immediately. The gravel area to which the vehicle was moved was open to the public. The vehicle was appropriately parked in that position. 6) The officer pulled in behind the vehicle, exited his patrol vehicle and requested identification from the driver and the Defendant. 7) The driver provided the officer with his drivers license. 8) The Defendant indicated that she did not have any identification with her. However, she did give him her correct na~Re. 9) The officer noticed a purse at her feet and asked what she had in it. The Defendant replied that she had an address book in the purse. When the officer requested to see the address book, the Defendant refused. 10) The officer then asked what they were doing. The driver said that they were just sitting and talking. The Defendant said they were driving around. 11) The officer then directed the driver to exit the vehicle. 12) The officer proceeded to question the driver outside 'the presence of the Defendant. 13) The driver told the officer that his wife of many years lay ~The officer indicated that these "inconsistent" statements led him to believe that criminal activity might be afoot. NO. 98-1714 CRIMINAL TERM on her death bed in the hospital at Carlisle. As the driver was leaving the hospital, he was accosted by the Defendant, a prostitute, who offered to sell him sexual favors. He drove her to their current location where the services were to be rendered. They were negotiating the price when the officer approached. 14) The officer returned to the vehicle and confronted the Defendant with the driver's story. He then asked her if she was willing to confirm the driver's version. At that point Defendant confessed that she was there to provide sex for money. 15) The officer then asked what was in her purse. The Defendant pulled out a pipe and said she used this to smoke marijuana. 16) The officer asked her what else was in the purse. She handed him the open purse. He noticed additional drug paraphernalia. At that time, he placed her under arrest and advised her of her Miranda rights. 17) Defendant was taken to the police station at which time she was again advised of her Miranda rights, which she waived in writing. She then gave a written statement. DISCUSSION The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth three (3) categories of interaction between citizens and police, each of which must be supported by different levels of suspicion. Comm. v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, 662 A.2d 1043. [1995]. The first is a mere encounter or request for information which need not be supported by any level of suspicion. The second category of NO. 98-1714 CRIMINAL TERM interaction is an investigative stop or detention, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The third category of interaction is an arrest or custodial detention which must be supported by probable cause to believe that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity. See Ellis, supra 662 A.2d at 1047. In the case before us, we are confronted with all three (3) levels of encounter. The first issue we must address is when the encounter ended and the investigative detention began. We must then determine if, at that point, the officer had the requisite level of suspicion necessary to justify the escalation. There is no bright line standard to differentiate a mere encounter from an investigative detention. Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa., 364, 378 A.2d 835 [1977]. The Jones Court set forth the standard to be used in determining when a stop or investigative detention has occurred. As the Jones Court stated: Thus, to determine when a "stop" has occurred . . . all of the circumstances which may in any way evidence a show of authority or exercise of force including such subtle factors as the demeanor of the police officer, the location of the confrontation, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories or statements must be examined. Once this factual examination has been made, the pivotal inquiry 'is whether, considering all of the facts and circumstances evidencing an exercise of force, "a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought [he was being restrained] had he been in the defendant's shoes." (citations omitted) 378 A.2d at 839 840. Under the circumstances presented in this case, we are satisfied that the interaction was a mere encounter until the NO. 98-1714 CRIMINAL TERM officer asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle. At that point both the Defendant and the driver could reasonably believe that they were being restrained. The officer, in full uniform, had directed the driver to move his vehicle to a specific location. The officer followed the vehicle and parked directly behind it. When he approached the vehicle he asked for identification and began to question both occupants. He then exercised his authority to direct the driver to leave the vehicle so that he might question him separately. At that point, it is entirely reasonable for the driver to conclude that he was not free to leave. Moreover, under the circumstances, the Defendant could also reasonably conclude that she was not free to leave.~ The focus of our inquiry now turns to whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot sufficient to justify the investigatory stop. Our Courts have defined reasonable suspicion to be something less than probable cause but more than a hunch. See Comm. v. Kearney, 411 Pa. Super. 274 601A.2d 346 [1992]. Reasonable suspicion must be based upon specific and articulable facts. See Comm. v. Vasquez, 703 A.2d 25 (Pa. Super. 1997)., In the instant case, we are ~As a practical matter, she was not free to leave. She had been brought in the driver's vehicle to this secluded location from the area of the hospital in Carlisle. The driver of the vehicle was detained. It is not reasonable to argue, as the Commonwealth does, that defendant could walk away from the scene. See Com. v. Vasquez, 703 A.2d 25 (Pa. Super. 1997) where the Superior Court reached a similar conclusion involving a defendant who was a passenger on a bus. NO. 98-1714 CRIMINAL TERM satisfied that no such specific and articulable facts existed at the time the officer asked the driver to exit the vehicle.3 Therefore, any evidence obtained after that point must be suppressed.4 ORDER AND NOW, this /~~ day of JANUARY, 1999, Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the Nature of a Motion to Suppress Evidence is GRANTED. The Commonwealth is precluded from introducing at trial any evidence obtained after the officer requested the driver to exit the vehicle. By the Court, District Attorney Timothy Clawges, Esquire For the Defendant :eld /s/ Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. 3The officer indicated that he asked the driver to get out of the vehicle because of the inconsistent responses he received to his inquiry as to why they were there. The driver said they were just talking. The Defendant said they were out driving around. We do not see how those responses are inconsistent. However, even if they were, that does not necessarily give rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 4Because of our decision that the officer did not have the requisite level of suspicion to justify the stop, we need not address the other issues raised in Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion.