HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-851 supportBRENDA K. BRYNER,
Plaintiff
Ve
STEVEN R. BRYNER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
,
NO. 851 SUPPORT 1998
DR# 27,999
IN RE: REQUEST FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT
BEFORE GUIDO, J.
AND NOW, this
ORDER OF COURT
day of APRIL, 1999, Plaintiff's claim
for spousal support is DENIED.
Paul Esposito, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
By the
Edward E. Guido, J.
Nichole M. Staley, Esquire
For the Defendant
Domestic Relations Section
:sld
BRENDA K. BRYNER,
Plaintiff
Ve
STEVEN R. BRYNER,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 851 SUPPORT 1998
DR# 27 t 999
IN RE: REOUEST FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT
BEFORE GUIDO, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
On October 6, 1998, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking
spousal support. A conference was held before the Domestic
Relations Office at which time the Defendant denied liability. A
hearing limited to the issue of Plaintiff's entitlement to
spousal support was held before this Court on March 25, 1999.
¢
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on October 14, 1992. They
separated on April 5, 1997. The separation was the direct result
of an extra marital affair to which the Defendant confessed in
December of 1996. Although Plaintiff tried to forgive him, she
was unable to accept Defendant's breach of marital trust.
Various reconciliations were attempted, but to no avail.
Plaintiff had grounds for divorce at the time of her separation
from the Defendant
~There is no question that the parties had a violent and
rocky relationship while they were together. Each heaped
indignities upon the other. We are satisfied that both parties
were injured but that neither party was innocent. Therefore the
only grounds for divorce which existed at separation arise
directly from the extra marital relationship of the Defendant.
NO. 851 SUPPORT 1998 - DR# 27,999
Subsequent to their separation, Plaintiff began an intimate
extra marital relationship with another man. While her
meretricious relationship did not begin until well after the
parties separated, it certainly began prior to the date of the
filing of the support complaint. Plaintiff has been living with
her paramour since October of 1998.
DISCUSSION
When the parties separated, Plaintiff had grounds for
divorce. Therefore, she was entitled to spousal support and
would continue to be entitled thereto until such time as her
conduct provided Defendant with grounds for divorce. Roach v.
Roach, 337 Pa. Super. 440, 487 A.2d 27 (1985).
Plaintiff has candidly admitted that she entered into an
extra marital relationship prior to the date of the filing of the
support complaint. In most circumstances, adultery, even post
separation adultery, would provide~ the requisite grounds for
divorce necessary to terminate a spouse's entitlement to support.
See Roach v. Roach, supra, and Williams v. Williams, 113 Dauph.
323 (1993). However, where, as in the instant case, the
defendant spouse had committed adultery pre-separation, the post
separation infidelity of the plaintiff spouse does not operate as
an automatic bar to spousal support. See Com. ex rel. Carmack v.
Carmack, 268 Pa. Super. 198, 407 A.2d 1314 (1979), and Schreiber
v. Schreiber, 308 Pa. Super. 243, 454 A.2d 112 (1982). The law
applicable to such cases was clearly stated by the Superior Court
NO. 851 SUPPORT 1998 - DR# 27,999
in Hellman v. Hellman, 246 Pa. Super. 536, 371 A.2d 964 (1977) as
follows:
[A]n act of adultery on the part of the husband does
not give a wife, unrestrained by morality or personal
dignity, a right to act forever in a licentious manner
and still command support from her husband. Support
laws, however, were not promulgated for the purpose of
rewarding a wife's good behavior. An order of support
seeks to secure a reasonable allowance for the
maintenance of the wife so that she may not become a
charge of the state. Thus, although it is true that
the only cause which will justify a husband's refusal
to support his wife is conduct on her part, such as
adultery, which would be a valid ground for divorce, we
must not focus our attention solely upon the wife's
conduct in reviewing her right to support. We must
look at all the circumstances present in each case. If
we were to mechanically apply the appellee's inflexible
rule, if we did not view each case in its entirety,
then certainly we would eventually occasion an
inequitable termination of support. (citations
omitted)
246 Pa. Super. at 543, 371 A.2d at 967.
Under all of the circumstances present in this case, we feel
that we must deny Plaintiff's request for spousal support. While
the Defendant's infidelity was the driving force behind the
parties' separation, it is clear that both parties have now given
up on the marriage. Plaintiff has moved on and made another life
for herself. She is gainfully employed and firmly entrenched in
another relationship.2 From that standpoint, her case is vastly
different from the above cited cases which involved isolated
incidents of post separation adultery. To award spousal support
to Plaintiff under these circumstances would not be appropriate.
2She has actually set up housekeeping with her paramour.
NO. 851 SUPPORT 1998 - DR# 27,999
For the foregoing reasons we will enter the order that
follows.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 9TH day of APRIL, 1999, Plaintiff's claim for
spousal support is DENIED.
By the Court,
/s/ Edward E. Guido
Edward E. Guido, J
Paul Esposito, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Nichole M. Staley, Esquire
For the Defendant
Domestic Relations Section
:sld