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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-1320 criminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. MATTHEW G. KEGG · NO. 98-1320 CRIMINAL TERM o IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA IN RE' RESTITUTION HEARING BEFORE GUIDO, J... AND NOW, this OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT ~d~ day of SEPTEMBER, 1999, after a hearing, the third restorative sanction appearing in the sentencing Order April 6, 1999, is vacated and replaced with the following' 3) That he pay restitution to Lisa Renshaw in the amount of $2521.80 for medical and mileage expenses. In all other respects the sentencing Order of April 6, 1999, shall remain in full force and effect. District Attorney By th Edward E. Guido, J. Probation Matthew R. Gover, Esquire For the Defendant 'sld COMMONWEALTH ge MATTHEW G. KEGG · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : : : · NO. 98-1320 CRIMINAL TERM : : ' CHARGES' ACCIDENT INVOLVING DAMAGE TO ATTENDED VEHICLE OR PROPERTY DRIVING ON RIGHT SIDE OF ROADWAY (SUM.) IN RE: RESTITUTION HEA .~G BEFORE GUIDO. J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT The Defendant plead guilty to the above captioned charges on February 23, 1999. On April 6, 1999 the Defendant was sentenced to a twelve (12) month period of intermediate punishment which included, inter alia, the direction that he pay restitution to Lisa Renshaw in an amount to be determined after heating. In addition, he was directed to pay Earl Renshaw restitution in the amount of $750.00. However, it was agreed that said restitution might be altered after a heating. The hearing contemplated by the original sentencing order was held before this Court on August 3, 1999. The parties were given the opportunity to file a brief in support of their respective positions. The Defendant filed a brief, the Commonwealth did not. This matter is now ready for disposition. 98-1320 CRIMINAL FINDINGS OF FACT Based upon the testimony received and the exhibits admitted into evidence at the aforesaid hearing we make the following findings of fact: 1) These charges arose as a result of a collision between a vehicle being operated by the Defendant and a vehicle in which Lisa Renshaw was the sole occupant. 2) As a result of the collision Lisa Renshaw received injuries for which she has received extensive medical treatment. 3) To date Lisa Renshaw has expended $1446.80 of her own funds for medical treatment. 4) To date Lisa Renshaw has incurred mileage expense of $1075.00 traveling to and from treatment,l 5) Lisa Renshaw's husband Earl has missed a total of 163 hours from work in order to tend to his wife's needs and to accompany her to medical appointments. 6) Earl Renshaw is an insurance salesman who works on a commission only basis. 7) Although Earl Renshaw lost income as a result of the time missed from work, the evidence presented was not sufficient to allow us to determine the amount of lost income. DISCUSSION Mandatory restitution is required under the provisions of both the Crimes Code and the Sentencing Code. Section 1106(a) of the Crimes Code provides as follows' I She has treated with specialists at Duke University Hospital in North Carolina as well as Columbia University Hospital in New York. Her total mileage is 3,750. Her request for reimbursement at the rate of $.30 per mile is reasonable. 98-1320 CRIMINAL § 1106. Restitution for injuries to person or property (a) General rule.-Upon conviction for any crime wherein property has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim suffered personal injury directly resulting from the crime, the offender shall be sentenced to make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed therefore. 18 Pa. C.S.A. Sec. 1106(a). Furthermore, the Sentencing Code provides' (c) Mandatory restitution.-In addition to the alternatives set forth in subsection (a) of this section the court shall order the defendant to compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained. 42 Pa. C.S.A. Sec. 9721 (c). Both the Crimes Code and the Sentencing Code adopt the definition of "victim" that appears in Section 479.1 of the Administrative Code of 1929, as amended. [71 P.S. Sec. 180-9.1 ]. Pursuant to that section of the Administrative Code "victim" is defined as: (1) A person against whom a crime is being or has been perpetrated or attempted. (2) A parent or legal guardian of a child so victimized, except when the parent or legal guardian of the child is the alleged offender. (3) A family member of a homicide victim, including stepbrothers or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a fiance, one of whom is to be identified to receive communication as provided for in this act. 98-1320 CRIMINAL 71 P.S. § 180-9. 1.2 In November of 1998 that section of the Administrative Code was repealed and replaced by the Crime Victims Act which defines "victim" as follows: (1) A direct victim.3 (2) A parent or legal guardian of a child who is a direct victim, except when the parent or legal guardian of the child is the alleged offender. (3) A family member of a homicide victim, including stepbrothers or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a fiance, one of whom is to be identified to receive communication as provided for in this act, except where the family member is the alleged offender. 18 P.S. § 11.103. Applying the above law to the case at bar we are satisfied that Lisa Renshaw is a victim in this case. We are further satisfied that she is entitled to restitution in the amount of $1446.80 for unreimbursed medical payments as well as $1075.00 for automobile expense incurred in traveling to and from medical appointments.4 2 In addition, recent amendments to the Crimes Code have expanded the definition of "victim to include" any insurance company that has compensated the victim for loss under an insurance contract." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(h). While our original sentencing order refers to restitution to be paid to Allstate Insurance "as will be determined by further heating of this Court," the was no evidence presented at the restitution hearing regarding any amounts owed to Allstate. 3 Direct victim is further defined as "An individual against whom a crime has been committed .... "18 P.S. § 11.103. 4 Defendant argues that the Commonwealth's failure to present expert testimony which causally links to the accident the condition for which Mrs. Renshaw sought treatment precludes an order of restitution for the expense of that treatment. We disagree. Mrs. Renshaw testified that her condition is, as yet, undiagnosed. However, the onset of the physical problems for which she has been forced to undergo extensive diagnostic tests, examinations, consultations and treatment corresponds with the happening of the accident. Therefore, we can logically and reasonably conclude that those problems are related to the accident. The only other conclusion, i.e. that an incredible coincidence occurred, is neither logical nor reasonable. 98-1320 CRIMINAL However, we are equally satisfied that we have no authority to enter an order of restitution to Earl Renshaw for his loss of wages. See Commonwealth v, Frisoli, 389 A.2d 136, 255 Pa. Super 593 (1978) (court may not award restitution without specific statutory authority), and Com. v. Runion, 541 Pa. 202, 662 A.2d 617 (1995) (legislature not the courts to expand meaning of the term victim for purposes of restitution). Since Earl Renshaw is clearly not a "victim" as defined in the aforesaid statutes, his claim for restitution cannot be granted. For the reasons set forth above, we will enter the order that follows: AND NOW, this ORDER day of SEPTEMBER, 1999, after a heating, the third restorative sanction appearing in the sentencing Order April 6, 1999, is vacated and replaced with the following: 3) That he pay restitution to Lisa Renshaw in the amount of $2521.80 for medical and mileage expenses. In all other respects the sentencing Order of April 6, 1999, shall remain in full force and effect. By the Court, s/s Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. District Attorney Probation Matthew R. Gover, Esquire For the Defendant :sld