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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-0215/0226 criminalCOMMONWEALTH Ve LEVAR DAMOND SMITH · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : : · NO. 99-0215 CRIMINAL TERM · NO. 99-0226 CRIMINAL TERM · : IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO APPELLATE RULE 1925 Guido, J., November 12, 1999 The Defendant, Levar Smith, was charged along with co-defendants James Moss and William Hooten, with Various drug related offenses. All of the cases were consolidated for trial. After a two day trial before a jury, Defendant Smith was convicted at 99-0215 of one count of conspiracy to unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.~ He was also found guilty of possession of a small amount of marijuana~- at 99- 0226. On August 31, 1999, we sentenced the Defendant to 3 ¥= to 10 years in a state ~ This timely appeal followed. correctional institution on the conspiracy charge. On October 12, 1999, Defendant filed a statement of matters complained of on appeal in which he raised three allegations of error as follows: (1.) The suppression court erred in failing to grant the relief requested in his omnibus pretrial motion. (2.) We failed to grant his request for a mistrial. (3.) We denied a portion of his requested points for charge. ~ 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903 to 35 P.S. {} 780-113(a)(30). The jury found him not guilty of the possession with intent to deliver charge. The jury returned with the same verdicts as to Defendant Hooten. Defendant Moss was convicted of both charges. 2 35 P.S. {} 780-113 (a)(31). 3 We imposed a sentence of costs and fines on the remaining charges. On October 20, 1999, the Defendant filed a supplement to his matters complained of on appeal in which he alleged that the evidence presented at thai was insufficient to sustain the conviction of conspiracy. The Honorable Kevin A. [tess ably and thoroughly discussed the first issue in his opinion and order of June 10, 1999. This opinion will address Defendant's other allegations of error. DISCUSSION Sufficiency Of The Evidence The standard of review on a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether all of the evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that all of the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Cox, 556 Pa. 366, 728 A.2d 923, (1999). In the instant case we are satisfied that the standard has been met. On the early morning hours of January 14, 1999, Troopers Chad Sydnor and Jeffrey Braid of the Pennsylvania State Police were patrolling Interstate 81 in Cumberland County.4 They were in a four wheel drive marked patrol unit.5 The weather was dreadful. It was snowing, the roads were icy, and it was cold.6 At approximately 1:00 a.m., as they were traveling southbound on Interstate 81, they came upon a Camaro with Maryland tags stuck in the median.7 They stopped to Notes of testimony, p. 11. Notes of testimony, p. 11. Notes of testimony, p. 11. Notes of testimony, pp. 12, 14. help, as they had done for several other vehicles during the night.8 As they approached the vehicle, co-defendant Hooten was behind the wheel and Defendant Smith and co- defendant Moss were standing outside.9 Trooper Sydnor began to question the parties. Co-defendant Moss made a point to tell him that he did not know the others, and that he had just stopped to help.~° When the trooper asked Defendant Smith what had happened, Smith said absolutely nothing. He just looked at the trooper.~ The trooper then questioned co-defendant Hooten. Hooten stated that he had been driving the Camaro when it slid into the median and got stuck.~2 Hooten refused the trooper's initial offer to call for a tow truck. However, when it became clear that they could not extricate the Camaro, Hooten eventually asked the trooper to call for a tow truck.~3 Both troopers returned to their vehicle and called for a tow truck.~4 As they were waiting for the tow truck, they noticed all three defendants walk across the highway and get into a Nissan that was parked along the southbound berm ofI-81.~5 Without saying a word to the troopers and without signaling them in any way, the Nissan just left.t6 This struck the troopers as very strange, so they pursued the vehicle.17 8 Notes of testimony, p. 35. 9 Notes of testimony, p. 14. ~0 Notes of testimony, pp. 15, 43. ~ Notes of testimony, p. 15. ~2 Notes of testimony, p. 16. ~3 Notes of testimony, p. 16. 14 Notes of testimony, p. 16. ~5 Notes of testimony: p. 16. ~6 Notes of testimony, p. 17. t7 The troopers went on to state that they had never before had anyone abandon their vehicle while waiting for a tow truck. (Notes of testimony p. 17, 40.) As soon as the troopers stopped the Nissan, Moss jumped out.~8 Trooper Sydnor obtained information from Moss, wi~ile Trooper Braid talked to the occupants in the vehicle.~9 They obtained conflicting stories from Moss, Hooten and Smith.2° In addition, Hooten told Trooper Braid a version of events that was at odds with what he had told Trooper Sydnor earlier.21 Hooten indicated that he had been partying at a girl's house in Scranton. He further indicated that another man named "Sincere" had been driving the Camaro when it went off the road. According to Hooten, Sincere had walked off exit 13 to the nearby Texaco station to call for help.22 The troopers obtained permission fi'om Moss to search the Nissan, which was properly registered to him in North Carolina.23 They discovered a small baggie of marijuana between the driver's side seat and the door.24 Moss denied any knowledge of the marijuana.2~ After running the registration on the Camaro, the troopers determined that it belonged to a man in Boonsboro.26 They obtained permission from the owner to search the vehicle and found a small baggie of marijuana under the front passenger seat.27 It was identical to the marijuana found in the Nissan, i.e. same size baggie, same approximate amount.28 ~8 Notes of testimony, p. 17. ~9 Notes of testimony, p. 18. 20 Notes of testimony, pp. 50, 51. 2~ Notes of testimony, p. 50. 22 Notes of testimony, p. 50. 23 Notes of testimony, p. 20. 24 Notes of testimony, p. 20. 25 Notes of testimony, p. 20. 26 Notes of testimony, p. 54. 27 Notes of testimony, p. 54. 28 Notes of testimony, pp. 58-59. The owner of the Camaro further advised Trooper Braid that he had loaned the car to Hooten several days earlier.29 At the time he had loaned the car to him, the driver's side window had been broken out.3° The same condition existed on the night in question.31 All three defendants were processed at the State Police Barracks in Carlisle on a charge of possession of a small amount of marijuana. While at the barracks, Defendant Moss seized the marijuana found in the Nissan and attempted to eat it.32 Trooper Keith Leydig is a member of the Pennsylvania State Police Bureau of Drug and Law Enforcement assigned to the tactical narcotics unit of Troop H. Because of the bad weather, and because he lives nearby, he decided to go to the Carlisle Barracks to do some paperwork on the morning of January 14, 1999.33 The sergeant in charge described the strange events of the night before to Trooper Leydig and asked if he thought there might be something more going on.34 Based upon his training and 35 experience, Leydig was certain that there was. Trooper Leydig was qualified by the Commonwealth and allowed to testify, without objection, as an expert in the field of drug investigation. He offered the following relevant testimony: Route 81 is a known- I guess you can could say as a drug route. From this area and a little bit south, drugs are normally from New York going south. And northbound usually is where the large cash seizures are. Drug dealers will use 81 to go north with their money, and come south with their drugs. 29 Notes of testimony, p. 61. 30 Notes of testimony, p. 54. 3~ Notes of testimony, pp. 46, 54. 32 Notes of testimony, p. 53. 33 Notes of testimony, p. 79. 34 Notes of testimony, p. 79. 35 Notes of testimony, pp. 79-80. The fact that they were going southbound, I believe they stated none of them had large amounts of cash or any cash for that fact, the small baggies of marijuana in both vehicles, and, well, let me back up. The fact that there were two vehicles together through my training and through one particular prior investigation, it's known that drug dealers nowadays will use two vehicles. One is in case one vehicle breaks down, the other can pick the people up and the drugs are in that vehicle, put the drugs in the other vehicle, and continue on their way. Another reason is in the drug- the car carrying the drugs would be stopped and get arrested, somebody is there to obtain bail money, and get them out of jail fight away, just for safety. You know, safety in numbers. Now, the bags of marijuana also during the training and experience and talking with informants, it's known that they will take small baggies of marijuana and place it in easily accessible places if for one way or another they are stopped by the police, and they do a search, they are counting on police officers who are tattered in the middle of the night- they do travel at night. They are counting on police offiCers that don't have a lot of experience when they find this bag, they know and they hope that the police officer will stop searching, they will get a small - the outcome will be slight, and they can get their vehicle back and be on their way. The fact that those bags were both similar, the way they described it, they appeared to be identical bags. Q. Was it significant at all that one of the cars that was involved in this incident didn't belong to any of the three suspects? A. Yes, that is common too, that they will either borrow a car or they will rent a car or lease a car. Most of the times they will borrow a car, and it will be from a user, like, I need your car for a couple of days. I will give you some rocks. That way if they are stopped, or if the car breaks down, they can abandon it and leave it. There is no way to trace them. The people that are driving it, there is no way to trace them to the car. And if they do get arrested with it, it's not theirs to be seized.36 Trooper Leydig obtained a search warrant for both the Camaro and Nissan.37 He eventually found 927 grams of crack cocaine in the air cleaner housing of the Nissan.38 It was packaged in the vehicle in such a way that he was surprised that the engine would 36 Notes of testimony, pp. 80, 81, 82 37 Notes of testimony, p. 82. 38 Notes of testimony, pp. 86, 107. run.39 There was little chance that it would run well.4° The drugs had a street value of at least $200,000.41 Trooper Leydig interviewed Defendant Smith who acknowledged that he was traveling from New York to Hagerstown.42 Defendant Hooten told the trooper that he was merely out joyriding that night.43 When the trooper told him he was lying, Hooten admitted that he was traveling from New York to Hagerstown.44 The crime of conspiracy is defined, in relevant part, as follows: § 903. Criminal conspiracy (a) Definition of conspiracy.- A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he' (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct with constitutes such crime... (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime... (e) Overt act. - No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime unless an overt act in pursuant of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.45 As our Supreme Court has stated' "To sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant (1) entered an agreement to commit or aid in 39 Notes of testimony, p. 86. 40 Notes of testimony, p. 94. 4~ Notes of testimony, p. 87. 42 Notes of testimony, p. 89. 43 Notes of testimony, p. 90. 44 Notes of testimony, pp. 90-91. 45 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903. an unlawful act with another person or persons, (2) with a shared criminal intent and, (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271,283,684 A.2d 1025, 1030 (1996). We are satisfied that the facts, as related above, along with the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, are sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that this Defendant is guilty of conspiracy. The jury obviously concluded that the actions of the three Defendants fit the drag trafficking scheme as described by Trooper Leydig. 'Co-defendant Hooten was driving a borrowed car late at night coming from New York with Smith. There was a small amount of marijuana planted under the front passenger seat where it would be easily discovered by the police if they were stopped. The fact that Hooten and Smith were acting in concert with Defendant Moss is clearly established by the fact that Moss stopped to aid them when the Camaro ran off the road. There is no other logical explanation why a man carrying over $200,000 worth of illegal drags in his air cleaner would stop to help. Rather than wait for the tow track, all three fled the scene together in Moss's Nissan. 46 Add to this scenario the "identical" small amounts of marijuana in the Nissan and Camaro, the abandonment of the Camaro, and the ridiculous explanations given by Hooten for his actions,47 the jury had more than sufficient evidence upon which to base its conclusion that Smith and Hooten had agreed to aid Moss in the transportation of the crack cocaine. 46 While evidence of flight alone is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, it is relevant and admissible to establish an inference of guilt. Commonwealth v, qiorby, 527 Pa. 98, 588 A.2d 902 (1991). 47 One of the various scenarios Hooten floated was that he was joyriding in a car without a driver's side window on a cold snowy night. In this Commonwealth we routinely advise jurors to use their reaso~ and common sense in evaluating the evidence. Looking at the above facts, there is no reasonable or common sense explanation of the conduct of the three defendants on the night in question, other than that they were acting in concert to transport a large quantity of crack cocaine. Failure To Grant Request For A Mistrial. During the direct examinatio, n of Trooper Leydig the following exchange took place: ., Q. Now, following your search, did you have occasion to speak to any of the defendants in this case? A .... I believe I had taken Mr. Smith, Levar Smith, which is seated by Mr. Milkes, into the holding cell, shortly before 11 a.m. on the 15th' I read him the criminal complaint and the affidavit, what he was being charged with, again, and why. I then read him his Miranda warnings. He acknowledged those. I asked him if' he wished to answer any questions, talk to me, you know, have any explanation for this - - Q. Let me stop you there. Did he tell you anything about where he was coming from or where he was going? A. Yes. He stated he was coming from New York, going to Hagerstown. MR. MILKES' May we approach for a moment, Your Honor?48 The Defendant's attorney found the above exchange objectionable and requested a mistrial. He stated his reasons as follows' MR. MILKES' I have to make a motion for a mistrial, I think, at this point with regard to the mentioning of Miranda warnings. It is going to become clear he decided not to speak. It is making a point that he exercised that right.49 48 Notes of testimony, pp. 88, 89. 49 Notes of testimony, p. 89. A mistrial should be granted "only where an event prejudicial to defendant occurs at thai and where the unavoidable effect of that event is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Commonwealth v. Brown, 544 Pa. 406, 676 A.2d 1178 (1996). In the instant case, we did not feel that the exchange between the prosecutor and the trooper came even remotely close to justifying the grant of a mistrial. Defehdant's counsel argues that the exchange improperly highlighted Defendant's decision not to speak. We disagree. The prosecutor understood the danger and immediately redirected the officer's testimony. We cannot imagine how the jury could have inferred that the Defendant had exercised his fight not to speak to the officer. To the contrary, the jury was left with the clear impression that the Defendant had, in fact, answered the question put to him by the officer. Therefore, there was no reason to grant a mistrial. Refusal Of Defendant's Point For Charge. At the conclusion of our charge to the jury, we asked counsel to approach the bench to discuss any additions or corrections. Defendant's counsel made the following request: MR. MILKES: Your Honor, I am not sure that I can say that there are any major principles contained in my instructions that weren't covered. I think the main difference would be in my first set of instructions having to do with possession and constructive possession, I do have additional language to further rename and define that term, based upon some court cases that I cited, in addition to the standard jury instruction.5° We denied the request on the basis that the law was fully covered in the standard jury instruction which was given.5~ 50 Notes of testimony, p. 130 52 Notes of testimony, p. 130 10 We have broad discretion in phrasing the charge and can choose our own wording so long as the law is accurately presented to the jury. Commonwealth v. Hawkins., 549 Pa. 352, 391,701 A.2d 492, 511 (1997), cert. denied, U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 1535, 140 L.Ed 2nd 685 (1998). Stated another way, we need not accept counsel's wording for an instruction, as long as the charge given correctly reflects the law. Commonwealth v... Ohle, 503 Pa. 566, 582, 470 A.2d 61, 70 (1983). Defendant's counsel conceded that our charge was appropriate. He merely requested that we use his language to further clarify certain points. Under those circumstances we were within our discretion to deny the 52 request..~ NOVEMBER/0~ ,1999 Edward E. Guido, J. Jaime Keating, Esquire For the Commonwealth Samuel W. Milkes, Esquire For the Defendant :sld 52 While we rejected the exact wording of the Defendant's proposed point for charge, we did give counsel leeway to argue the requested language to the jury. See Notes of testimony p. 130. 11