Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-1669 criminalCOMMONWEALTH go LISA ANN OWENS · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : : : ' NO. 99-1669 CRIMINAL TERM : : IN RE' DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE GUIDO, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this .~//,C?' day of DECEMBER, '1999, for the reasons stated in the attached opinion, the relief requested in Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. By Edward E. Guido, J. Joba~ A. Abom, Esquire For the Commonwealth P. Richard Wagner, Esquire For the Defendant :sld COMMONWEALTH go LISA ANN OWENS · IN Tile COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · ' 99-1669 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE GUID_O., J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT The Defendant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a Motion to Suppress Evidence. She alleges that the initial stop of her vehicle was inappropriate, the statements she made to Officer Cornelius were obtained in violation of her Miranda rights,~ and that her medical records were seized in violation of her constitutional fights. An evidentiary hearing was held before this Court on December 8, 1999. Both parties were directed to file briefs in support of their respective positions. This matter is now ready for disposition. F1NDINOS OF FACT Shortly after midnight on May 7, 1999, Officer Comelious of the Camp Hill Police Department was on routine patrol in a marked vehicle. While patrolling along the Camp Hill by-pass, he noticed the Defendant's car pulling away from him. He was travelling thirty-six (36) miles per hour. The posted speed limit was thirty-five (35) mile per hour. He increased his speed to catch up to her vehicle so that he could perform a Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed 2nd 694 (1966). 99-1669 CKIM~AL clock. He clocked her for 3/10 of a mile and determined that she was travelling fifty-one (51) miles per hour. The officer also noticed the Defendant's vehicle weaving within its lane of travel. At one point she had to jerk suddenly to avoid hitting the concrete medial strip. He continued to follow her for a short distance. As they approached the next intersection, she drove into the left hand mm lane and came to a stop at the red light. The left hand mm lane was controlled by its own traffic signal. The officer pulled in directly behind her vehicle. When the light changed to green, the Defendant did not move. She did not proceed through the light until it mined yellow. The officer followed her through the light and initiated a traffic stop. The Defendant pulled over and stopped her vehicle. As the officer began walking toward her car, the Defendant took off. The officer ran back to his vehicle, began pursuit and called for back up. The Defendant pulled over again a short distance down the road. The officer approached the vehicle and asked the Defendant for her license and registration. She had difficulty with her wallet but eventually fumbled through and obtained the documents. The officer noticed an odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant. He also noticed that her speech was slurred and that her eyes were glassy. After receiving her license and registration, Officer Cornelius asked where she was coming from and how much she had had to drink. The Defendant responded to these questions. The officer then administered the standard field sobriety tests, which she failed. When the officer advised her that she was under arrest for driving under the influence, she became belligerent and indicated that she was not going to be arrested. 99-1669 CRIMINAL The officer handchffed her and placed her in the patrol vehicle. At that point she demanded to talk te her lawyer. The Defendant was taken to the Harrisburg Hospital for a blood alcohol test. While on route to the hospital, she squirmed out of the handcuffs and threw them at Officer Cornelius. As she threw the cuffs, she stated "I may be drank, but I'm not blatantly drunk to the point of killing someone." She made several additional statements during the trip to the hospital. All of the statements were made spontaneously. None of the statements were in response to police questioning. While at the Harrisburg Hospital, Defendant was advised of the warnings under the implied cOnsent law. When the officer asked her to sign the form acknowledging that she had received the warnings, she replied" I'm not signing a f--- ing thing until I speak with my lawyer". The officer again asked if she would submit to a test and she again responded emphatically and profanely that she would not, unless and until she got to speak with her lawyer. The officer then transported her to the West Shore Booking Center. At no time during the course of events related herein did Officer Cornelius advise the Defendant of her Miranda rights. While at the West Shore Booking Center the Defendant became belligerent and argumentative with the booking agents. A scuffle ensued and the Defendant received a black eye. Although Officer Cornelius was present to witness the scuffle, he eventually left Defendant in the custody of the booking center agents and resumed his patrol duties. Subsequently he received a call from the booking center indicating that the Defendant had requested treatment for the injuries she had sustained. An ambulance was summoned to transport her to the Holy Spirit Hospital. However, because of her belligerent 99-1669 CKIM~AL behavior, the crew refused to transport her without being accompanied by the police. Officer Cornelius was assigned to accompany the ambulance to the hospital. During the course of a conversation with her treating physician, Officer Cornelius learned that blood had been taken from the Defendant for medical purposes. He eventually obtained a search warrant for the medical records containing the alcohol test results. A copy of the search warrant was admitted into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit #2. DISCUSSION Initial Stop of Defendant's Vehicle. Section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code authorizes a police officer to perform an investigatory stop to check the license and registration of a motorist if he has "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation" of the Vehicle Code. 75 Pa. C.S.A. {} 6308(b). Defendant's argument that no such articulable and reasonable grounds existed in the instant case is clearly without merit. The officer had a reasonable basis to stop her vehicle to investigate possible violations of Section 3362 (maximum speed limits)2 and Section 3731 (driving under the influence). ~ Commonwealth v. Starr, 739 A.2d 191 2 Defendant argues that there was no credible evidence presented to support the officer's conclusion that she was speeding. She points to the fact that the certificate of speedometer accuracy entered into evidence as COmmonwealth Exhibit 1 was a photocopy. Citing Commonwealth v, Gummings, 338 Pa. Super 149, 487 A,2d 897 (1985) she contends that the photocopy should not have been admitted. However, the C~ummings decision can be distinguished from the case at bar. In _Cummings the defendant was on trial for the offense of speeding. The Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the speedometer was accurate. In the instant case, the Commonwealth need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer had reasonable and articulable grounds to suspect that a violation had occurred. Therefore, so long as the officer thought that the speedometer had been properly tested for accuracy, the Commonwealth has met its burden. 99-1669 CRIMINAL (Pa. Super 1999).3 Statements Made By The Defendant. It is elementary that no custodial interrogation can take place unless a defendant has been advised of the fight against self incrimination and to counsel. Miranda v~. Arizona, supra. However, it is equally elementary that the procedural safeguards of Miranda apply only to statements made in response to police questioning. In other words, volunteered or spontaneous statements are admissible even though a defendant did not receive Miranda warnings. Commonwealth v. Baez, 554 Pa. 66, 720 A.2d 711 (1998). Except for her response to the question at the time of the initial stop, all statements made by this Defendant to Officer Comelious were spontaneous and volunteered.4 Immediately after receiving the Defendant's license and registration, the officer asked her how much she had had to drink. There is no doubt that the question amounted to "interrogation." However, there is also no doubt that the question could be properly asked without first advising the Defendant of her Miranda.rights. It is well settled that ordinary traffic stops are not considered custodial for purposes of Miranda. See Commonwealth v. Proctor, 441 Pa. Super. 176, 657 A.2d 8, (1995) and _Commonwealth v, 3 Even if the initial stop of the Defendant's vehicle was not justified under Section 6308(b), the final stop of Defendant was justified. See Commonwealth v, Scattone, 448 Pa. Super. 533,672 A.2d 345 (1996), in which the Superior Court held that a defendant could be convicted of fleeing or attempting to elude for refusing to stop under Section 3733(a) even if the officer was not authorized to order the stop under Section 6308(b). a Defendant argues.that the refusal to submit to chemical testing of her blood was the result of police questioning and should be suppressed. However, it has long been the law of this Commonwealth that the oral refusal to submit to such testing is non-testimonial in nature. Therefore, the ~ warnings are not applicable. _Commonwealth v, Dougherty, 25'9 Pa. Super. 88, 393 A.2d 730 (1978); Commonwq:alth w Graham, 703 A.2d 510 (Pa. Super. 1997). 99-1669 CRIMINAL Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S.Ct. 205, 102 L.Ed 172 (1988). For the reasons set forth above, we hold that none of the statements made by the Defendant to Officer Comelious during thc course of the evening were obtained in violation of her Miranda fights. Therefore, we are satisfied that her motion to suppress them should be denied. Validity Of Seizure Of Medical Records. In Count III of her motion the Defendant requests that we suppress the medical records which were seized pursuant to a search warrant. We assume that this issue has been waived since it was not addressed in her brief. 5 In any event, we are convinced that the issue is without merit. A search warrant was properly obtained and the medical records are admissible on that basis.6 See Commonwealth v..Reidel, 539 Pa. 172, 651 A.2d 135 (1994). Commonwealth v. Urbanski, 426 Pa. Super. 505,627 A.2d 789 (1994). ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 31ST day of DECEMBER, 1999, for the reasons stated in the attached opinion, the relief requested in Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. John A. Abom, Esquire For the Commonwealth By the Court, P. Richard Wagner, Esquire For the Defendant /S/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. s See Local Rule 210-7. 6 Count IV of the motion sought to have the medical records excluded from evidence at trial on other grounds. The parties agreed that if Defendant wished to pursue the objections on other grounds she would do so by way of a motion in limine.