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HomeMy WebLinkAbout669 S 2002 KATHERINE M. JOHNSON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : vs. : DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION : PACSES NO. 639104710 CRAIG SCHILLING, : Defendant : 02-0669 SUPPORT IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 Craig Schilling appeals, pro se, from our April 16, 2007, order awarding counsel fees in favor of the plaintiff in this case and against him in the amount of $4,000.00. The matter was recently remanded to us for a determination of an award of additional counsel fees in what the Superior Court aptly referred to as a “long and tortured case.” In its memorandum opinion, filed January 3, 2007, the Superior Court described the history of the case thusly. On July 30, 2002, Katherine Wetzel (now Katherine Johnson) filed a Complaint for Support against Schilling. A domestic relations conference was held, genetic testing confirmed that Schilling was the biological father of the child in question, and an interim order of support against Schilling was entered on October 25, 2002. At Schilling’s request, a Master’s Hearing was held on February 4, 2003, and a Report and Recommendation was filed. Pertinent to the appeal currently before us, the issue of mileage reimbursement was raised during the Master’s hearing. Based on the Master’s Report and Recommendation, an Interim Order was filed on February 11, 2003. Schilling filed exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendation, including an allegation that the Master had erred with regard to the mileage reimbursement issue. The exceptions were dismissed by a June 26, 2003 order of the lower court, which also made permanent the February 11, 2003 Interim Order. On July 16, 2003, Schilling filed a Petition to Modify the October 25, 2002 interim support NO. 02-0669 SUPPORT order. It did not dispute the resolution to the mileage reimbursement issue reached by the June 26, 2003 order of the lower court. On September 16, 2003, an Interim Order was filed in response to Schilling’s July 16, 2003 Petition to Modify, but Schilling appealed the order and requested a de novo hearing. Following delays occasioned by discovery, a hearing was held before a Support Master on December 15, 2004. On January 20, 2005, the Master issued his Report and Recommendation, and an Interim Order based thereon was entered the same day. Schilling filed 23 exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendation, while Johnson filed three exceptions. In addition to filing exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendation, Schilling filed a Petition for Special Relief on March 4, 2005. Johnson filed a response to that petition, and requested that she be awarded attorney’s fees. Before his exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendation were dealt with, Shilling [sic] filed the Petition for Retroactive Modification currently at issue on April 18, 2005, asking the lower court to “retroactively correct the Order of the Court dated February 11, 2003.” Petition filed 4/18/05. Johnson filed a response, and again requested that she be awarded attorney’s fees. A hearing was held on July 27, 2005 to deal with these filings. The Petition for Special Relief was eventually denied by an order of the lower court dated July 27, 2005, filed August 2, 2005. In addition, the lower court filed the following order nd on August 3, 2005: “AND NOW, this 2 day of August, 2005, the petition of the defendant for retroactive modification of support order is DENIED. The defendant is, further, ordered to pay counsel fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $500.00.” Order dated 8/2/05, filed 8/3/05. It is this order which is currently before us on appeal. 2 NO. 02-0669 SUPPORT Superior Court Memorandum, January 3, 2007, pp. 1-3. The Superior Court went on to affirm our dismissal of the defendant’s petition for “Retroactive Modification of Support Order” and our award of counsel fees. The Court went on to conclude with the following directive: In addition to affirming the lower court’s order, we grant Johnson’s petition for counsel fees incurred from the July 27, 2005 hearing forward. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the August 2, 2005 order of the lower court, grant Johnson’s petition for counsel fees as they relate to this appeal, and remand to the lower court for a determination of the amount of those fees. Superior Court Memorandum, January 3, 2007, p. 4. Pursuant to this instruction, we held a hearing in March of 2007 with respect to the amount of counsel fees to be assessed. At the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel submitted a detailed statement of his billings in which he painstakingly separated out attorney’s fees attributable to the issues and time period of the litigation referenced in the Superior Court’s most recent remand. Mr. Griffie’s billing statement indicates fees and costs of that appeal in the amount of $6,018.64. Interestingly, Mr. Schilling admitted at the hearing that he thought that an award of $3,000.00 would be “a pretty good number.” N.T. 10. Based on an hourly rate of $250.00, the demand of $6,000.00 was not unrealistic. In awarding $4,000.00 in attorney’s fees we simply concluded that approximately two-thirds of the amount claimed was more “reasonable.” Earlier in this case, we found the defendant to be culpable for intentionally vexatious conduct. The Superior Court agreed, concluding that his obdurate conduct had continued into the appeal stage. In accordance with the directive of the Superior Court, we have awarded 3 NO. 02-0669 SUPPORT counsel fees. In what is either incredible chutzpah or a substantial lapse in judgment, the defendant has again appealed. In his statement of matters complained of on appeal, Mr. Schilling acknowledges that we have the “responsibility and prerogative to decide what is ‘reasonable’ in the amount of attorney’s fees in this case ….” He then goes on to complain that in the face of “the evidence and testimony presented the award of $4,000.00 would appear to be arbitrary and more a negotiation than a decision.” In essence, he complains that we may have compromised. Any compromise of an amount less than $6,000.00 is clearly in Mr. Schilling’s favor. His failure to understand that would be mind boggling but for the past history of this case, which demonstrates that his use of the legal system is less litigation and more machination. It is true that in fashioning an award of attorney’s fees in this case, we gave Mr. Schilling the benefit of any 1 doubt. It is also true that he now complains that we did so. July , 2007 __________________________ Kevin A. Hess, J. Bradley Griffie, Esquire For the Plaintiff Craig Schilling, Pro Se 6 Cardinal Drive Carlisle, PA 17013 Defendant :rlm 1 The Superior Court may rest assured that if this matter is remanded with a direction to assess yet additional legal fees or impose some other sanction, we will perform our duty with alacrity. 4