Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-6548 civilCARLISLE AUTO PLAZA, INC. a/k/a CARS BY GETTEL, INC. and ERIC J. WIENER, Plaintiffs Ve GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA AND J. RODNEY FICKEL INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : · : :. : · NO. 98-6548 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION- LAW IN RE- MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS FILED BY DEFENDANT J, RODNEY FICKEL INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., O!~ER, GUIDO, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of MAY, 2000, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant J. Rodney Fickel Insurance Agency, Inc., is GRANTED and the complaint, as to said defendant, is DISMISSED. By the Court, Edward E. Gu .o, J. Eric J. Wiener, Esquire G. Thomas Miller, Esquire Douglas B. Marcello, Esquire :sld CARLISLE AUTO PLAZA, INC. a/k/a CARS BY GETTEL, INC. and ERIC J. WIENER, Plaintiffs ge GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA and J. RODNEY FICKEL INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., Defendants · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · · · ·NO. 98-6548 CIVIL TERM o o o IN RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS FILED BY DEFENDANT J. RODNEY FICKEL INSURANCE AGENCY, INC, BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER, GUIDO, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a praecipe for writ of summons on November 17, 1998. On December 10, 1999, a Rule was issued upon plaintiffs to file a complaint. A complaint was filed on February 10, 2000. On February 25, 2000, Defendant J. Rodney Fickel Insurance Agency, Inc. (hereinafter "Fickel") filed an answer with new matter and counterclaim. The pleadings between those parties were completed when plaintiffs filed a reply. Currently before us is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant Fickel. The parties have briefed their respective positions and this matter is now ready for disposition. DISCUSSION Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1034(a) provides that "(a)fter the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay the trial, any party may 98-6548 CIVIL TERM move for judgment on the pleadings." Only the pleadings between the parties to the motion need be closed prior to the filing of the motion.~ A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted where the pleadings demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hammerstein v. Linds.ay., 440 Pa. Super. 350, 655 A.2d 597, 600-601 (1995). We must accept as true all well pleaded facts of the non-moving party, and any other facts which he has specifically admitted. Id. Judgment on the pleadings should be granted only in cases which are clear and free from doubt such that a trial would be fruitless. Applying the above standard to the case at bar, we are satisfied that Defendant Fickel is entitled to judgment on the pleadings. On July 12, 1994, Plaintiff Eric Wiener (hereinafter "Wiener") acting on behalf of Plaintiff Carlisle Auto Plaza, Inc. (hereinafter "Auto Plaza") purchased a vehicle from another dealer.2 The vehicle was subsequently sold by plaintiffs.3 It tums out that the vehicle was stolen.4 Plaintiffs were required to reimburse the ultimate purchaser for the cost of the vehicle plus legal fees.s Defendant Fickel was the insurance agent for Plaintiff Auto Plaza.6 Plaintiff Auto Plaza had contracted with Defendant Fickel for "full and complete coverage for the automobile dealership.''? On September 20, 1994, plaintiffs put Defendant Fickel on notice of a possible Comment to Pa. R.C.P. 1034(a). Complaint paragraph 5. Complaint paragraph 6. Complaint paragraph 7. Complaint paragraph 8. Complaint paragraph 11. Complaint paragraphs 13 and 17. 98-6548 CIVIL TERM claim in that the subject vehicle might be stolen.8 At that time they were advised that their insurance policy did not cover any such loss.9 On October 20, 1994, an 10 endorsement was added to the policy to include such coverage. This action was brought by Plaintiffs in an effort to recover their loss stemming from the purchase and sale of the aforementioned car.~l They allege that Defendant Fickel is liable "for breach of contract in its failure to... obtain full and complete coverage..." for Plaintiff Auto Plaza.~2 In its new matter, Defendant Fickel alleges that plaintiffs' action is time barred. We agree. The statute of limitations for contract actions is four years.~3 Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until they discovered that the vehicle was stolen and realized that they did not have the coverage for which that they had allegedly contracted. It is their position that this date was November 23, 1994, when they 14 discovered that "the subject vehicle was, in fact, stolen. Under the "discovery rule" the statute of limitations in a contract action begins to run when "the injured party becomes aware or reasonably should have been aware of his injury or its cause." Grouse v. Cyclops Industries, 704 A.2d 1090, 1094 (Pa. Super. 1997). The point in time when an injured party should have been aware of his injury is typically a question of fact. Id. However, "where the facts are so clear that reasonable 8 Complaint paragraph 14. 9 Complaint paragraph 14. l0 Complaint paragraph 15. ~ Plaintiff Auto Plaza has assigned all of its interest in this claim to plaintiff Wiener. See complaint 2aragraph 9. Complaint paragraph 19. ~3 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525. We will assume for purposes of discussion that plaintiffs have correctly labeled this a breach o-f contract action. However, there is considerable merit in defendant Fickel's argument that the action really sounds in negligence and is subject to a two year statute of limitations. 14 Complaint paragraph 16. 98-6548 CIVIL TERM minds cannot differ.., the commencement of the limitation period (may) be determined as a matter of law." Id. quoting Sadtler v. Jack$or~ Cross Company, 402 Pa. Super. 492, 500, 587 A.2d 727, 731 (1991). Such is the case in the matter before us. Plaintiffs notified Defendant Fickel on September 20, 1994, that the vehicle might be stolen. On the same day they were advised that they did not have the coverage for which they had allegedly contracted. If a contract to provide "full and complete coverage" existed, plaintiffs were aware of its breach on that date. The statute of limitations clearly began to mn at that time. Since the instant action was not filed until November 18, 1998, it is time barred. For the reasons set forth above, we will grant Defendant Fickel's motion for judgment on the pleadings. ORDER AND NOW, this ,~$'~¥' day of MAY, 2000, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant J. Rodney Fickel Insurance Agency, Inc. is GRANTED and the complaint, as to said defendant, is DISMISSED. By the Court, Eric J. Wiener, Esquire /$/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. G. Thomas Miller, Esquire Douglas B. Marcello, Esquire :sld