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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-3864 civilMEGAN THERES, a minor, · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF by JUDY THERES, as GUARDIAN, and IN HER OWN RIGHT, Plaintiffs Vo EMBERS INN, INC., Defendant · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · · NO. 99-3864 CIVIL TERM · · · CIVIL ACTION- LAW IN RE' OPINION PURSUANT TO PA RULE 1925 Guido, J., August 24, 2000 On April 28, 1999, we sustained defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice. In this timely appeal, plaintiffs allege that we improperly applied the standard for sustaining a demurrer.1 FACT[JAL BACKOR0~D The minor plaintiff attended a birthday party for a friend. The party consisted of four (4) children of mixed gender and ranging in ages from 12 to 14 years.2 The party was to include a sleepover. Minor plaintiff's mother was told that the sleepover would be at the friend's residence.3 However, the sleepover was actually held in a room at the motel owned and operated by defendant.4 Refer to Plaintiff's Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. Amended complaint paragraphs 4, 9. Amended complaint paragraph 7. Amended complaint paragraph 8. 99-3864 CIVIL TERM The friend's father registered for the room at the defendant motel.5 He provided the room key to the children and returned home, leaving the children attended only by the seventeen (17) year old step sister of the birthday celebrant.6 During the course of the day, and well into the night, the children used the pool and other common facilities at the defendant motel.7 Defendant's employees had numerous opportunities to see the children using its facilities without adult supervision,a· Employees of the defendant were in the room on at least two occasions after midnight to deliver additional bedding.9 The appearance of the room made it clear that a party was in progress.~° The employees did nothing to confirm that the children were being supervised by an adult.~l The partygoers, as well as the 17 year old step sister, eventually went to sleep. Minor plaintiff fell asleep in a bed with two party guests, at least one of which was a male.~2 During the course of the night one of the minor plaintiff's bedmates woke her up and had sexual intercourse with her.~3 Minor plaintiff neither consented nor desired to engage in the sexual intercourse which resulted in the loss of her virginity.TM DISCUSSION The standard to be applied to preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer was succinctly stated by our Supreme Court as follows: Amended complaint paragraph 12. Amended complaint paragraphs 10, 12. Amended complaint paragraph 17. Amended complaint paragraphs 12 - 24, 25 - 33. Amended complaint paragraphs 36, 42. l0 Amended complaint paragraphs 35, 43, 46. ~ Amended complaint paragraphs 40, 44, 47. ~2 Amended complaint paragraphs 48, 49. ~3 Amended complaint paragraphs 50- 52. 24 Amended complaint paragraphs 53- 55. 99-3864 CIVIL TERM A demurrer can only be sustained where the complaint is clearly insufficient to establish the pleader's right to relief. For the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits as tree all well-pleaded, material, relevant facts, and every inference fairly deducible from those facts. -- --::.-'. .... · o o Since the sustaining of a demurrer results in a denial of the pleader, s claim or a dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. (citations · omitted). Allegheny County v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 372 490 A.2d 402 (1985). Applying the above standard to the case at bar, we are satisfied that plaintiffs' amended complaint clearly and without a doubt failed to state a cause of action. In order to state a cause of action in negligence, the plaintiff must establish (1) a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach of duty and resulting harm, and (4) actual loss or damage. T.A.v. Allen, 447 Pa. Super. 302, 669 A.2d 360 (1995). Where there is no duty, there can be no negligence. Maxwell v. Keas, 433 Pa. Super 70, 639 A.2d 1215 (1994). Under the circumstances existing in the instant case, we concluded as a matter of law that defendant motel owed no duty to plaintiffs. In Wenrick v. Schloemann- Siemag Aktiengesellschafi, 523 Pa. 1,564 A.2d 1244 (1989) our Supreme Court stated: Before a person may be subject to liability for failing to act in a given situation, it must be established that the person has a duty to act; if no care is due, it is meaningless to assert that a person failed to act with due care. Certain relations between parties may give rise to such a duty. Although each person may be.said to have a relationship with the world at large that creates a duty to act where his own conduct places others in peril, Anglo-American common law has for centuries accepted the fundamental premise that mere knowledge of a dangerous 99-3864 CIVIL TERM situation, even by one who has the ability to intervene, is not sufficient to create a duty to act. Id. at 8, 564 A.2d at 1248. Stated another way, a defendant cannot be held liable for injury caused by the criminal conduct of another in the absence of a special r-dlati'6iiship "' imposing a duty. Feld v. Merriam, 50'6 Pa. 383,485 A.2d 742 (1984).~5 In Feld v, Merriam, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that an innkeeper may, under certain circumstances, be subject to liability for the intentionally harmful acts of third persons. The Feld court indicated that such liability is predicated upon Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) Torts which provides as follows' § 344. Business Premises Open to Public: Acts of Third Persons or Animals A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it. See also Section 315 of Restatement of Torts (Second) which provides as follows: § 315. General Principle There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection. 99-3864 CIVIL TERM However, the .Feld court further indicated that the duty imposed by Section 344 is limited by f comment thereto which provides as follows'16 f. Duty to police premises. Since the possessor is not an-i-nstii't~r of "' the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is · likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he haS no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection. (emphasis added) Plaintiffs have not pled any facts which would justify an inference that the motel employees should have known that minor plaintiff would be sexually assaulted by a party guest. Furthermore, the duty imposed by Section 344 is primarily designed to protect against the intentionally harmful acts of unknown third persons.~7 It is not designed to protect those who enter upon the premises together from intentionally harming each other. A motel owner should not be put in the position of having to police what goes on between invited guests in the privacy of their own rooms. To hold otherwise would result in far reaching and unintended consequences. In the instant case, the room was properly rented by an adult. He made the decision to allow the children to stay under the supervision of a 17 year old. The motel ~6 Comment "f" of Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) Torts was adopted by the Supreme Court in Moran v, Valley Forge Drive-In Theater, Inc,, 431 Pa. 432, 246 A.2d'875 (1968). 17 See Feld v. Mcrriam, supra. 99-3864 CIVIL TERM employees were under no duty to second guess that decision. For that reason, the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action. August ~q , 2000 Edward E. Guido, J. Peter J. Russo, Esquire For the Plaintiff Todd B. Narvol, Esquire For the Defendant :sld