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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-2015 criminalCOMMONWEALTH go JERMAINE WATKINS OTN: F271807-4 · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ·/CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 98-2015 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE' OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 Guido, J., November 13, 2000 On July 12, 1999, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to one count of criminal attempt to murder and one count of aggravated assault in full satisfaction of numerous charges filed at this term and number.~ The plea was entered subject to an agreement whereby petitioner received consecutive sentences of 9 to 18 years imprisonment on each count. No direct appeal was filed. On May 5, 2000, petitioner filed a motion for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9541, et seq.). On May 8, 2000, counsel was appointed to represent him. An evidentiary hearing was held on September 1, 2000. At the conclusion of the hearing we denied petitioner's request for relief. This timely appeal followed. Petitioner has filed a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa. Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). He alleges that his request for post conviction relief should have been granted because of the following' ~ Among the crimes charged was a count of first degree murder for which the Commonwealth had indicated its intention to seek the death penalty. NO. 98-2015 CRIMINAL (1.) His counsel should have obtained additional ballistic tests to determine if any of the bullets fired by petitioner struck the deceased victim. (2.) His counsel should have done more investigation to determine if"maybe a third person shot Mr. Banks.''2 (3.) He was coaxed into pleading guilty because he was "scared of a federal charge being brought against him.''3 We are satisfied that each of his allegations of error are without merit. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The factual basis for the plea was set forth in the guilty plea colloquy as follows: MR. SCHWOYER: The facts in support of this plea, Your Honor, are that on May 25th, 1998 shortly before 5'00 p.m., the Defendant, Jermaine Watkins, and Ronnie Johnson entered Memorial Park in the Borough of Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The Defendant and Johnson were looking for Robert "Rocky" Anderson, Jr., to settle a dispute which had been ongoing over the Memorial Day weekend. The Defendant was in possession of a .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun and Johnson was in possession of a .22 caliber revolver. The Defendant approached Rocky Anderson while Anderson was playing basketball. An argument ensued between the Defendant and Rocky Anderson. In the course of the argument, the Defendant began to discharge his weapon at Rocky Anderson intentionally striking Anderson numerous times including a shot in the stomach and a shot in his back as Anderson ran for cover, causing Anderson serious bodily injury. During the shooting, a bystander, Anthony Shannon Banks, was struck by bullets and fell to the ground. Anthony Shannon Banks died from multiple gunshot wounds. A subsequent autopsy revealed that Banks was struck with bullets fired from both the .22 caliber and the .380 caliber firearms. Specifically a .380 caliber bullet was removed from Anthony Shannon Banks' leg by Dr. Wayne Ross. THE COURT' Okay, The attempted murder is with regard to Mr. - - MR. SCHWOYER: Anderson THE COURT' -- Anderson? MR. SCHWOYER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT' And the serious bodily injury is with regard to Mr. Banks? 2 Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. 3 Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. NO. 98-2015 CRIMINAL MR. SCHWOYER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is that correct? Mr. Banks is the decedent, the one that passed away in this case? MR. SCHWOYER: That is correct. THE COURT: Mr. Watkins, do you understand the factual basis, the factual scenario that forms the basis of this plea? In other words, the allegations are that you attempted to kill Mr. Anderson and that you intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life caused serious bodily injury to Mr. Banks. Do you understand the factual basis for this plea, sir? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Are you prepared to admit that's what you did? THE DEFENDANT: Well, I admit to shooting Anderson, but Banks - - I say it was recklessly, but I didn't intend to- - THE COURT: You didn't intend to hurt Mr. Banks, but what you' re telling me is that you agreed that your conduct was reckless and you believe that he could be seriously injured as a result of that conduct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT' So you're prepared to admit that factual basis? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Urn-hum.4 Furthermore, during the course of the colloquy, the following exchange took place: THE COURT: And my understanding is the only agreement in this case is that the District Attorney will take these two - - pleas to these two charges in full satisfaction of all other charges at this term and number, and there will be a set sentence in the aggregate, 18 to 36 years. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Are there any other agreements that this Court should be aware of or that you think exist? MR. THOMAS' Your Honor, it's my understanding that there will be no request made to federal authorities to bring additional charges. THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Schwoyer? MR. SCHWOYER: That's correct. With this plea there will be no referral from our office to the federal - - to the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Middles District to bring any additional charges related to drug distribution in the Carlisle area. Petitioner does not contest the fact that he emptied his .380 caliber semi- automatic in an attempt to shoot Mr. Anderson in a crowded park. The following Guilty Plea and Sentence Colloquy, July 12, 1999, pp. 2-5. Guilty Plea and Sentence Colloquy, July 12, 1999, pp. 5-6. NO. 98-2015 CRIMINAL exchange took place between the Court and petitioner at the evidentiary hearing: Q. Okay. Let me understand this. What you're saying is you're not contesting that you shot - - was it a .380? A. Yeah. Q. At these gentlemen, but you're contesting whether or not you hit them; is that correct? A. Can you repeat that? Q. In other words, you agree, as you did in the colloquy, that you shot a .380 pistol at these two men, but you're - - A. No, no. I never said I shot it at two men. I basically said Anderson. I ain't never said nothing about Banks. Q. Okay. But you're questioning then whether or not you hit anybody, and if you did hit anybody, did you hit them in a vital area? A. Yes. Q. Okay. I understand that issue, and so - - and you're also saying that while you shot at Mr. - - that you did not shoot at Mr. Banks. You only shot at Mr. Anderson; is that right? A. Yes. Q. And that you pled to Mr. Banks on the grounds that- - A. - - it was reckless. Q. That it was reckless? A. Yes. Q. And you're saying that Mr. Thomas should have done more investigation to see if maybe a third person had shot that? A. Yes. Because it says in the - - some people in the witness - - I mean witnesses said that they seen somebody else come from out of the bushes, saying that they seen another co-defendant come out of the bushes and shot, and I know the day it happened everybody was hysterical and a lot of people that made statements don't know what really happened.6 DISCUSSION To be eligible for relief under any Post Conviction Relief Act petition, petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence arose from one or more of the factors enumerated at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §9543(a)(2). Commonwealth v. Allen.., 557 Pa. 135,732 A.2d 582 (1999). The relevant portions of that section provide as follows' 6 See PCRA Proceedings September 1, 2000, pp. 11-13. NO. 98-2015 CRIMINAL (a) General rule.-To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following: (2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the following: (ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. (iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent. 42 Pa. C.S.A. {} 9543(a)(2)(ii) and (iii). Petitioner has not established his fight to relief under either of these sections. While petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective for not doing a more thorough investigation, our appellate Courts have consistently held that the truth determining process is not involved in cases where the defendant has entered a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Woodrow, 743 A.2d 458 (Pa. Super. 1999); Commonwealth v. Shekerko, 432 Pa. Super. 610, 639 A.2d 810 (1994), appeal denied 539 Pa. 677, 652 A.2d 1322 (1994). Therefore, his claim under 42 Pa. C.S.A. {} 9543(a)(2)(ii) must fail. In order to be eligible for relief under Section 9543(a)(2)(iii), petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and that he is innocent. After hearing the evidence, we concluded that he did not sustain his burden of proof in connection with either of those propositions. With regard to the issue of the unlawfully induced plea, petitioner's attorney testified that he did not attempt to coerce petitioner into entering the plea. We found that testimony to be credible. Counsel did nothing more than advise petitioner of his options and give him an honest opinion as NO. 98-2015 CRIMINAL to his prospects for success. We are also satisfied that petitioner's plea was not induced by a threat of federal prosecution. The decision to plead guilty was arrived at by petitioner, after consultation with his counsel, because of the Commonwealth's willingness to forego prosecution of the other more serious offenses with which he was charged in this case. The federal charges were made part of the plea agreement merely as 7 a precautionary measure. Furthermore, petitioners claim for relief must also fail since he has not come forward with any evidence tending to prove his innocence. See Commonwealth v. Woodrow, supra. Petitioner alleges that his counsel should have done more investigation to determine if"maybe" a third person shot Mr. Banks.8 However, at the evidentiary hearing, he offered no evidence to prove that he did not shoot Mr. Banks. He merely testified that he was not sure if a stray bullet from his gun hit the decedent. There were two shooters in the park.9 There were two different types of bullets removed from the decedent. The ones from the codefendant's gun were identified as the fatal shots. Another bullet taken from the decedent was deformed, probably from a ricochet, and could not be identified other than to say that it came from a .380 caliber or larger weapon. Under the circumstances, it is clear that petitioner has not sustained the burden of proving his innocence. 7 See PCRA Proceedings, September 1, 2000, p. 45. Federal drug trafficking charges had been filed against two of the original codefendants. 8 At the hearing petitioner also expressed doubt as to whether he hit the surviving victim, Mr. Anderson. However, this issue has not been raised on appeal. In any event, it is irrelevant to the attempted murder charge since he concedes that he attempted to shoot Mr. Anderson. 9 Some of the preliminary statements taken by the police showed that the numerous witnesses were confused as to how many shooters there might have been. This is not surprising given the excitement surrounding a gun fight in a crowded park on a holiday afternoon. In the final analysis, however, the police determined that there were only two shooters and petitioner has not presented any credible evidence to the contrary. NO. 98-2015 CRIMINAL Petitioner was faced with a number of very serious charges arising from the confrontation which was instigated by him and his codefendant,l° He entered these pleas to avoid the death penalty or a mandatory life prison sentence. Weare not quite certain that he really wants to withdraw his plea and face all of the original charges.TM We are certain that he has some questions in his own mind as to whether any bullets from his gun struck Mr. Banks. However, the purpose of a PCRA proceeding is not to set the petitioner's mind at ease, it is to correct a miscarriage of justice or a violation of his constitutional rights. We are satisfied that no such miscarriage or violation occurred in the case at bar. For the reasons set forth above, we denied petitioner's request to withdraw his guilty plea under the Post Conviction Relief Act. 15 ,2ooo Edward E. Guido, J. Jaime Keating, Esquire For the Commonwealth Darrell Dethlefs, Esquire For the Defendant :sld l0 The charges included First Degree Murder (as a principal and' ~Ccomplice), conSph-acy to First Degree Murder, conspiracy to Aggravated Assault, Aggravated Assault (i~ntentionally or kn6wing causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4)), Recklessly Endangering, Possessing a Firearm as a Convict (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105) and Possessing a Firearm ~o~t.la,,o, ~.:~ c.~ gCeffse~._, (lg [P~S.A. § 6106) as well as the charges to which he pled guilty. ~ See PCRA Proceedings, September 1, 2000, at p. 32.