Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-3696 Civil ROBERT C. BOYCE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : vs. : CIVIL ACTION – LAW : NO. 04-3696 CIVIL EARL M. BARNHART, D.D.S., : Defendant : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 The following are the facts of this case in a light favorable to the verdict winner. For more than twenty years, Plaintiff has owned a farm in Cumberland County, located about five miles from Defendant’s residence. Defendant had been Plaintiff’s dentist and friend for more than fifteen years prior to the lawsuit. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 32-34, November 6, 2006.) Defendant has been in the horseracing business as a breeder and owner for more than forty years. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 164, November 6, 2006.) Prior to the year 2000, Defendant’s racing operations were primarily based in Maryland. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 51, 57, November 6, 2006.) Under the registration requirements of the Pennsylvania Horse Breeders Association (PHBA), either the mother of a thoroughbred horse, or the foal itself, must be kept in Pennsylvania for at least ninety days in the foal’s year of birth in order to qualify the foal for registration with the PHBA as a Pennsylvania bred foal. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 9, November 6, 2006.) The PHBA is a nonprofit organization responsible for managing the Pennsylvania Breeding Fund Program. The Pennsylvania Breeding Fund Program promotes the thoroughbred horse racing industry in Pennsylvania by paying bonus money, over and above the purse money, to breeders of horses that finish first, second, or third in Pennsylvania races if the horses have the required Pennsylvania connections and are registered with the PHBA. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 7-8, November 6, 2006.) Breeder awards are paid to the breeders of the horses, even if the breeders are not the NO. 04-3696 CIVIL owners of the horses. If a horse that is eligible for Pennsylvania breeder awards is raced outside Pennsylvania, the breeder does not receive a breeder award, regardless of what place the horse finishes. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 17, November 6, 2006.) On January 2, 2001, Plaintiff and Defendant met for lunch at Boiling Springs Tavern to discuss an arrangement whereby Defendant would deliver a pregnant brood mare to Plaintiff’s farm. Plaintiff would maintain the mare for the eleven months until the foal would be born. Plaintiff would then raise the foal until it would be taken from his farm to be trained for racing at approximately eighteen months of age. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 43-44, November 6, 2006.) Plaintiff would pay all of the expenses for the mare and the foal while they were at his farm. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 57-58, 127-28, November 6, 2006.) Plaintiff would be responsible for registering the foal. Defendant would pay the stud fee and all of the training and other expenses for the mare and foal when they were not Plaintiff’s farm. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 59, 128, November 6, 2006.) When the foal was born it would be registered jointly and equally with the Jockey Club and the PHBA. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 59, November 6, 2006.) When the foal would race as an adult, Defendant would be entitled to all of the purse money. Plaintiff and Defendant would equally divide any breeder awards that the horse would earn during its racing life. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 59-60, November 6, 2006.) The breeder awards were the only way that Plaintiff was going to be compensated for his care of the mare and foal. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 60, November 6, 2006.) After the meeting at Boiling Springs Tavern, Defendant delivered a pregnant mare to Plaintiff’s farm. Its foal, named Significant One, was born on June 9, 2001. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 62, November 6, 2006.) Defendant had five more foals born on Plaintiff’s farm between March of 2003 and April of 2004. Significant One ran his first race on December 29, 2003, earning a 2 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL breeder award in the amount of $1,310.40. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 63-65, November 6, 2006.) Defendant accepted his one-half of the award, and Plaintiff retained his one-half share. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 65, 98, November 6, 2006.) Significant One raced again and won on February 26, 2004, and again the parties split the breeder award of $1,388.40. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 65-66, 99, November 6, 2006.) Defendant raced Significant One in Charleston, West Virginia, in violation of the agreement to race the horses in Pennsylvania. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 68, November 6, 2006.) Defendant registered Love is Kind, the third foal born on Plaintiff’s farm in Defendant’s name alone, in violation of the agreement. Finally, Defendant did not have the last three foals born on Plaintiff’s farm trained for racing, in violation of the agreement. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 107, November 6, 2006.) In essence, the Plaintiff performed his part of the bargain by caring for the pregnant mares and their foals. The Defendant, however, did not follow through on his promise to train and race the horses. After trial, the jury awarded the Plaintiff some $74,000.00, no doubt as reimbursement to the Plaintiff for expenses he incurred in following through with his part of the agreement. The Defendant filed post-trial motions seeking judgment in his favor, the verdict not withstanding. His motions were denied and this appeal followed. The Defendant raised several issues post-trial. We deal with them seriatim. Where appropriate, we will discuss the case law cited by the parties in their briefs filed in connection with the Defendant’s post-trial motion. A court’s grant or denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict will be reversed only when there is found to be an abuse of discretion or error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc., 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa.Super. 2006). A judgment N.O.V. 3 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL is appropriate where: “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;” and/or “the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant.” Id. When reviewing the decision to deny a judgment N.O.V., evidence will be reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner; that party will get the benefit of every reasonable inference, while all unfavorable testimony and inferences are rejected. Carozza v. Greenbaum, 866 A.2d 369, 379 (Pa.Super. 2004). Courts look to determine whether there is “sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict.” Id. Even where there is a question as to the weight of the evidence, where evidence conflicts in such a way that the jury could have decided in favor of either party, the verdict will not be disturbed. See Lanning v. West, 803 A.2d 753, 766 (Pa.Super. 2002). The Defendant first contends that there was insufficient evidence in the case to warrant a finding that a contract had been formed between the parties. A contract is formed “when the parties to it (1) reach a mutual understanding, (2) exchange consideration, and (3) delineate the terms of their bargain with sufficient clarity.” Weavertown Transport Leasing, Inc. v. Moran, 834 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa.Super. 2003). Consideration must be bargained for as the exchange for the promise. Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. American Ash Recycling Corp. of Pennsylvania, 895 A.2d 595, 600 (Pa Super. 2006). An agreement is “sufficiently definite if the parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis upon which the court can provide an appropriate remedy.” Regscan, Inc. v. Con-Way Transp. Services, 875 A.2d 332, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2005). A brief review of Plaintiff’s testimony reveals that all three elements are present within the agreement. Under the agreement, Defendant would deliver a pregnant mare to the Plaintiff’s farm. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 43-46, 57-60, November 6, 2006). Plaintiff would care for the mare for 4 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL eleven months until the foal was born. After the birth of the foal, Plaintiff would then raise the foal until Defendant could take it to be trained for racing at approximately eighteen months of age. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 43-46, 57-60, November 6, 2006). Plaintiff would pay all expenses for both the mare and foal while they were at Plaintiff’s farm. Defendant would pay the stud fee and all training and other expenses for both the foal and mare when they were not at Plaintiff’s farm. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 43-46, 57-60, November 6, 2006). In exchange for boarding and caring for the mare and foal, Plaintiff would receive one-half of any breeder awards the horse would earn during its racing life. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 57-60, November 6, 2006). In preparation of fulfilling the agreement, Plaintiff refurbished a stall and constructed two additional horse shelters. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 43-46, November 6, 2006). As there could only be breeder awards if the horses were raced in Pennsylvania, Defendant agreed the horses would be raced in Pennsylvania. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 58, November 6, 2006). Though Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to prove the elements “necessary to the formation of a legally viable oral contract,” (Def.’s Br. in Sup. of Mot. for Post-Tr. Rel. 13), he neglects to identify, specifically, the elements that Plaintiff failed to prove. It is apparent that there was a mutual understanding between the parties, that the obligations of the parties were clear and that there was consideration. After Plaintiff’s meeting with Defendant, whereupon they agreed upon the contractual terms, Defendant delivered a pregnant mare to Plaintiff’s farm. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 62, November 6, 2006). Plaintiff proceeded to care for and raise the foal; as a result of his success, Defendant arranged to have five more foals born on Plaintiff’s farm. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 63, November 6, 2006). Defendant raced the first foal in Pennsylvania, and the breeder awards were equally split when the horse won. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, November 6, 2006). 5 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL For one who asserts that there was no meeting of the minds, Defendant did an impressive job of fulfilling his end of the contract during the early stages of the agreement. Defendant claims that Plaintiff presented no evidence concerning the length of the contract, nor that the terms of the agreement encompassed the delivery or care of other foals. (Def.’s Br. in Sup. of Mot. for Post-Tr. Rel. 11). However, “because courts wish to effectuate the parties’ intentions, they may enforce an indefinite contract if its terms have become definite as the result of partial performance.” Regscan, Inc. v. Con-Way Transp. Services, 875 A.2d 332, 337 (Pa. Super. 2005). Therefore, if a term is omitted from a contract, courts will not seek to invalidate the contract, but will instead include a reasonable term within it. See id. According to Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff’s success in raising and caring for the first foal led Defendant to arrange to birth five more foals on Plaintiff’s farm. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 63, November 6, 2006). Though the original agreement did not explicitly cover future foals, Defendant’s performance, by bringing more pregnant mares to Plaintiff’s farm, combined with Plaintiff’s performance in raising the foals indicated that both parties intended for the agreement to continue to apply to future foals. Finally, Defendant argues there was no evidence offered as to when and where the other foals would be raced. (Def.’s Br. in Sup. of Mot. for Post-Tr. Rel. 14). Again, this is a term that may be inferred by the courts through partial performance. After Plaintiff’s success with the initial foal, Defendant arranged to birth five more foals on Plaintiff’s farm. Breeder awards were the only way that Plaintiff would be reimbursed for the expense of raising the foals. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, November 6, 2006). Defendant’s performance of bringing the foals to Plaintiff’s farm, and Plaintiff’s subsequent birth and care for them, is sufficient for the court to conclude that the 6 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL parties intended for the agreement to continue to include additional foals. The only alternative is a suggestion that the Plaintiff had agreed to birth and raise subsequent foals for free; such a notion is absurd. The Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support an action for a breach of contract. The Plaintiff provided evidence of several instances that, if believed by the jury, would have constituted a breach of the contract. Defendant raced the first foal born, Significant One, in West Virginia, rather than Pennsylvania as pursuant to their agreement. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 68, November 6, 2006.) Defendant never trained, nor raced, the last three foals that were born on the Boyce farm as pursuant to their agreement. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 107, November 6, 2006.) Defendant never taught Plaintiff how to register foals, (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 61, November 6, 2006), nor did Defendant pay the stud fee so that the sixth foal could be registered, as previously agreed (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 93-4, November 6, 2006.) Finally, Defendant registered the third foal, Love Is Kind, in his name alone, and never returned Love Is Kind to Plaintiff’s farm. Both of these actions were also in violation of the contract. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 89-93, November 6, 2006.) Though Defendant obviously disagrees with these contentions, the evidence conflicted in such a way that the matter was properly the province of the jury. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff did not produce evidence that the jury could have used to calculate damages resulting from the breach. (Def.’s Br. in Sup. of Mot. for Post-Tr. Rel. 23-24.) Defendant cites a myriad of cases stating that damages must be calculated “without conjecture,” A.G. Cullen Construction, Inc. v. State System of Higher Education, 898 A.2d 1145, 1161, (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006), that damages “cannot be presumed,” Vrabel v. Commonwealth, 844 A.2d 595, 601 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004), and that courts require “greater certainty in the proof 7 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL of damages for breach of a contract than in the proof of damages for a tort,” Cook v. S. Walter Packaging Corp., 71 Pa. D. & C.4th 383, 393 (2005). Though these citations are accurate, the fact remains that Plaintiff did provide evidence that would allow the jury to properly calculate damages. Where one party to a contract breaches the contract, the other party is entitled to recover the damages he suffered, provided: “(1) they were such as would naturally and ordinarily result from the breach, or (2) they were reasonably foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract, and (3) they can be proved with reasonable certainty.” Logan v. Mirror Printing Co. of Altoona, Pa., 600 A.2d 225, 226 (Pa.Super. 1991). In the instant case, Plaintiff provided evidence of the expenses he assumed in caring for the mares and foals over a period of years. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 109-15, November 6, 2006.) These expenses were clearly foreseeable and were proven with reasonable certainty. Barnhart, in other words, knew that Plaintiff would need to spend a substantial amount of money caring for the horses. He was, in fact, intimately familiar with the cost of boarding horses. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 109-15, November 6, 2006.) Similarly, Defendant knew that the only way Plaintiff would be reimbursed for theses expenses was through his half of the breeder’s awards when the horses would be raced in Pennsylvania. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 57-60.) Such awards were not forthcoming because Defendant took no steps to obtain them. One stated goal of awarding damages in a breach of contract case is to make the plaintiff whole again. See Ferrer vs. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania et al., 825 A.2d 591, 605 (Pa. 2002). Entering into this contract cost Plaintiff money, in constructing fences, shelters at his farm, paying for veterinary fees, farrier fees, and registration fees, as well as general feeding and 8 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL care expenses. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 47-50, 101-04, 107-09, 113-14, November 6, 2006.) Plaintiff would not have had to incur any of these expenses had he not entered into the contract that Defendant later breached. The jury’s damage verdict of $74,000 (while not the entire amount sought by the Plaintiff) was an attempt to put him back into the same position he had been prior to entering the contract. Notwithstanding, the Defendant avers that the jury was confused or elected to ignore the Court’s instructions in regard to its determination of damages. To support this contention, Defendant earlier cited to Lampley v. Webb, a 1996 federal district court case involving a breach of contract arising out of thoroughbred racing. See Lampley v. Webb, No. 94-260, 1996 WL 524330, *1 (E.D. Pa. 1996). In Lampley, the court held that the Plaintiff, a racehorse nutritionist, should not have been allowed to give testimony regarding the value of racehorses that he never owned, as he was not an expert in this regard. See id. at *3. Since he was testifying as to the potential income generated by ownership of racehorses, without this testimony, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to calculate the damages suffered by the Plaintiff. See id. Defendant likens this to the instant case, presumably because Plaintiff’s only evidence as to the extent of the damages he suffered was his own testimony. In Lampley, the verdict was overturned not because the jury relied solely on Plaintiff’s testimony to establish damages, but, because the jury relied solely on testimony which was inadmissible. Here, the Plaintiff’s testimony concerning damages was clearly not inadmissible. The Plaintiff simply testified as to expenses he incurred. Finally, Defendant complained, post-trial, that we erred in admitting Plaintiff’s Exhibits 8 and 9 and allowing Exhibit 8 to go out to the jury. Exhibits 8 and 9 were written summaries of 9 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL breeder awards which Dr. Barnhart had earned. Exhibit 8, specifically, corroborated the Plaintiff’s testimony with respect to representations made by Dr. Barnhart at their meeting at the Boiling Springs Tavern in January of 2001. “The exclusion or admission of evidence at trial is within the discretion of the trial court and a new trial should be granted only when there is a clear abuse of discretion by the judge.” DeVita v. Durst, 647 A.2d 636, 640 (Pa.Commw. 1994). Admissibility of evidence is generally determined by whether the evidence is competent and relevant. Peled v. Meridian Bank, 710 A.2d 620, 625 (Pa. Super. 1998). Evidence is considered relevant if it is likely to make a fact at issue either more or less probable. Id. Defendant argues that Exhibits 8 and 9 were irrelevant to damages, and therefore should have been excluded. However, the exhibits were not introduced in connection with damages but rather to corroborate the nature and extent of the representations made to the Plaintiff to induce him to enter into the contract. Defendant goes on to argue that even if the evidence is relevant, its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or of confusing the jury. Defendant contends that “in an action where damages are sought, any statement to the jury by counsel that calls the juror’s attention to claims or amounts not supported by the evidence is in error.” Wilson v. Nelson, 258 A.2d 657, 659 (Pa. 1969). As previously noted, the evidence was introduced in the instant case in order to show inducement used by Defendant to convince Plaintiff to enter into a contract. The evidence in the instant case was not presented to the jury for use in the calculation of damages. Thus, there was no prejudice in the matter of damages. 10 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL Citing Kearns v. Clark, 493 A.2d 1358, 1362 (Pa.Super. 1985), Defendant argues that “where a written exhibit may be subject to misinterpretation, in the absence of explanation, a trial court properly refuses to allow it to accompany the jury during its deliberations.” (Def.’s Br. in Sup. of Mot. for Post-Tr. Rel. 38.) Defendant wholly misconstrues Kearns v. Clark. Kearns concerned a trial judge’s refusal to allow the curriculum vitae of two defense experts, an expert witness report, and patient records of the Plaintiff to be taken into the deliberation room See Kearns, 493 A.2d at 1362 (Pa.Super. 1985). The Superior Court found that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the jurors to take out with them these exhibits, as it was “within the trial judge’s discretion to curtail the jury’s unfettered examination of complete [medical] records.” Id. That “a trial court properly refuses” to allow evidence into the jury room, does not necessarily imply that it would be improper had the judge allowed it. Kearns summarizes the rule in clear terms: “exhibits properly admitted into evidence, with the exception of depositions and transcripts of testimony, may, within the discretion of the trial court, be sent out with the jury.” Id. Conversely, exhibits properly admitted into evidence, may, within the discretion of the trial court, be prevented from being sent out with the jury. Either way, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine what goes out to the jury. See DeVita v. Durst, 647 A.2d 636, 640 (Pa.Commw. 1994). August 6, 2007 ___________________________ Kevin A. Hess, J. 11 NO. 04-3696 CIVIL Wayne Shade, Esquire For the Plaintiff Brigid Alford, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm 12