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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-3291-2006 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : vs. : CP-21-CR-3291-2006 : DWAYNE J. CRUM : AFFIANT: CPL. WILLIAM PALMERO OTN: K018151-0 : PA. STATE POLICE IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION TO SUPPRESS BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER The instant petition seeks suppression of evidence as a result of an alleged unlawful traffic stop. On October 31, 2006, Cpl. Palmero, of the Pennsylvania State Police, was operating an unmarked patrol vehicle traveling south on Route 465, west of Carlisle, Cumberland County. The Corporal noticed a vehicle make a right turn, accelerate onto the ramp for Interstate 81 and merge onto the Interstate. In the process of merging, the vehicle forced a southbound vehicle to brake and swerve to its left to avoid being struck. Thereafter, Cpl. Palmero initiated a traffic stop of the defendant, Dwayne Crum. After further investigation, Cpl. Palmero subsequently charged Crum as a Habitual Offender, Driving under Suspension (DUI-related), and Turning Movements and Required Signals. When considering whether evidence obtained in a traffic stop should be suppressed, the crucial question is “whether the stop or seizure of the vehicle here was unreasonable and, therefore, constitutionally impermissible.” Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 111, 307 A.2d 875, 876 (1973). In Swanger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “before a police officer may stop a single vehicle to determine CP-21-CR-3291-2006 whether or not the vehicle is being operated in compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code, he must have probable cause based on specific facts which indicate to him either the vehicle or the driver are in violation of the code.” Id. at 115, 307 A.2d 879. The basis for justifying a traffic stop was later refined by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550, 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995). In Whitmyer, the Supreme Court determined that a traffic stop is justified when “the alleged basis of a vehicle stop is to permit a determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of this Commonwealth, it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.” Id. In Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. 2005), the Superior Court pointed out a further change in the basis upon which a police officer may stop a vehicle. An amendment to Pennsylvania statutory law states that whenever a police officer has a reasonable suspicion [emphasis added] that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code has occurred, he may stop the vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). Thus, the threshold for initiating a traffic stop has been reduced from a probable cause requirement to a less 1 stringent reasonable suspicion standard. In the case at issue, Palmero possessed not only reasonable suspicion but probable cause to believe that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code occurred. Crum merged into the lane of traffic without adequately yielding to the vehicle in the primary lane of travel. His actions forced the other driver to brake and swerve in a defensive manner to avoid a 1 The court, however, limited its holding to the constitutionality of the statute as applied in driving under the influence cases. See Sands, at 270. 22 CP-21-CR-3291-2006 collision with Crum’s vehicle. This is arguably a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3309 which prohibits one from changing lanes of travel if the change cannot be made in safety and/or 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3323 which sets forth the duties to yield. In addition, careless driving is defined as “[a]ny person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless driving, a summary offense.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714(a). Palmero had a reasonable suspicion to believe that Crum violated § 3714(a) when he swerved into the lane of traffic forcing another vehicle to swerve and brake to avoid a collision. The failure to determine that the other lane was free and clear of other vehicles before merging could be considered a careless disregard for the safety of person or property. ORDER AND NOW, this 12th day of July, 2007, the omnibus pretrial motion of the defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. BY THE COURT, ____________________________ Kevin A. Hess, J. Michelle Sibert, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney H. Anthony Adams, Esquire Assistant Public Defender :rlm 33 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : vs. : CP-21-CR-3291-2006 : DWAYNE J. CRUM : AFFIANT: CPL. WILLIAM PALMERO OTN: K018151-0 : PA. STATE POLICE IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION TO SUPPRESS BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER AND NOW, this 12th day of July, 2007, the omnibus pretrial motion of the defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. BY THE COURT, ____________________________ Kevin A. Hess, J. Michelle Sibert, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney H. Anthony Adams, Esquire Assistant Public Defender :rlm