HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0641-2006
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
vs. : CP-21-CR-0641-2006
:
:
SHAWN MICHAEL WALKER :
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925
In this case, the defendant, Shawn Michael Walker, was found guilty of driving under the
influence – high rate of alcohol. On January 23, 2007, we imposed a sentence of thirty days to
six months in the Cumberland County Prison but permitted the defendant to remain at liberty
pending the filing of post-trial motions. Post-trial motions were, in fact, filed. The defendant’s
post-trial motions were denied and this appeal followed. In his statement of matters complained
of on appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish a conviction for
the offense charged, a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3802(b). Specifically, the defendant contends
that the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence as to the time of the accident and failed to
produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood
alcohol was between .10 and .16 within two hours of driving. Taken in a light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, the facts are as follows.
Early in the morning on December 4, 2005, Mr. Walker, while on the way to pick up his
girlfriend, Kayla Joseph, had an accident involving a utility pole. N.T. at 4. Road conditions
were bad and the streets were covered with snow; numerous vehicle accidents had been reported
in Hampden Township that evening. N.T. at 7. Mr. Walker telephoned in his own accident. The
police officer, Patrolman Shawn Fullerton, received the dispatch call for this particular accident
sometime after 2:00 a.m. but before 2:30 a.m. N.T. at 5. This accident was third on Officer
CP-21-CR-0641-2006
Fullerton’s list of dispatch calls that morning. N.T. at 11. The Commonwealth offered no
testimony as to the time at which the dispatch center received a report of the accidents. Officer
Fullerton arrived at the accident scene around 2:30 a.m. N.T. at 5. He testified that the
defendant’s van was completely disabled because the front end was “folded around the utility
pole.” N.T. at 5. Noticing various indicia of intoxication, Officer Fullerton asked Mr. Walker to
submit to a preliminary breath test. He consented and, based on the indicia of intoxication and
the preliminary breath test, Officer Fullerton formed the opinion that Mr. Walker was not
capable of safe driving. N.T. at 6-7. The defendant was placed under arrest at 2:45 a.m. N.T. at
8. On arriving at the booking center, the booking agent began Mr. Walker’s twenty-minute
observation period at 3:23 a.m. N.T. at 13. During that time, Mr. Walker indicated that he had
not imbibed alcohol anytime after the accident. N.T. at 14, 17. Breath tests were conducted
commencing at 3:50 a.m. The breath test revealed a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .112. N.T.
at 16. Mr. Walker was released to Ms. Joseph sometime after 4:00 a.m.
The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in
control of a moving vehicle after imbibing enough alcohol to attain a BAC between .10% and
.16% “within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical
control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Commonwealth may use circumstantial evidence to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Com. v. Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256, 1257 (Pa.Super. 1986). In support of the defendant’s
contention that his conviction ought to be set aside, the defendant cites the case of Com. v.
Segida, 912 A.2d 841 (Pa.Super. 2006).
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In Segida, the police received a 12:20 a.m. dispatch to investigate a one-vehicle accident.
After questioning the defendant at the scene, he was taken into custody. A blood sample was
eventually taken and subsequent testing revealed a BAC of .36%. There was no testimony in the
Segida case concerning the time at which the defendant’s blood was drawn. The Superior Court
indicated that the failure to establish the time that the blood was drawn was “but one part of the
equation.” The court went on to observe:
The state offered absolutely no evidence as to
when Appellant drank alcohol, including whether
he drank after the accident in question.
Additionally, the Commonwealth presented no
evidence from which it could be inferred what time
the accident occurred. There were no witnesses to
the accident or to the manner in which the car was
operated. Rather, here, the state offered only (a)
the time the officer received the call from dispatch
about the accident and (b) the time that the officer
arrived on the scene. It did not indicate when
dispatch received the call about the accident, the
name of the person who called dispatch, whether
the person who called dispatch actually saw the
accident or only came upon it some time later, or
what time the caller first saw the accident. The
officer testified that he did not know, when he
arrived at the scene, how long Appellant’s car had
actually been located at the scene of the accident.
And he acknowledged that he never asked
Appellant if he had been at the scene the entire
time since the accident occurred.
Id. at 846.
In this case, we overruled the defendant’s post-trial motion because we found noteworthy
factual differences between this case and Segida. Importantly, in this case, the Commonwealth
offered testimony concerning the time at which the breath test had been taken. There was also
testimony that the defendant did not drink after the accident. In addition, the defendant, in this
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case, called in his own accident. Admittedly, our verdict in this case rested on the assumptions
that the defendant would have called in the accident within minutes of its having occurred and
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that a dispatch would have followed immediately after his call.
August 7, 2007 ____________________________
Kevin A. Hess, J.
Jaime Keating, Esquire
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Linda Hollinger, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender
:rlm
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If those assumptions were improper, then the verdict, we agree, cannot stand.
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